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Forestry

Post-fire Management and Public Lands Conflict: The Bitterroot National Forest and
Beyond
Chair: Dr. Jack Ward Thomas
Montana’s Bitterroot Valley is rich in nature, history, complexity, and cultural
diversity. The wildfires of 2000 burned significant portions of public forest land in
the Bitterroot Valley and in the Northern Rockies. These fires comprised
disturbances to both forest ecosystems and human communities. Different
stakeholders, entities, and agencies viewed the burned landscapes through different
lenses. Some saw “catastrophe,” others saw natural processes, others saw threats to
personal property, others saw ecological processes in action, others saw an
opportunity to extract a vast volume of burned timber for commercial purposes, and
others believed active salvage and mitigation efforts at large spatial scales would
generate unnecessary ecological harm. The Bitterroot National Forest (BNF)
proposed post-fire management on a significant scale, promulgating what the BNF
believed to be a balanced plan addressing both commodity-related and ecological
values. The BNF’s plan met both support and opposition, but ultimately resulted in
stalemate. The conflict resulted in a court-mandated settlement—which all involved
stakeholders and managers deemed unsuccessful. Tensions spilled over into
subsequent management actions, including 2005’s Middle East Fork sale. The story
of the aftermath of 2000’s wildfires includes powerful political figures, broken
promises, diverted restoration funds, and appearances of impropriety. Politicians
belittled the BNF, citing the Montana Department of Natural Resources (DNRC)’s
speedy and voluminous salvage as a success. If the criteria of timber volume
extracted and that of successful interactions with stakeholder groups are those used to
define “success,” then the DNRC was, in fact, successful. While the contrast in
outcomes between the two agencies relates in part to the clarity o f the DNRC’s trust
mandate/agency mission, it also relates to the attitudes and management culture
manifest in the DNRC’s leadership. Further, BNF/USFS managers were hindered by
complex barriers to efficiency and propensities for conflict relating to Congress and
USFS central office-influenced budgets, bureaucratic inertia, and the traditional
culture of public lands “forestry”—which resists sharing management discretion with
non-agency citizens. The dialogue over national forest management following 2000’s
wildfires was (and largely remains) ambiguous, confusing, and replete with undefined
terms and imprecise, polarizing use of natural resource-related rhetoric.
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Chapter 1
Introduction & Purpose of Study
This is an interdisciplinary case study addressing natural and human resources
relating to public forest lands in Western Montana and elsewhere. This study is
meant to be more practical than theoretical. The author’s intent is to document and
explore a complex case of natural resource conflict. While some theoretical
frameworks for public participation and governance are presented, this study is
policy-focused in the lessons it discusses and does not present in-depth focus on any
single related genre. Rather, this study’s goal is to cover a range of issues-relating to
aftermath of the wildfires of 2000 in Western Montana.
Following the wildfire season of the year 2000, contending stakeholders in public
land management looked upon the burned landscapes of the Bitterroot National
Forest (BNF), the Sula State Forest (SSF) and the Northern Rocky Mountains through
various lenses: those of ecological integrity, those of commodity extraction and
revenue generation, those of political expediency, those of fiduciary obligation, those
of multiple uses, and those of citizens who didn’t know much about—or didn’t care to
know much about—America’s public lands (Interviews 1-37). While various parties
made efforts to communicate and come together in mutual understanding, in the end,
tension and conflict reigned. Five years after the fires, fighting over management of
the Bitterroot Valley’s federal lands has not ceased, though the Bitterroot’s state
lands, managed by the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
(DNRC), are another story.
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The wildfires of 2000 and their aftermath suggest that the landscape on which
humans live and its resources and ineffable ecological and socio-political processes
can, at any moment, actuate conflict, crisis, and diversion of scarce public resources.
Federal Judge Michael Hogan, who guided the post-fire conflict’s court-mandated
settlement, noted: “The Bitterroot Valley is a fairly concentrated area and there was
the real possibility of... physical confrontation between people who had... opposing
ideas in the valley” (Interview 13:4). BNF Supervisor Dave Bull noted, after
criticism o f his use of law enforcement officers to control attendance at a 2005 press
release, “It’s the Bitterroot. You never know what’s going to happen” (Interview
36:1).
The conflict surrounding the aftermath of the Bitterroot fires of 2000 provides not
only an interesting story and legal fact pattern, but also a lens through which to
analyze public lands conflict, post-fire management, and the efficacy and legitimacy
(from various criteria) of our public land management agencies. The Bitterroot fires
of 2000 beg important questions. Who controls public lands? How democratic is
national forest management? How democratic should it be? Does the management
of state trust land offer lessons for our federally managed lands? Can polities balance
commodity extraction with ecological integrity, efforts to sustain a clean and healthy
environment, and multiple use?
The answers to these questions are manifold and vary greatly depending upon
who provides the answer. Because the mission the national forests is often perceived
as unclear (Interviews 9, 27, Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005), it follows that many of
these questions do not and will not have clear answers. Public land law scholars

2
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George Cameron Coggins and Robert Glicksman (2001:191) note of the concept of
multiple use that guides national forest management, “[it] is so abstract that its
usefulness as a constraint on agency management is questionable.”
Nonetheless, the common law, which is constantly and rapidly evolving
from lawsuits, can provide some measure of clarity if managers and congressional
and central office budget makers recognize and learn the holdings’ significance. For
instance, Wilderness Society v. Rey (180 F.Supp.2d 1141(2002))—the case in which
the BNF found itself following the wildfires of 2000—has already served as
precedent upon which subsequent public lands cases, including 2005’s Earth Island v.
Pengilly (376 F.Supp.2d 994 (2005)) rely. Flad involved agency officials, attorneys,
and supervising political appointees read, understood, and appropriately considered
Wilderness Society v. Rey and its rules regarding the right to appeal USFS agency
decisions; the holding in Earth Island v. Pengilly (and its direct and opportunity costs
to the USFS and to American citizens) might have been obviated.
With focused examination and thought, those involved can leam from every
experience wherein conflict envelops public lands, the degree to which the land and
its various resources, systems, and biota are visceral and vital components of human
communities. Natural disturbances of varying intensities and scales indicate that
human-land relationships should be (and increasingly are) both the subject and object
of ongoing thought, discourse, dialogue, application, and adjustment. As stories such
as those emerging from the 2000 wildfires and 2005’s Hurricane Katrina indicate;
humanity will be taught over and again that humility and heed will improve human
relationships with the land, and moreover, with one another.

3
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The unique status and existence of the public lands are among the lasting
accomplishments of American democracy (Runte 1991). The ongoing social
experiment that is the public estate should be scientific in nature: asking, testing, and
objectively communicating and applying resulting knowledge with intellectual and
ecological humility. That is to say, society should seek to manage public lands not
merely under vague notions of the greatest good fo r the greatest number in the long
run (Pinchot 1947, Hirt 1994), but to define such credos and continually refine those
definitions so that human and ecological communities may likewise prosper. As
Forest Service Chief Dale Bosworth notes, “The devil is in the details” (Miller
2004:vii).
Purpose of Study & Central Research Question
The interdisciplinary examination that follows will not reconcile the many public
lands complexities and paradoxes, but it does relate a complicated public lands
dispute within the context of an evolving human community struggling to make sense
of its relationship to surrounding public lands and resources. Beyond relating the fact
pattern and evolving story, this study’s primary research explored the notion that the
DNRC successfully avoided public conflict and legal disputes, while the BNF became
embroiled in public conflict and legal battles. Why the differing outcomes as between
the DNRC and the BNF? What did the DNRC do to fend o ff conflict? What might the
BNF have done differently to mitigate the protracted conflict? What factors
contributed to the fa ct pattern that played out? Conclusions drawn and associated
analyses comprise responses to problems and contributing variables highlighted
through research.

4
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Chapter 2
Design
This case study seeks primarily to describe, explore, and explain (Yin 1994)
important aspects of the aftermath of the Bitterroot Valley wildfires of 2000 in the
interdisciplinary context of public land management. It utilizes embedded units of
analysis (Yin 1994) in the form of respondent interviews, legal documents, archival
records, scholarly articles, and news articles. It also examines a time series of events
in the form of a chronology (Yin 1994). The study employs pattern matching (Yin
1994) techniques by virtue of its comparisons between land management agencies
and to a lesser degree, by comparing temporally distinct management conflicts.
Methodology
This case study inquires as to what factors contributed to disparate outcomes and
public perceptions as between DNRC and USFS post-fire management on burned
areas in the Bitterroot Valley following the wildfires of 2000. Primary sources
include more than three dozen data sets derived from personal interviews, seminarstyle discussions, focus groups, and observed panel discussions. Respondents
included state and federal public land managers, a federal judge, lobbyists, foresters,
non-government organization (NGO) representatives, policy analysts, and academics.
Sample
Respondents were chosen on the basis of direct knowledge of and participation in
the events and associated conflicts that followed the wildfires of 2000. First,
researchers developed an extensive list of stakeholders and involved parties through
examination o f legal records, archival data, news articles, and preliminary telephone

5

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

interviews. Researchers next sent letters introducing the study to more than 100
potential respondents. These letters were sent during the spring and summer of 2004.
To the extent certain stakeholders were unable to participate in this study, other
stakeholders and interested parties were included in the sample. Interviews were
completed by fall 2005.
The sample broke down as follows:
Academic Observers

5

DNRC Employees/Managers

5

Environmental/
Conservation NGO Employees

6

Federal Judges

1

Timber Industry or Lobbyists

5

USFS Employees

15

Of the 15 USFS-related respondents, 5 were non-local, non-participants in the
events that occurred in the Bitterroot Valley, but may have experienced episodes
similar to events discussed in this study. These non-local respondents were chosen in
order to provide comparative units of analysis relative to involved-USFS managers.
Beyond primary research, this study draws upon legal records, public meetings,
panel discussions, and other observations. Interviews were semi-structured, and
sought to illuminate differing experiences, perspectives, and values as pertained to the
central research question in the context of conflicts that followed the Bitterroot fires
of 2000. Interviews were conducted and transcribed during 2004 and 2005.
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The Interview Process
Interviews generally entailed a process whereby a series of broad, thematic, openended questions gradually narrowed in scope, eventually focusing on the central
research question relating to disparate outcomes in post-wildfire management as
between the BNF and the DNRC.
Anonymity
Researchers offered anonymity (as pertained to the final report) to all respondents.
Some respondents preferred to remain anonymous, while others did not. One DNRC
employee and five USFS employees requested anonymity.
Interview Analysis
Qualitative Interview analysis entailed integrated use of techniques including:
theme identification (Ryan and Bernard 2005), key-words-in-context (KWIC) (Ryan
and Bernard 2005), constant comparison (Glazer and Strauss 1967), evidence of
social conflict (Spradley 1972), and the single case study and critical case study
methods (Yin 1994). Data selection within each data set was based on the degree to
which it related back to the central research question. Interview transcripts were
analyzed by virtue of ideas expressed, the patterns or umbrella themes under which
ideas were expressed, the frequency with which such ideas were expressed, the
overall context in which such ideas were expressed, and the relevance of ideas to the
central research question. Ideas were subsequently grouped into higher-order
categories in order to establish overarching themes (Ryan and Bernard 2005) that are
presented in this report.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical and Legal Frameworks
In analyzing events such as those upon which this study focuses, it is useful to be
able to draw upon a theoretical context or framework. This allows for the comparison
of variables, a richer analysis, and more clarity. Application of related theory allows
the researcher to stand upon the foundational work of previous researchers. While
providing context, application of extant theory can allow for the expansion,
elucidation, and or revision of previous research through application to contemporary
circumstances. This, in turn, may increase the likelihood that current policy makers,
policy executors, and interested citizens will make use of research as it pertains to
existing, real-world conditions.
Agency Decision Making in Public Lands Planning and Management:
Expertocracies and Technocracies
The notion of injecting a higher degree of democratic involvement into USFS
management runs counter to the dominant technocratic paradigm of the Progressive
Era, wherein Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot preached long-term public
values, but held that the minutiae of forest planning and management should be
largely left to the trained professionals (Hirt 1994, Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005).
These Progressive Era agency experts comport with the “expertocratic” paradigm
described by Rossi (1997), wherein policy makers and decision makers possess
specialized, technical training and education that facilitates an understanding of
arcane issues. Under the expertocratic paradigm, an exclusive right to make
management decisions attaches to the expert skill set (Rossi 1997, Dunn 2004). Early

9
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models along the lines of technocracy or expertocracy assumed that skill and
expertise alone justified a “bureaucracy’s claim to power” (Rossi 1997:197).
The Synoptic Paradigm
Rossi (1997) argues that the “synoptic” or “comprehensive” paradigm is the
modem incarnation of expertocracy. Synoptic models are labeled as such because of
the high degree o f synthesis required of modern decision makers (Rossi 1997).
Within such models, agency decision makers (theoretically) make rational decisions
by: 1) defining a policy problem, 2) clarifying and prioritizing goals, values, and
objectives (ends), 3) devising practical policies for achieving desired ends, 4)
investigating possible consequences or outcomes as pertains to different policy
options, 5) comparing alternatives, and 6) choosing policy alternatives deemed most
likely to achieve desired ends (Rossi 1997). Thus, the synoptic model and other
modern versions of technocratic/expertocratic decision making seem to have retained
the notion of specialized training and expertise, but also add an aspect of synthesis
with regard to multiple categories of specialized knowledge. Such models
acknowledge the complexity of natural resource and public land management, and
public administration generally, while also retaining more unilateral traits of the
expertocratic models.
Gmmbine (1992) argues that such technology or expert-dominated models do not
readily accept citizen participation beyond that provided by traditional administrative
processes (Dunn 2004). Grumbine notes, “Technocracies of professional experts do
not mix well with participatory citizen movements” (1992:168). Attached to
“technocratic,” “agency professional,” and/or “agency expertise”-related models is an

10
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implicit assumption relating to the notion that a significant degree of ignorance about
environmental and natural resource issues dominates the interested public.
Deliberative Democracy
A more democratic paradigm is that presented by Dryzek (2000). Dryzek’s
deliberative democratic model promotes public discourse and accommodates
opportunities for reflection and flexibility. Dryzek and List (2003:1) note,
For deliberative democrats, the essence of democratic legitimacy is the
capacity of those affected by a collective decision to deliberate in the
production of that decision. Deliberation involves discussion in which
individuals are amenable to scrutinizing and challenging their preferences in
light of persuasion (but not manipulation, deception or coercion) from other
participants. Claims for and against courses of action must be justified to
others in terms they can accept. Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls,
respectively the most influential continental and Anglo-American political
philosophers of the late twentieth century, have both identified themselves as
deliberative democrats. Deliberative democrats are uniformly optimistic that
deliberation yields rational collective outcomes.
During deliberation, citizens (as a group) exchange ideas about courses of action most
beneficial to the common good (Poisner 1996). The common good is found through
dialogue, not pre-existing consensus (Poisner 1996). As evidenced by its processorientation, the deliberative paradigm calls upon teleology and its philosophical
contributors such as Kant, Locke, and Rawls (Bak and Urven 2005).
Poisner (1996:94) propounds a deliberative model wherein tools for citizen
participation, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 4321-61), should focus on the concept of citizenship and create structures that
remove citizen roles such as “advocate” and “bystander,” replacing such roles with
the role of “decision maker.” Poisner notes (1996) that,
According to proponents of deliberation, the long-term health of American
democracy depends upon certain forms of discussion... The purposes of

11
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deliberation include the creation and implementation of the common good of
the community and the inculcation of civic virtue in the participants... The
political philosophy o f civic republicanism provides the theoretical
underpinning o f the deliberative ideal.. .Civic republican advocates of
deliberation... do not believe that individual utility, however aggregated, can
entirely capture the range of goals appropriately pursued by a democratic
society. Community, from the civic republican perspective, denotes not just a
collection of individuals, but a set of relationships that can give rise to goals
not capable of being expressed in individual terms. Civic republicans believe
that citizens can work together to “create” a common good for the community.
The deliberative model Poisner describes is distinct from the pluralistic model he
outlines, in which predetermined, as opposed to organic/flexible, management
schemata are addressed through a stakeholder bargaining process (Poisner 1996,
Dunn 2004).
The Pluralistic Model
Under pluralistic models, government decision making processes emulate
economic (free) markets as policy seeks a level playing field from which all parties
may use political pressure, posturing, and strategic bargaining to influence outcomes.
Poisner (1996) suggests that pluralistic models are problematic in that they refer to a
mode of discussion wherein private interests bargain with one another in selfinterested attempts to maximize their own private utility. Poisner notes that pluralist
models evince the core belief that no public good exists, but rather, private interests
collectively provide for an overall social utility (Sunstein 1985, Barber 1994, Poisner
1996). The pluralistic notions of aggregating private interests and deriving a
collective utility therefrom, evoke classical economic theory.
Evident within pluralistic paradigm are some of Adam Smith’s foundational
theories, including his theory of economic welfare and the notion of the invisible
hand whereby the self-interested application of capital to industry by individuals in

12
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society frequently bolsters society’s collective utility (Smith 1937). Pluralistic
models also seem to be utilitarian, by virtue of the underlying assumption that in a
competitive, capitalist culture most individual economic behavior is self-interested
(Hunt 2002).
Application o f such economic-influenced theories to public participation models
pertaining to environmental regulation, natural resource management, or public land
management illuminates a tension between the interest of the individual as loosely
equating to the public interest, and the public interest as something altogether distinct
from individuals pursuing their own self-interested ends. That is to say, some models
assume that the public interest is bom of aggregations of disjoint self-interested
behavior, while others argue the public interest results from a more deliberative,
interactive, non-aggregating process.
Social Choice Theory
Theories of social choice stand in contrast to pluralistic models of governance and
public participation. Social choice theories question the notion of aggregating private
interests. Kenneth Arrow’s seminal work argued that the aggregation of private
interests is “bedeviled by impossibility, instability and arbitrariness” (Dryzek and List
2003). William Riker argued further, that any notion of a popular will independent of
the mechanism used to aggregate preferences was untenable (Riker 1982). Some
social choice theorists thus argue that democratic choices are arbitrary, and
democracy is thus devoid of meaning by virtue of the ineffectiveness of its
aggregative mechanisms (Dryzek and List 2003).

13
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Deliberation and Public Discourse
Deliberative democrats tend to value public discourse. Nonetheless, some would
argue that there is a point of diminishing returns or threshold at which too much
public participation hinders democratic decision making (Rossi 1997). Rossi (1997)
notes,
Mass participation, while in some cases beneficial to agency legitimacy, may
in certain circumstances impair deliberation, which many contemporary
political theorists perceive as an equally important function of administrative
law. A threshold amount of participation is necessary to deliberative
decisions, but at some point participation creates significant institutional costs
for deliberative administrative process. As a result, the ideals of democratic
governance may suffer.
Shepherd and Bowler (1997) present a model wherein managers “all too often”
involve public in management planning because laws such as the NEPA require the
agencies to do so. Shepherd and Bowler outline four major rationales underlying
public participation in agency decision making:
1) Public participation is proper and fair in the context of democratic
government
2) Public participation is an accepted means of ensuring projects meet
citizens’ needs and are suitable to affected publics
3) Public participation creates more legitimacy and less hostility by
virtue of the fact that affected parties can influence the decision
making process
4) Final decisions are better when local values and knowledge are
incorporated and when expert knowledge receives public scrutiny
This model thus distinguishes between meeting minimal legal requirements and
making the participation process meaningful with regard to outcome. Further,
Shepherd and Bowler (1997) correlate perceptions of citizen participatory processes

14
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to fairness, efficacy, success, and legitimacy in instances where citizens feel that
input has been heard and has affected policy outcomes (Dunn 2004).
Critics of public participation in planning processes such as that associated with
the NEPA, note that it is quicker and more cost-efficient to exclude the public from
environmental planning processes (Shepherd and Bowler 1997). Some managers
may regard public participation as unnecessary because citizens lack project-specific
expertise or because managers may not want to educate the public about the merits of
particular projects (Shepherd and Bowler 1997). Nonetheless, Shepherd and
Bowler’s model suggests that the short term costs of implementing public
participation in time and money, beget long term gains in the form of trust and
cooperative attitudes:
To the project proponent, it might seem more prudent to push the project
through quietly rather than run the risk of a public process. However,
excluding the public does not ensure expediency. Alienated citizens become
skeptical citizens and, once citizens begin to lose trust in a project proponent,
it is difficult, if not impossible, for the project proponent to regain citizens’
trust... Distrustful citizens tend to respond with contentious, legalistic actions
which can be time-consuming and expensive for the project proponent...
Therefore, the project proponent needs to consider not only the risks of
including versus avoiding citizen input, but also the potential benefit of
establishing a long term cooperative relationship with the citizens (Shepherd
and Bowler 1997:726).
Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000:62) discuss the concept of agency discretion as it
relates to decision making,
The concept o f agency discretion is here important, as the degree to which
discretionary actions incorporate citizen input largely depends upon individual
agency officials. Importantly, where individuals possess discretion, individual
personality and agency culture become significant variables. USFS District
Ranger, Gordon Weldon, noted of agency culture, bureaucratic discretion, and
obstacles to collaboration: “Turf, ego, the human elements—those are the real
barriers” (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000:62).

15
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The NEPA Process, Agency Action, and Public Participation
The National Environmental Policy Act has been described as “the basic charter
for environmental protection in the United States” (Poisner 1996, Shepherd and
Bowler 1997). In passing the NEPA, Congress intended to “encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the
health and welfare of man” (42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), Poisner 1996).
EIS and Scoping Overview
The NEPA requires all federal agencies to conduct an environmental impact
statement (EIS) for proposed major activities. The NEPA has multiple purposes.
These include 1) improving the quality of decisions; 2) informing the public of the
proposed projects and possible environmental impacts (Shepherd and Bowler 1997);
and 3) incorporating public input into agency decision processes (Kent et al. 2003).
The NEPA includes a process for public participation, which is generally referred to
as scoping. Scoping entails the solicitation of public input through public notice of a
major activity. Public notice often entails announcement in the Federal Register,
newsletters, public meetings, workshops, or other fora (Kent et al. 2003).
The NEPA Framework
The first step an agency takes under the NEPA, is deciding whether to prepare an
EIS. Agencies are required to categorize actions into three groups: 1) actions
normally requiring an EIS; 2) actions normally requiring (the less exhaustive analysis
of) an environmental assessment (EA), but not necessarily requiring an EIS; and 3)
actions that normally require neither an EIS, nor an EA (40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1995),
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Poisner 1996). If an agency determines that the third classification applies, then no
further action is required under the NEPA. If the second classification applies, then
an agency must prepare an EA (40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1995), Posner 1996). An EA is
a public document that outlines baseline information used by an agency to determine
whether an EIS is necessary (,Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985),
Poisner 1996).
Generally, EAs focus on whether a proposed action will have a significant impact
on the human environment. If it is determined that a proposed action will
significantly affect the human environment, then the agency must prepare an EIS. If
the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the human environment, the
agency must prepare a finding of no significant impact (FONSI). Agencies generally
do not consult with the public in writing EAs or FONSIs (40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e),
Poisner 1996). Public participation usually begins during the scoping process,
whereby the agency identifies the range of issues implicated by a project and effects a
project might have (40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e), Poisner 1996).
Scoping requires agencies to seek participation and input of other agencies as well
as citizens and interest groups (40 C.F.R. § 1501.7, Poisner 1996). Both writing and
public meetings are common mechanisms for input under the scoping process
(Poisner 1996). After an agency completes the scoping process, it prepares a draft
EIS (DEIS). Generally, an EIS includes the following information:
1) Project summary stating issues, controversies, and conclusions
2) Statement o f proposed project’s underlying purpose
3) Identification and comparison of alternative courses of action
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4) Description of the affected environment(s)
5) Description of environmental consequences of each alternative (40
C.F.R. § 1502, Poisner 1996)
After considering comments from citizens and other agencies, the agency adjusts
its EIS and produces a final EIS (FEIS), which must respond to “responsible”
opposing viewpoints (Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, INC. v. Seaborg, 463
F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971), Poisner 1996). 30 days after release of the FEIS, an
agency may issue its record of decision (ROD). The ROD specifies a final decision
and should open the agency’s “decision making soul” to public scrutiny (Poisner
1996:74). The ROD must identify the alternatives considered, specify
environmentally preferable alternatives, discuss factors that were balanced in coming
to the final decision, and discuss whether or not all practical means of avoiding or
minimizing environmental harm were incorporated into the decision (Poisner 1996).
Administrative Appeals
Administrative appeals comprise formal mechanisms by which citizens and
entities may challenge an agency’s decision to act, not to act, or to act in a certain
manner. Administrative appeals, though part of a broad set of legal rights, generally
occur within an agency’s internal bureaucracy, and are thus distinct from litigation
processes. At present, multiple laws provide for various rights to appeal
USFS/agency decisions. These laws include the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) (5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-559, 701-706), the Appeals Reform Act (ARA) (16 U.S.C.
§ 1612), the NEPA, and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) (16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1600-14). Under the current Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), three types of
USFS activities may be appealed. These include forest plans, revisions, and
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amendments (36 CFR 217); permits or written authorizations relating to use or
occupancy of the national forests (36 CFR 251); and NEPA project decisions (36
CFR 215) (Teich et al. 2004). Appeals have proven a controversial aspect of national
forest management and remain the subject of ongoing policy debate (Floyd 2004,
Manring 2004, Teich et al. 2004).
Nancy Manring notes (2004:237) that in the context of national forest planning,
“administrative appeals [of agency decisions] provide an instrument of both political
and legal accountability.” Moreover, administrative “appeals provide an essential
avenue for meaningful public participation in the management of national lands...
appeals have helped compel the agencies to follow the laws more closely” (Baldwin
1997:2). Teich et al. (2004:14) note that USFS [often] blames administrative appeals
for delaying national forest projects “championed for reducing the risk of
catastrophic, stand replacing wildfires.” Teich et al. (2004:14) describe USFS
officials as invoking the phrase “analysis paralysis” in critisizing the administrative
appeals processes by which the agency must abide.
Donald Floyd (2004:9) summarizes a political tension associated with
administrative appeals, noting:
Appeals and litigation are a symptom of a broader problem—they represent
the skirmish lines within a network of conflicting values... Democratic
processes and public participation that ensure government accountability may
seem frustrating and inefficient to resource managers confronting forest fires
and insect and disease outbreaks. But if we value democratic traditions and
trust citizens, our professional responsibility includes listening carefully and
acting in partnership with the many individuals and groups who care about our
[national] forests.
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Public Participation and Democracy
In discussing public administration, public participation, and government
interactions with the citizenry, the word “democracy” is inevitably mentioned or
discussed. How “democratic” is our government? Are our public participation
processes democratic enough? In many ways notions of democracy and what the
concept entails are ambiguous and philosophical in application. Nonetheless, it is
important to note that democracy is both a system of government as well as an idea.
Political scientist John Dewey (1927:144) included among democracy’s trappings as
a system of government, “general suffrage, elected representatives, majority rule, and
so on.” As an idea, Dewey characterized democracy as service of community.
Government exists to serve its community... its purpose cannot be achieved
unless the community itself shares in selecting its governors and determining
their policies... Belief in this political aspect [of democracy] is not a mystic
faith as if in some overruling providence that cares for children, drunkards and
others unable to help themselves. It marks a well-attested conclusion from
historic facts. We have every reason to think that whatever changes may take
place in existing democratic machinery, they will be of a sort to make the
interest o f the public a more supreme guide and criterion of governmental
activity, and to enable the public to form and manifest its purposes still more
authoritatively. In this sense the cure for the ailments of democracy is more
democracy. The prime difficulty.. .is that of discovering the means by which
a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize itself as to define
and express its interests.
Thus, in the context of national forest management, the same difficulties of
scattered, mobile, and manifold interests seem to confound and complicate clear and
efficient public lands governance. Dewey and advocates of more deliberative models
see more democracy as the road ahead, while advocates of synoptic, technocratic,
and, to some degree, pluralistic models see expertise and more limited citizen
involvement in agency decision making as mechanisms for improving governance.

20

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Such models and theories aid in the analysis and distillation of the conflicts that
followed the Bitterroot wildfires of 2000.
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Chapter 4 Background
Public Lands, the Bitterroot National Forest and Beyond
[I]f the national forests are going to accomplish anything worthwhile, the people
must know all about them and must take a very active part in their management. The
officers are paid by the people to act as their agents and to see that all the resources
o f the forests are used in the best interest o f everyone concerned.
-Gifford Pinchot, 1907

Human conflict surrounding public lands management is not a recent
phenomenon. Though Chief Pinchot’s words are propitious, they offer little utility to
the managers o f public lands. What is “the best interest o f everyone?” Conflict is
perhaps as native and historic a component of public lands management as is wildfire
(Amo 1980) in Northern Rocky Mountains’ ecosystems.
The Bitterroot National Forest
The BNF encompasses 6 million acres in Montana and Idaho including postcard
worthy peaks, wild and scenic rivers such as the Selway and the Salmon, part of the
largest block of contiguous undeveloped wildland in the lower 48 states, and
ecological values that defy monetization. Forty-seven percent of the BNF (743,000
acres) lies within the Anaconda-Pintler, Selway-Bitterroot, and Frank Church-River
of No Return Wilderness Areas (BNF 2005).
After the passage of the Organic Act (1897) (16 U.S.C.A § 476 et seq.), Congress
set aside the Bitter Root (sic) Forest Reserve on February 22, 1897 (BNF 2005). The
Forest Reserve would become a National Forest, with the establishment of the USDA
Forest Service (USFS) in 1905.
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The BNF has a rich history that includes some notable periods of public conflict
surrounding its management. Due to what is now generally regarded as short-sighted
management that favored extractive values over ecological health and the popular
aesthetic sensibilities, the BNF would, in the 1960s and 1970s, become the subject of
national controversy (Bolle et al. 1970, Flirt 1994, Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005).
Politicians, academics, and other observers criticized the BNF for terracing
mountainsides and clear cutting large tracts of forest. As a result of the BNF’s largely
unpalatable forest management, in addition to a similar situation involving a public
backlash on West Virginia’s Monongahela National Forest, Congress passed the
NFMA. Among other important objectives, the NFMA responded to the quality of
land stewardship on the BNF and elsewhere. The NFMA was in part a prescriptive
measure designed to qualify and update the 1897 Organic Act’s (16 U.S.C.A § 476 et
seq. (§ 476 repealed 1976)) broad mandate to the agency (Steen 1991).
The Sula State Forest
While the NFMA and other federal laws governing the management of national
forests manifest a growing respect for ecological integrity, a need for intellectual
humility, and a legal land ethic, some consider the myriad federal laws and their
prescribed multiple uses to be ambiguous when applied to on-the-ground
management (Interviews 2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 24). By contrast, the State of Montana
manages its state lands under rules quite different than those governing the BNF.
Rules governing state trust lands are less complicated than those governing
management of the national forests (Sienkiewicz 2006). Nonetheless, Montana’s
constitutionalization of environmental protection established ecological values as a
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priority for all Montanans (Mont. Const, art. II, § 3). Ironically, Montana’s
constitutional protection of the environment runs up against requirements to fund
public schools because the mission and institutional structure of state trust land
management requires long-term profit maximization for trust beneficiaries (Souder
and Fairfax 1996, Sienkiewicz 2006). Thus there exists in Montana, a battle of public
goods—a tension or inverse relationship between two auspicious social values
(Sienkiewicz 2006). The USFS is therefore not alone in having paradoxical
management goals.
Relative to the BNF’s vast acreage, the SSF’s acreage (within the same general
area) is, perhaps, relatively insignificant. Of course, culturally, ecologically,
aesthetically, economically, and politically, the SSF—like the BNF—is of significant
value. The 17,600 acre SSF lies within Ravalli County’s Camp and Cameron Creek
Watersheds, near Ross’ Hole. Ross’ Hole provided the inspiration for Charlie
Russell’s masterpiece, Lewis and Clark Meeting the Indians, which hangs in
Montana’s State House (Bitter Root Valley Historical Society 1982). The SSF is
surrounded by the BNF, but being classified as state trust land, it is managed and
guided by a dramatically different management mission than that of the BNF.
During the 2000 wildfire season, 87% of the SSF burned, though in mixed
degrees of severity (Harrington 2003, Interviews 7, 20, 22, 28). The State Land
Board, which oversees the management of state-owned trust lands by the Montana
DNRC, praised the agency’s efforts to salvage burned timber from the Sula in a
timely fashion. At the same time, elected officials at both the state and federal levels
of government criticized the BNF for its delays in salvaging commercially-valuable
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burned timber from the fire-disturbed areas on federal lands. In 2001, (former)
Montana Governor Judy Martz told Montana’s Congressmen,
W e’ve just gone to town, but the Forest Service hasn’t done one thing yet.
And they need to do something too... My point is simple, [i]f the state of
Montana can move in a timely, environmentally sound and fiscally
responsible manner with limited resources, should we not expect our federal
neighbors to do the same? (Missoulian, March 9, 2001).
DNRC managers opted for an aggressive salvage operation, removing more than
27 million board feet (MMBF) of burned trees from approximately 6,000 acres of the
SSF trust lands (Harrington 2003). This salvage operation generated more than $6
million for Montana’s state trust land beneficiaries (Harrington 2003). According to
the DNRC’s Forestry Division Administrator, Bob Harrington, “The majority of this
harvest occurred within six months of the fire, allowing [the DNRC] to capture
maximum [economic] value from purchasers” (Harrington 2003).
With respect to his federal counterparts on the BNF, Harrington (2003)
commented: “The internal [NEPA] appeals process has been used to handcuff agency
professionals, and to prevent good projects from moving forward.” Although
perspectives as to the importance of public participation under the NEPA (42
U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-61) and definitions of “good” can reasonably differ, Harrington’s
words and those of some federal managers evince resentment of the appeals process
as applied and/or the manifestations of public participation in public land
management that emerged following the wildfires of 2000 (Interviews 2, 10, 12).
Many public stakeholders, by contrast, value and exercise their participatory
rights under the NEPA and other public land laws (Interviews 5, 9, 19, 20, 22, 24...).
Importantly, government officials, managers, stakeholders, and pundits infrequently
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offer definitions of subjective terms such as good, or healthy, or restoration, or
thinning when offering public commentary on land management issues. Definitions
o f such terms vary dramatically depending upon applicable evaluation criteria or
desired management goals. Economic “health” will in many cases differ from
ecological health. Thus, the public lands management dialogue requires precise
language. Agreed upon definitions of such terms is critical to productive
communication between parties and for comprehension of issues by the general
public. As Voltaire said, “If you wish to converse with me, define your terms”
(Polymath Systems 2005).
In contrast to the DNRC’s explicitly-mandated, commodity-driven management
mission, Mike Hillis, a biologist on the Lolo National Forest (LNF) described
ecological considerations for which the USFS must—by federal statutory and
common law—account. These include, among sundry other ecological values, the
habitat function provided by large diameter standing dead trees (which are also those
trees most valuable for harvest in a salvage logging operation):
Snags are the most important tree for wildlife in the forest. Pileated
woodpeckers will dig huge cavities in snags, and lots of them, which are used
by everything from pine martens to flying squirrels to flammulated owls.
They need large larch or ponderosa pine snags. No other snags will do (High
Country News, April 9, 2001).
When does a scorched tree become moribund? What constitutes a dying tree? What
constitutes a snag? How many snags per acre are appropriate to maintain viable local
populations of the species Hillis noted? What diameter constitutes “large?” The
uncertainty associated with such questions fosters scientific debate and facilitates
public conflict. This is so because unsettled scientific questions leave room for
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argument and thus draw involvement by politically-motivated factions and
stakeholder groups.
Vagueness and ambiguity are sometimes intentional relative to underlying laws.
This ambiguity can allow outcomes other than that which statutory language might
suggest to laypeople— in order to, among other reasons, make a law more marketable
in its legislative phases. Sometimes ambiguity is a trait of poorly drafted legislation.
Sometimes legislators (and their bill drafters) are intentionally vague in order to avoid
accountability (Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005). These political realities consequently
interact with sociological and ecological variables. Forest managers, forest users, and
forest ecosystems must live with the outcomes. The aftermath of the wildfires of
2000 bears out the complexity of such interactions.
Larry Campbell, Conservation Director of the Friends of the Bitterroot, noted, “If
you are ever going to leave a forest alone to heal and ensure future productivity, it
should be done after a fire” (High Country News, April 9, 2001). In response to such
critiques, DNRC silviculturist, Jon Hayes, noted of the mission for state lands such as
the SSF: “Unfortunately, concerns with wildlife don’t generate the type of revenue
the logs do. We’re required by state law to make money off these lands. A lot of
times we’re not able to do the maximum for wildlife” (High Country News, April 9,
2001). Here, DNRC Silviculturist Hayes relates a clear management priority—
generating revenue. In contrast to that guiding the DNRC’s trust land management,
the law and policy guiding USFS management is not conducive to such clarity. Some
argue that USFS-related law and policy is confounding in its application to the land
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and in its interaction with unwritten realities relating to political, social, economic,
and institutional pressures (Interviews 8, 9, 27, Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005).
Are comparisons of the SSF to the BNF valid? Did elected officials and
managers who drew such comparisons understand the difference in mission and
purpose that guide federally-managed USFS lands as compared to Montana’s state
trust lands? Did (former) Governer Martz’ criticisms of the USFS/BNF account for
differences in spatial and temporal scale and complexity, as between the BNF and the
SSF? Did observations and public commentary following the fires of 2000 manifest
an adequate understanding of legal, ecological, and ethical mandates? No matter the
nature of one’s opinions, the aftermath of the wildfires of 2000 in the Bitterroot
Valley begot drastically different results as between the SSF and the BNF.
Interestingly, the legal mandate underlying Hayes’ comments has led some nonbeneficiaries (mostly in western states) to question the state trust land doctrine and
the common interpretation in favor of revenue maximization above all other
management values (Sienkiewicz 2006). In Montana, the tension between managing
for ecological integrity and managing for commodity extraction on state lands
sometimes makes for muddled policy (Sienkiewicz 2006). This is so partly because
Montana’s Constitution declares that all of its citizens possess a right to a clean and
healthy environment (Mont. Const, art. II, § 3). Nonetheless, trust land
jurisprudence—by virtue of its relative clarity and simplicity—favors deference to
state land management agencies more than federal public land law favors deference
the federal land management agencies (Sienkiewicz 2006).
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Bitter Conflict
Given the human history in the Bitterroot Valley and its relevance to public lands,
it is interesting that national-scale conflict returned to the area after the landmark fire
season of 2000. The BNF seems a magnet for controversy, but it is simultaneously a
proving ground for novel interpretations of public land law and policy. The BNF has
provided a forum for addressing the complex ecological, social, political, and
economic equations that inform public forest management. Some see in the besieged
BNF a potential for serving as the model for guiding national forest management.
Spike Thompson, BNF Deputy Supervisor during 2000’s wildfires and their
aftermath, noted:
It seems like to me that with a forest that’s basically allocated the way the
Bitterroot is, 50% wilderness, 25% inventoried roadless, if you could
somehow get the public to buy into a restoration program for the forest where
you could just set down the political philosophies for a while, because I know
there’s people there that want the Bitterroot to cut 30 million board feet
[(MMBF)] a year and there’s people there that want them to cut zero. If you
could just set aside the political philosophies for a while, the Bitterroot could
be the model forest for the whole nation... You’ve got... such a diverse
amount of things you can do there. It’s really becoming an urban forest,
where the day use has... tremendously increased over the last few years. And
yet, you’ve got some of the wildest country in the United States, outside of
Alaska, close to it. It just seems like the Bitterroot could be the model forest
for the [United States], and this is what I always told the environmental
groups, “If you could help us, you can make this the model of what you’d like
to see the whole Forest Service look like.” And yet, they couldn’t see that for
the philosophy difference. And rather than give someone that 25% and let the
Forest Service have some maneuverability there, they fight every project
(Interview 2:25).
Spike Thompson is Supervisor of the Lewis and Clark National Forest in
Northwestern Montana.
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The Conflict Continues
It is debatable who initiated (and initiates) the conflicts that continually plague the
BNF and whether “every” project is actually challenged. In any case, conflict
continues to characterize the BNF’s management. Just when it seemed time would
leave the post-2000 wildfire conflicts behind, 2005’s Middle East Fork project found
many of the same stakeholders once again at odds over BNF management. The
subtitle for a September 2005 article in the Missoulian declared: “Bitterroot National
Forest prepared fo r timber cut before final decision [was] reached.” Reporter
Michael Moore led-in: “[The BNF]... spent more than $160,000 marking trees for a
timber cut designed to reduce hazardous fuels, even though a final decision on the
logging project ha[d]n’t been reached.” The article did not define “hazardous fuels.”
In the same article, Moore quoted Matthew Koehler, Director of the Native Forest
Network:
We find it incredibly disingenuous that during the public comment period, a
period where [the BNF] said they would take the public’s comment and
incorporate it into their plan, they were just moving ahead with the plan that
they apparently already have chosen (Missoulian, September 23, 2005).
A few days later, BNF officials ordered USFS law enforcement officers to escort
environmental advocates Jim Miller, Larry Campbell, and Stewart Brandborg from a
press conference (called to allow invited participants to discuss the aforementioned
timber sale/ thinning operation) before they were able to sit down. The 80-year old
Brandborg, whose father once served as the BNF Supervisor, noted that “In all my
life, I’ve never seen where the public couldn’t attend a press conference” (Missoulian,
September 23, 2005).
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Larry Campbell said of the process surrounding the Middle East Fork Sale, “The
Forest Service ignored nearly 10,000 public comments that were unfavorable toward
the preferred alternative to favor a handful of Sula residents” {Missoulian, September
23, 2005). USFS spokeswoman Dixie Dies noted, “Most all of the comments we got
on this are form letters, so we take that into account” {Missoula Independent,
November 10, 2005). For his part, Supervisor Bull later noted that if he had the
whole process to do over, he would do it differently {Missoulian, September 30,
2005). As to the 98% o f received public comments opposing aspects of the Middle
East Fork Sale, Supervisor Bull noted that the BNF will do “what’s best for the
resource”— and that such decisions are not a “popular vote” (Interview 36).
Supervisor Bull explained that the public already knew how opponents of the
project felt, that the press conference at issue was to allow supporters of the planning
option favored by the BNF to speak. Bull noted that the “Washington D.C. office”
had urged him “to control the message,” so he invited only supporters of the USFS’
proposed actions and denied other citizens entry (Interview 36). Were those
involved—manager, NGO (non-government organization), and citizen alike—
communicating? Clearly? In good faith? The aforementioned comments suggest a
polarity or tension between technocratic, unilateral leanings of some managers and
the more deliberative democratic preferences of some interested citizens.
Some of the citizens barred from the press conference are, at the time of writing,
pursuing a lawsuit for what they call “a series of anti-democratic actions” by certain
BNF personnel {Missoulian, October 5, 2005). These events beg the question as to
what the role of democracy in national forest management is and should be. Do the
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democratic rights of individuals, as pertain to national forest management, extend
beyond the right to vote for elected officials?
It seems that environmental groups, federal managers, Washington power players,
industry representatives, and others have staked out the BNF as a symbolic chess
board as pertains to individual agendas. The BNF could be called the “Gaza Strip” of
the National Forest System. Moreover, the Bitterroot Valley’s privately-held
bottomlands are undergoing rapid changes relating to in-migration, parcelization,
human population growth, development, and the accompanying policy problems and
pains (Flores 1999).
Today, tensions continue to run high in communities adjacent to the BNF. Will
old wounds ever heal? Trust between the USFS and the spokespersons of interested
stakeholder contingents appears to be no stronger than it has ever been, to the extent it
exists at all. But as some USFS managers are apt to say, “If everybody’s mad at you,
you’re ok,” suggesting conflict goes hand in hand with multiple use management
(Interview 9:34). What is the importance of mutual tmst between and among public
forest managers and the many concerned publics?
Perhaps USFS managers simply cannot please everyone, and in seeking to do so,
please no one? Are such assumptions valid in the context of the management of
ecosystems and their interactions with complex socio-political systems? Should
citizens accept discord as inevitable where the public estate is concerned? Is public
participation an obstacle to management? Is management an obstacle to public
participation? Is there a balance to be struck? Given extensive scientific research and
the significant natural resources educational infrastructure, is it unreasonable to
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expect public land management to rise to meet the challenge and complexity of
today’s changing ecological, social, and political climate?
A salient variable further complicating national forest governance relates to
congressional delegates and political appointees playing a direct role in regional and
local management of the national forests (Vaughn and Cortner 2005). This, if
coupled with attempts to keep such influence below the “public radar,” creates a
problem for managers and citizens alike. To this effect, Undersecretary of
Agriculture for Natural Resources & Environment Mark Rey signed the Record of
Decision (ROD) for post-fire management actions on the BNF following the 2000
wildfires. Rey subsequently attempted to avoid a court-ordered settlement conference
in the federal lawsuit associated with the same management actions. The official case
record suggests that Undersecretary Rey’s attempted absence irked federal Judge
Donald Molloy who noted in a court order that “apparently, [land management]
decisions are being made in Washington D.C. (emphasis added)” (Document 44, CV
01-219-M-DWM: 180 F.Supp.2d 1141).
Bolstering conclusions related to top-level influence on local issues, BNF
Supervisor Dave Bull, BNF District Ranger Dave Campbell, and others have argued
that elected officials, executive branch appointees, and centrally-made budgets leave
USFS managers with little leeway as to what categories of projects receive priority
(Interviews 8, 9, 27). Should USFS management of public lands and resources of be
of a top-down or a bottom-up nature? USFS Chief Dale Bosworth noted of senior
officials influencing local decisions, “If [an executive] want[s] to tell a [District
Ranger or Forest Supervisor] what decision to make, then [she] ought to make it
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[herjself... and be accountable to that decision... [that is to say:] ‘I ’m OK with
making a different decision Boss, just don’t tell me what decisions to make and make
like it was my idea,,, (Interview 12:6-8).
Given the present formula of law, forest plans, and budgets, Chief Bosworth’s
words suggest he would prefer a more bottom-up land management process. To what
extent does a particular national forest’s Congress-influenced and centrallydetermined budget have the same effect as an executive official ordering a particular
course of land management action without claiming ownership of that course of
action?
The Collaborative Paradigm
If, as a matter of policy, public land management agencies seek to be less
technocratic and more deliberative as a mechanism for avoiding protracted conflict,
then collaboration is one means by which to do so. Collaborative, open, and adaptive
frameworks propounded by some in both environment and extraction-focused
stakeholder groups stand in contrast to the present management paradigm (Interview
24). Some planning models derived from the collaborative school of thought differ
from the current public participation paradigm, most conspicuously, because
proposed collaborative efforts at planning entail adoption by agency managers as
opposed to being merely ‘considered’ by managers (Interviews 24, 36). As
Supervisor Dave Bull noted, management decisions are not a “popular vote”
(Interview 36). The agency has not embraced such collaborative planning processes
at a significant scale—nor have recent executive administrations (Vaughn and
Cortner 2005). Although Supervisor Bull’s election metaphor does not quite match
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the context of national forest management planning; ironically, his words hint at
possible mechanisms for ameliorating conflict—namely, devising a process whereby
diverse stakeholder views might be better represented in final agency actions. Such a
process would comprise a move toward the deliberative democratic models outlined
by Dewey (1927), Poisner (1996), and Shepherd and Bowler (1997).
Importantly however, such alternative, participatory planning models would not
jibe well with ongoing, indirect congressional and executive branch-born influences
some USFS managers describe and decry (Interviews 5, 8, 9, 27). The strong
presence of such influence speaks to the competitive pluralistic models described by
Sunstein (1985), Barber (1994), and Poisner (1996). Nonetheless, much current
scholarship focuses on the auspices of more collaborative, deliberative public lands
management (Interviews 1, 24, Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Brick et al. 2001).
Thinking Big
In September 2005, six scientists published an article in the Journal o f Forestry
imploring managers to think “big,” to think holistically, and to analyze problems of
forest fire and management from a landscape perspective. They urged a cultural shift
toward holistic management occur—“now”—before the window of opportunity for
“big thinking” closes “as communities expand into forests, and fire is used as a
scapegoat for management failures” (Sisk et al. 2005). The message these scientists
convey is one to the effect that “managers” are presently focused narrowly,
entrenched in a myopic culture, thereby facilitating rhetoric and oversimplification of
eco-sociological problems. Do such ideas apply to the BNF’s handling of post-fire
management following the 2000 wildfire season? Do USFS managers have the
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intellectual and political tools, or the cultural-institutional freedom, to think “big?”
Can USFS managers think “bigger” than their overseers allow? What is the nature of
managerial discretion? May a manager contravene official, centrally-made budgets?
To what extent does the policy agenda of the executive branch and its political
appointees proscribe managerial discretion? Can a shift to more collaborative
bottom-up management of the national forests originate anywhere but the topi
Would a more collaborative management process solve any problems? Would a more
collaborative management process prove more meaningful in a democratic sense?
Moving On
The players in the ongoing BNF drama have a long history of dysfunction with
which to contend. Norman Maclean said, “If boyhood questions aren’t answered
before a certain point in time, they can’t ever be raised again” (Maclean 1976:8). Is it
time to start over, and leave “boyhood questions” behind? The professional society
most closely allied with the Forest Service, the Society of American Foresters,
recently published an article in its Journal o f Forestry titled, When an Agency
Outlasts its Time (Fairfax 2005). Analogously, two of the
environmental/conservation movement’s own have stirred infighting and dialogue
with their 34 page piece titled, The Death o f Environmentalism (Shellenberger and
Nordhaus 2005).
The authors detail overarching problems in public land management and
environmentalism, respectively—relating to such broad themes as mission, message,
and core philosophy. These are, of course, only two of numerous scholarly and
philosophical perspectives about contemporary public land and environmental issues.

36

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Nonetheless, as the theories manifest in the titles of these articles suggest, conflict’s
aftermath can prompt reexamination, and perhaps, produce change.
This story of enmity and conflict has prompted reconsideration of present
paradigms within movements, industries, Congress, and agencies. Some argue that
Undersecretary Rey, other executive branch officials, and elected officials of various
levels intentionally provoked controversy in order to, as Judge Molloy noted in
Wilderness Society v. Rey, “speed matters to ... court” (180 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1148).
The USFS would do so, note critics, in order to lay foundation for the “analysis
paralysis” argument— or the notion that USFS managers are “shackled” (Harrington
2003, Vaughn and Cortner 2005) by the NEPA (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-61) and the
existing body of environmental and public land law (Interview 15, Vaughn and
Cortner 2005).
Vaughn and Cortner (2005) argue further, that members of the George W. Bush
Administration and its supporters have made a habit of manipulating rhetoric and
utilizing polarizing, apocryphal characterizations in order to garner support for the
Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003 (HFRA) (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 6501-6591).
Vaughn and Cortner (2005) note also, that some within the broad environmental
community have responded in kind, with polarizing rhetoric of their own.
A recent public lands conflict brought to light a tension between the executive
branch USFS and the judicial branch whose decisions guide USFS management.
Following 2005’s Earth Island v. Pengilly (376 F.Supp.2d 994) holding, USFS Chief
Dale Bosworth ordered national forests to cease all “categorically excluded” projects.
These included not only those significant actions prominent environmental NGOS
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often challenge, but also negligible actions such as an individual cutting a Christmas
tree. Judge James K. Singleton’s ruling in the case had not contemplated prevention
of insignificant activities on public lands by individuals, but rather land use and
planning-related issues (376 F.Supp.2d). Nonetheless, the USFS halted activities
such as the cutting of the Capitol’s Christmas tree and firewood collecting by
individuals.
Chief Bosworth perhaps did so as part of a strategy to actuate clarification of the
ruling. Others, however, saw the action as gamesmanship being played-out in the
federal courts. Retired USFS economist, Bob Wolf, chastised Undersecretary of
Agriculture Mark Rey (USFS Chief Bosworth’s supervisor) for the “administration’s
abuse of the court system,” noting to Undersecretary Rey in an e-mail, “Your ploy
backfired... Congress didn’t leap to overturn Judge Singleton’s decision. Instead,
senior members wrote that you were playing a game” (High Country News, January
23, 2006).
An article in the Washington Times (October 11, 2005) described the national
forest shutdown associated with Earth Island v. Pengilly, arraying
“environmentalists” (ostensibly referring to the Plaintiffs) in positions antipodal to
Christmas and boy scouts. The Society of American Foresters (SAF)— a professional
society with extensive cultural, historical, and professional ties to the USFS—linked
to the Washington Times article in its electronic newsletter without qualification of
the included characterizations (E-Forester, October 17, 2005). In a subsequent issue
of The Forestry Source (December 2005), the SAF’s editors again presented this legal
dispute in terms that could reasonably be perceived as casting aspersions upon
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administrative process. The SAF’s editors, again, pitted environmental groups and
administrative appeals against Christmas.
Judge Singleton, upon motion by those who had sued the USFS (over issues
relating to public participation), subsequently issued an order stating that the USFS
had over-applied the ruling, which had been intended for major actions such as timber
sales or thinning projects (376 F.Supp.2d 994). Some, again, accused the USFS of
intentionally drawing controversy in order to build a case against the current body of
environmental and public land laws and to lay foundation for the “analysis paralysis”
argument (Missoulian, October 21, 2005, Vaughn and Cortner 2005).
No matter one’s opinions on these matters, it is clear that parties from across the
political spectrum presently cripple national forest management by utilizing rhetoricbased, euphemistic methods to influence national forest law and policy and broadbased environmental law and policy. This is perhaps the nature of politics, but
significantly increased litigation and associated diversion of limited public resources,
with associated costs in time, personnel, and money, is a salient outcome that
deserves examination (Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005). USFS management has, of
late, been unable to rise above the controversy. Some among the myriad
“environmental community” also seem unable to rise above the controversy, choosing
adversarial strategies over working toward better dialogue and relationships. The
vicious cycle of public land conflict thus continues in the Bitterroot Valley and
elsewhere.
Protracted conflict characterizes not just the BNF, but many of America’s national
forests, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands, park lands, and other public land
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designations. Public land management faces manifold challenges that prevent
expeditiously meeting the various desires of the people and the needs of the land.
Prominent among these challenges are core differences between citizens,
stakeholders, and managers as to what “the needs of the land” actually are (Interviews
1-37). Other challenges include uncertainty, increasingly scarce funding, imperfect
information, institutional barriers to change, conflict, ever-changing direction from
changing political regimes, and many others (interview 1-37).
At present, some federal officials are open to moving public lands into private
ownership. Terry Anderson, Public Lands Advisor to President George W. Bush, has
proposed “selling off public lands to private game ranchers” (Hermann 2005:32).
Further, 2005 proposals to sell select national park lands {Headwaters News, October
10, 2005, Sacramento Bee, October 29, 2005) and loosen claim patenting
requirements under the Mining Law of 1872, once again thrust public lands to the
fore of American policy debates {Missoulian, November 20, 2005, New York Times,
November 20, 2005, High Country News, November 28, 2005). USFS Chief
Emeritus (and Former Head of the BLM) Mike Dombeck noted of these trends,
[0]ur federal public lands are under siege in Congress. It seems that some
folks simply do not like the idea of the public owning land. These radicals
and ideologues are taking advantage of the fact that Americans are
preoccupied with economic insecurity, high fuel prices and a war abroad to
promote their personal interests by pushing language in the federal budget bill
that would put a “for sale” sign on 270 million acres of national forest and
other public land... Theodore Roosevelt put it this way: ‘The nation behaves
well if treats the natural resources as assets which it must turn over to the next
generation increased, and not impaired in value.’ That kind of leadership is
why Roosevelt’s face is carved on Mount Rushmore. The leadership we are
seeing in some dark corners of Congress will leave Americans with a much
different legacy {Missoulian, November 22, 2005).
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Thus, the public ownership of public lands is not immutable. Perhaps present
attempts at privatization are somehow related to the National Forest System’s past
conflicts and changing management focus? To the degree conflict over public land
management engenders policies that would diminish the public estate, then it would
behoove employees of public lands agencies and all manner of public lands users to
redouble efforts at public lands conflict resolution. Perhaps the conflicts will
diminish with more certain mandates, better coordinated and revamped laws, and
more clearly defined processes for arriving at management plans.
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Chapter 5
The Wildfires of 2000: a Story of Protracted Conflict
During the summer of 2000 the Bitterroot Watershed of Montana and Idaho
experienced wildfire at a scale and severity it had not seen since the extensive
wildfires o f 1910 (USFS 2000A). The 2000 wildfires burned 356,000 acres in the
Bitterroot Watershed (USFS 2000A). Fire affected nearly 20 percent of the BNF
(USFS 2000A). The 2000 fires gained national attention as they dominated the
attention o f public land managers and citizens alike across the Northern Rockies
(USFS 2000A).
Tragic, inspiring, and cathartic events marked the 2000 fire season. However, the
social and political conflict that polarized human communities in the Bitterroot
Valley and surrounding areas is perhaps of tantamount importance. Moreover,
similar issues remain divisive and vitriolic today— five years later. Ongoing tensions
exist between individuals and groups focused on ecological restoration and those
individuals and groups focused on the salvage of wildfire-burned timber. Events
following the wildfires comprise a classic case of natural resource value conflict.
Interestingly, in recent years, the policy distinction between ecological restoration and
salvage logging has become increasingly unclear due to ambiguous and undefined
rhetoric pervading forest management (Vaughn and Cortner 2005). Many, for
instance, speak o f salvage and restoration interchangeably (Interviews 2, 6, 8, 10, 11,
12), while others distinguish between the two concepts (Interviews 12, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19, 24, 25, 26A, 26C, 27).
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The post-fire conflicts played out within local communities, state and federal
agencies, the Montana Legislature, the halls of Congress, the White House, federal
court houses, and elsewhere. For those tied to the diverse natural resources and
values associated with public lands, a continued analysis of the management and
policy lessons surrounding the 2000 fires can provide significant lessons. As history
has many times taught natural resources professionals, careful consideration over
time tends to clarify that which was once unclear and to correct the imperfect vision
that comes o f being human in a time of turmoil.
Background
The Bitterroot Valley’s 2000 wildfire season began in early June when lightning
ignited the Fish Lake area in the Upper East Fork of the Bitterroot drainage. This fire
grew to only five acres, not portending the significant ecological and social
disturbance that was to erupt later in the season and affect much of the intermountain
West. On July 15, the Little Blue Fire forced the evacuation of 25 homes near
Painted Rocks Lake and burned 5800 acres before being suppressed (USFS 2000A).
Other wildfires were ignited across the Bitterroot and Sapphire Ranges, and within
the Selway-Bitterroot and Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness areas. On
the night of July 3 1st, a severe lightning storm swept across the Bitterroot Valley
igniting 78 discrete blazes. Some would merge into larger fire “complexes,”
significantly altering stand structure and ecological function in affected localities
(USFS 2000A). Thus began the 2000 fire season in the Bitterroot Watershed. Blazes
would continue until September of that year (Halvorsen 2002). Parts of the Bitterroot
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Valley’s east and west flanks burned. Many homes within the wildland-urban
interface (W UI)1 were lost to wildfire.
BNF officials, in view of building risk to human communities and ongoing
wildfire suppression efforts, closed the forest to public access. Many non-forest roads
in the WUI were likewise closed. Within the Bitterroot Valley’s (human)
communities, stage two and three air quality alerts became a regular occurrence
during the 2000 fire season. At the time, many viewed the fires as an unprecedented
disaster (Halvorsen 2002). Severe fire seasons are, of course, nothing new to Rocky
Mountain ecosystems. Nonetheless, local communities galvanized to address the
dangers to private property, livelihood, and well-being. While the 2000 fires took 70
homes, 170 ancillary structures, and 94 vehicles from forest edges in the Bitterroot
Valley, some 1,700 threatened homes were saved as a result of interagency
cooperation and community efforts (USFS 2000A).
Beyond the Bitterroot Valley, the 2000 wildfires affected much of the West,
where more than 2.2 million acres of national forest land and 5 million acres of other
public ownerships and private land burned at varying degrees of intensity. The 2000
wildfire season set records for government firefighting expenditures, consuming more
than $1 billion in federal funds (TFCS 2004). In 2000, firefighting expenditures on
the BNF, alone, approached $70 million (TFCS 2004). Although such expenditures
were little questioned at the time, they have prompted re-consideration by a broad
array of citizens and public and private interest groups as to what appropriate wildfire

1 WUI is the point at which urban development abuts “wildlands” or the forested landscape.
Definitions o f the term w ill vary, but the idea connotes developm ent and human domiciles within the
private forest lands that adjoin public forest lands. From an ecological or a wildfire perspective, there
is no clear boundary, and thus homes in the WUI are at risk.

44

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

management and policy should entail. This re-consideration continues, and focuses
as much, if not more, on what comprises appropriate forest management after fires
have altered a stand, watershed, ecosystem, or human community. As BNF
Supervisor Dave Bull noted, “[post-wildfire operations] are just always controversial.
They just always are” (Interview 8:16)
Post-Wildfire Salvage and Restoration
By December of 2000, significant political and social conflict over post-fire
salvage logging plans was increasingly apparent. The BNF’s personnel had,
nonetheless, been in communication with the public through a series of town hall
meetings, through an extensive website dedicated to the fires and their aftermath, as
well as through the traditional public comment processes and proposed management
actions required under laws such as the APA (5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-559, 701-706) and
theNEPA (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-61).
Through the fall of 2000, the BNF began what its officials termed an “aggressive
emergency rehabilitation program.” According to the agency’s literature, the BNF
stabilized 4,000 acres of sloped terrain (via placement of straw waddles and cross
felled trees), seeded 254 acres with nursery stock (Interview 37), rehabilitated 200
miles of fire line, sprayed 195 acres for weeds and replaced 350 undersized culverts
during this initial post-fire period (USFS 2000B). The BNF operated under the
assumption that the aforementioned actions were ecologically restorative. Others
would challenge such assumptions.
Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation (BAER) Teams performed much of the
initial emergency rehabilitation work. The emergency efforts included the labor of
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more than 400 volunteers (USFS 2000B). Some stakeholders opposed these
management actions, calling upon the Beschta Report—a scientific study that
questioned common assumptions theretofore accepted by agency foresters and
managers as to what management approaches best actuated post-fire ecological
“recovery” (Interviews 15, 16, 18, 19, 26A, Beschta etal. 1995).
In a post-fire survey the BNF sponsored, the ecologically-focused approach
described by the Beschta Report was not specifically mentioned. Nonetheless, the
post-fire survey drew criticism (Interviews 15, 16, 17) for arraying a “do nothing”
approach against positively-framed management activities (BBER 2001). “Doing
nothing” amounted to a label often attached to proponents of natural recovery
(Courier-Journal, October 12, 2005, Forestry Source, December 2005,
thefurtrapper.com 2005). Importantly, neither managers, nor environmental NGOs
advocated one approach for all categories of burned terrain, yet oversimplifications of
mission and management approach on burned lands were (and are) often repeated in
the media (Vaughn and Cortner 2005).
The Burned Area Recovery (BAR) Project
By February of 2001, the BNF was well into the process of planning post-fire
management per the BAR project. The BNF solicited and received public comment
on the BAR project, which included an EIS required under the NEPA. The BAR
project and its associated EIS would become the focus of much of the post-fire
controversy. The BAR outlined how much dead, dying, or live timber would be cut
and where; what roads would be built and where; what manner of restoration activity
would occur and where; as well as addressing other pressing management concerns
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such as site-specific forest plan amendments. In an effort to help address fire
recovery on non-USFS lands, the BNF joined forces with other agencies and
community groups, forming the Bitterroot Interagency Recovery Team (BIRT).
Partners included the Natural Resources Conservation Service and the Ravalli County
Extension Office (USFS 2000B).
Management Alternatives under Various Stages of the EIS Process
During the “scoping” process (proposing management alternatives and soliciting
and analyzing comment on those alternatives), the BNF and interested stakeholders
eventually produced seven management alternatives (identified as A-G) which would
be considered for implementation. These alternatives addressed the critical issues of
economic opportunity, erosion and aquatic habitat, fuels reduction, motorized access,
reforestation, roads, proliferation of noxious weeds, and others. The alternatives
differed with regard to tradeoffs anticipated between the degree of ecological
degradation associated with the various proposed management actions and habitat
protection for various species, volume and methods of timber extraction, and other
associated actions such as road building, maintenance, and “storage.”
In May of 2001, the BNF issued a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS)
as part of the BAR project (CV 01-220-M-DWM 2001). The DEIS included five
potential management alternatives for post-fire management that addressed logging,
watershed improvement, and other issues. Some of the stakeholders that would
eventually sue the USFS over the BAR project, commented on these alternatives
within designated time limits. These stakeholders would, in turn, submit their own
post-fire management alternative for consideration, called the “Conservation and
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Local Economy” alternative. This alternative would later appear as an option in the
final environmental impact statement (FEIS) (CV 01-220-M-DWM 2001).
The “Conservation and Local Economy” alternative focused on fuel reduction
efforts around homes and communities within the WUI. This alternative (Alternative
G) proposed aggressive decommissioning of roads to protect sensitive watersheds as
well as establishing a “community conservation corps” to implement fuel reduction
activities and generate employment opportunities for local citizens (CV 01-220-MDWM 2001).
By September o f 2001, the BNF completed the FEIS, whose stated purpose was
to:
1) Reduce fuels in portions of the burned area.
2) Improve watershed and aquatic conditions in heavily impacted
burned drainages.
3) Restore forested conditions in some areas.
4) Accomplish fuel reduction more cost efficiently by harvesting
forest products, and provide jobs and income.
The FEIS noted that the proposed action was designed to move resource conditions
closer to desired future conditions as described in the BNF Land Use Plan (USFS
2001 A). Nonetheless, the FEIS proposed amendments to the Bitterroot Forest Plan
that entailed modification of:
1) Forest-wide snag retention standards.
2) Forest-wide elk habitat effectiveness index in third order drainages.
3) Forest-wide thermal cover standard in one geographic area.
4) The coarse woody debris standards for several management areas.
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Modifications would apply only to projects prepared under the BAR (USFS
2001 A). The FEIS chose Alternative F as its preferred management option, which
had not been part of the DEIS and thus had not received prior public scrutiny. The
BNF’s choosing a previously unreleased option was unorthodox and controversial.
The FEIS included as an option, but did not select, the community-submitted
Conservation and Local Economy Alternative (CV 01-220-M-DWM 2001).
With regard to “treatment of suitable timberland outside of the [wildland-urban
interface]”— meaning backcountry forests—alternatives A, C, E, & G proposed no
action. By contrast, Alternative B proposed salvage operations on 21,490 acres,
Alternative D proposed harvest on 21,490 acres, and Alternative G proposed salvage
on 15,930 acres (USFS 2001A). In general, all of the scoping process’ contemplated
alternatives differed significantly from the BNF’s original plan to conduct salvage
operations and thinning on 79,221 acres (Missoulian, August 11, 2001)—a salvage
sale which would have been among the most voluminous in USFS history had it been
carried out (United Nations ISDR 2002). In the FEIS, the BNF chose Alternative F,
which proposed salvage on 46,239 acres, replanting of trees on 32,977 acres, repair of
513 miles o f forest road, placement of 105 miles of road into “storage” and
decommissioning of 46 miles of forest roads (Missoulian, October 11, 2001).
Larry Campbell of the Friends of the Bitterroot called the chosen alternative
called it an “old-fashioned timber sale” (Missoulian, October 11, 2001), while (then)
BNF Deputy Supervisor, Spike Thompson, noted that more than half of all burned
acreage occurred within the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness or other unroaded areas
and would not be considered for active management (Missoulian, October 11, 2001).
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The BNF Interdisciplinary Planning Team Leader (for post-fire management) Stu
Lovejoy noted,
The forest ha[d] literally hundreds of thousands of acres of fire killed stands.
Some of those stands [we]re in certain locations... of concern... In the
absence o f any fuel treatments [the burned trees] will pile up on the forest
floor. And when... all the stars [line] up with hot, dry, windy, really good
burning conditions and lots of fire ignitions, as happened in July and August
of 2000, now we’re going to have this insurmountable and very, very
impactive disturbance both to people and communities and natural resources
(Interview 6:3).
Along these lines, the BNF defended its decision noting the importance of
breaking up “large contiguous blocks of heavy fuels that are created when... burned
trees fall down” (Missoulian, October 11, 2001). Debate continues as to whether the
“rebum hypothesis” is valid. Some fire scientists argue that logging in burned areas
actually increases wildfire risk, or in the least, is not ideal if recovery of ecological
integrity is desired (Beschta et al. 1995, Donato et al. 2006). This tension proved
divisive among BNF stakeholders, and pitted the agency’s preferred science against
external science— some of which was authored by federal government scientists
(Beschta et al. 1995, Donato et al. 2006).
The Administrative Appeals Exemption
What was, perhaps, the most controversial issue of the early stages of the
Bitterroot conflict arose in conjunction with the BNF’s release of the FEIS in October
of 2000 and the BNF’s subsequent Record of Decision (ROD). Some respondents
noted that BNF’s actions under the FEIS/ROD were presented to USFS officials by
Michael Gippert (USDA Assistant General Counsel) and USFS executives in
Washington D.C. (Interview 8). These officials presented a strategy to exempt the

50

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

BNF from the normal administrative appeals process on more than 5000 acres of
burned forest lands (Interview 8).
Gippert noted in a September 2000 meeting in Washington D.C. that in the
previous administration, President Clinton’s Undersecretary of Agriculture for
Natural Resources, James Lyons, had often signed records of decision for
controversial decisions so as to exempt projects from administrative appeal by
citizens or NGOs (Interview 8). At this juncture, the feeling among involved
USFS/BNF officials including then Supervisor Rod Richardson, then Deputy
Supervisor Spike Thompson, then Regional Forester Dale Bosworth, and then BNF
Planning Leader Stu Lovejoy was that the environmental community had drawn a

hard line and would sue if the BNF pursued its preferred management alternative
(Interviews 2, 8, 9, 10, 12).
Because no party had previously sued on the issue of exempting projects from
administrative appeal (vis-a-vis the Undersecretary of Agriculture for Natural
Resources signing the ROD), Chief Bosworth and Undersecretary Rey assumed this
process to be legal. It seems that this approach was, in fact, not a new one—
theretofore comprising an occasional administrative habit in previous administrations
(Interview 12). Because their supervisors believed the exemption to be legal and
appropriate, BNF officials also assumed that avoiding the administrative appeals
process in this manner was legal. The subsequent court holding in Wilderness Society
v. Rey, would invalidate these assumptions, illuminating nuances of laws governing
USFS management that agency managers had not considered (180 F.Supp.2d 1141).
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USFS officials, managers, and concerned political figures wanted to salvage log
as soon as possible in order to capture maximum market value for burned timber,
which loses market value over time (Interviews 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 26B, 27).
Environmental interests would later argue that time was, likewise, of the essence with
regard to ecological restoration activities including road upgrades (Interviews 15, 16,
17, 18). Environmentalists propounded this argument, because the ecological impact
of soil-related disturbances (such as sediment loading to streams and rivers) is frontloaded with regard to the variable of time (Agee 1993, Interviews 15, 16, 17, 18).
For their part, some in the environmental community saw the USFS’ emergency
exemption/exclusion strategy in a different light than did agency managers. Larry
Campbell of Friends of the Bitterroot noted,
And [the BNF] very quickly they came up with this scheme where Mark Rey,
Undersecretary of Agriculture—because he wasn’t a Forest Service
employee—was asked to sign the record of decision and they claimed it would
[release] them from the legal responsibility of the appeal process because that
only applied to the Forest Service. And that in my view was, at that point is
where [I became] really disappointed (Interview 15:16).
Pacific Rivers Council Senior Staff Scientist and Research Associate Professor
(University of Montana and Oregon State), Chris Frissell, noted,
The legal interaction was hastened by the Interior [(sic)] Undersecretary Mark
Rey’s decision to circumvent appeals regulations in this case and sign the
record of decision himself... That pushed everyone into acute legal conflict at
the point where most of us weren’t . .. quite prepared to go there yet (Interview
18:6).
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USFS Chief Dale Bosworth noted of this critical juncture,
It had gone on for almost a year. People had pretty well said that [were] any
timber... removed they were going to go to court. Some of... what I call the
more hardcore environmentalists had said that... that’s their position. And
so... given... that they stated they were going to court, the purpose of the
administrative appeal is really to try to resolve things that way rather than
going to court. And so it doesn’t make a lot of sense to go through all that if
you don’t have to (Interview 12:5).
Chief Bosworth qualified his comments by describing courts and administrative
appeals as being separate from public involvement, “They’re the result of public
involvement not having worked” (Interview 12:6). According to Chief Bosworth’s
logic, the BNF’s post-wildfire public involvement efforts did not work. Thus, a “he
said-she said” came to exist between the USFS, environmental interests, and
extractive interests. Chief Bosworth indicated that environmental interests were
opposed to “any timber” being removed (Interview 12:5). The “Conservation and
Local Economy” alternative propounded by some local residents and some local
environmental NGOs, however, entailed salvage logging and thinning within the
WUI. Evidently the USFS and the environmental groups entertained different
definitions of such key terms as WUI, salvage, and timber.
Some of the 5,000 acres the BNF sought to exempt from administrative appeals
occurred in watersheds that were habitat for threatened and/or endangered salmonid
species (bull trout [Salvelinus c o n f l w.s]/westslope cutthroat trout [Oncorhynchus
clarki lewisi]) (Missoulian, October 11, 2001). This reality fueled a backlash by
some local residents and environmental groups. BNF Deputy Supervisor Spike
Thompson believed the requested emergency exemption would not prevent appeals in
[federal] court, suggesting that the ultimate recourse still remained for public sector
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opponents of the BNF’s salvage and restoration plans {Missoulian, October 11, 2001).
Nonetheless, the BNF postponed a final record of decision on the BAR project largely
in response to opposition to the final environmental impact statement. This
opposition came from those who preferred less salvage logging than was proposed as
well as those who preferred more {Missoulian, November 20, 2001).
Some of those dissatisfied with the FEIS and/or the degree of public involvement
and character o f that involvement staged protests at the BNF headquarters in
Hamilton, MT {Missoulian, November 21, 2001). Ellen Engstedt, a lobbyist for the
Montana Wood Products Association, noted: “The Forest Service is stuck in the
middle... No matter which way they fall on this decision, they are going to fall”
{Missoulian, November 20, 2001).
It became clear that Larry Campbell and other environmentalists were primarily
concerned with three umbrella issues: 1) the spatial scale and volume of the proposed
salvage logging, 2) the notion that 34% of proposed logging would occur in roadless
areas, and 3) the appropriate consideration of threatened salmonid {Salvelinus
confluentus, Oncorhynchus clarki lewisi) populations {Missoulian, November 20,
2001).

By November of 2001, USFS executives in Washington D.C. were well aware of
threatened litigation regarding the BNF’s plan to salvage log more than 45,000 acres
of burned forest (Alternative F). The agency and stakeholders had, once again, come
to very public impasse regarding management of the BNF. Both the national and
international media thoroughly tracked these events. Chief Bosworth noted in a letter
to Under Secretary of Agriculture, Mark Rey, that, “The exchange of paper” that
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occurs under administrative appeals “will not serve to illuminate the public or the
agency, but merely delay likely litigation.” To this end, Bosworth requested that
Under Secretary Rey ratify the BNF’s Burned Area Recovery Plan and associated
final environmental impact statement. Bosworth stated further, “I think it is in the
best interest of the public, the agency and the resources to get on with this entire
project” (Missoulian, November 28, 2001).
In the meantime both extractive and environmental interests marched on the
Forest Supervisor’s office in Hamilton (Missoulian, December 11, 2001). On
December 17, 2001 Undersecretary of Agriculture Mark Rey co-signed the Burned
Area Recovery Plan Record of Decision along with Chief Dale Bosworth, Regional
Forester Bradley Powell and BNF Supervisor Rodd Richardson (USFS 2000B).
Litigation
Immediately following the release of the ROD, two coalitions, comprised largely
of non-profit environmental groups, sued the BNF/USFS in U.S. District Court.
Taken together, Plaintiffs’ claims accused Defendant BNF/USFS of:
(1) Violating the ARA by circumventing administrative appeals
(2) Violating the NEPA by failing to adequately address appropriate science
in the FEIS
(3) Violating the NFMA by failing to insure viable management of indicator
species and sensitive species
(4) Violating the NFMA by failing to insure that soil resources will be
conserved and that soils will not be significantly impaired or irreversibly
damaged and
(5) Violating forest plan standards and guidelines (CV 01-220-M-DWM
2001 ).
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The Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief preventing implementation of the BAR
project as well as declaratory relief deeming the USFS’ attempt to circumvent the
administrative appeals process arbitrary and capricious (and in violation of the ARA)
(CV 01-220-M-DWM 2001). In essence, Plaintiffs sought to ensure that the BAR
project adequately and scientifically considered ecological and natural values.
Administrative laws tend to hinge upon notions of “arbitrary and capricious”
agency action—particularly in the context of laws such as the Administrative
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-559, 701-706) andtheNEPA (42 U.S.C.A. §§
4321-61). These laws, in turn, evoke notions of administrator-accountability,
minimum standards o f public involvement in agency decisions, and— in short—some
injection of democracy into the discretionary power of individual government
decision makers.
There were originally two coalitions of plaintiffs. One coalition including the
local group, the Friends of the Bitterroot, hoped to proceed on substantive claims that
would undermine agency policy and scientific arguments relating to the prudence of
active management in burned public forests. The coalition, including wealthier
national organizations such as Earthjustice and the Wilderness Society, sought to use
the more efficient and time-tested procedural claim approach. The national groups’
preference to file suit under procedural claims, as opposed to substantive claims
(relating to ecological impacts actuated by salvage logging, road building, and other
post fire management actions), proved to be divisive within the environmental
community and the greater public lands stakeholder community.
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Herein arose a tension between the political and financial expediency of a
procedural claim, and riskier but higher-stakes ecology-based tack that would attempt
to force the USFS into acknowledging and acting upon a particular body of science
and technical information that did not comport with agency policies on post-fire
management and/or interpretation of that same information (Interviews 2, 8, 9, 10, 12,
26B). This distinction is illustrative of the reality that there is no single
“environmental” community, just as there is no single “industry” community.
Soon after Undersecretary Rey signed the ROD, Judge Molloy joined
(consolidated) the two law suits. Those litigants preferring to sue primarily on
procedural claims won out within the forced environmental coalition opposing the
USFS. Larry Campbell called this split within the environmental community a
“watershed” event.
The paths split in the environmental side because what happened at that point
is you’ve got these heavyweights, the Wilderness Society, Sierra Club, and
Pacific Rivers came in with Earthjustice and argued on procedural grounds,
which I’m glad they did. [Rey’s signing the ROD] was a totally illegal
maneuver, which Molloy confirmed. But then what happened, and what
actually usually happens in these court cases is—now as far as the public
goes, the whole argument is procedural... meanwhile, our homework prior to
that had been all based on substantial damage to the environment (Interview
15:16-17).
The Government responded to the Plaintiffs’ complaint, arguing that the
administrative head of an agency has the right, at any time, to re-assume an authority
delegated to subordinates and thus make a final administrative decision, and that
consequently, Undersecretary Rey’s decision was not subject to the appeal
requirement of the Appeals Reform Act (180 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1144). The
Defendants’ attorneys further argued that “the public interest squarely lies with
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making productive use of dead trees where doing so will not only result in no
negative environmental impacts, but will result in positive externalities... Even the
delay of one season renders the provisions of the project considerably less viable”
(.Missoulian, December 29, 2001).
Legalese
Government attorneys propounded this argument based upon ambiguous language
in § 1506.11 of administrative regulations guiding implementation of the NEPA (36
C.F.R. § 1506.11). This language states,
Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action with
significant environmental impact without observing the provisions of these
regulations, the Federal agency taking the action should consult with the
Council [on Environmental Quality] about alternative arrangements.
Agencies and the Council will limit such arrangements to actions necessary to
control the immediate impacts of the emergency. Other actions remain
subject to NEPA review. (36 C.F.R. § 1506.11)
In effect, this administrative provision provides both flexibility and a loophole,
whereby an agency may hypothetically bypass normal administrative processes such
as soliciting public comment, hearing administrative appeals, and the like, so long as
the agency can justify its actions as “an emergency.”
Administrative rules allow USFS officials, including the Chief and Deputy Chief
to declare situations to be “emergencies” per the aforementioned NEPA
administrative language (36 CFR 215.10(d)(l)(iii)). Former BNF Supervisor Rodd
Richardson had, in fact, petitioned USFS Chief Bosworth to declare an “emergency”
on 4800 acres “to allow immediate tree cutting... and to decommission about 12
miles of road” (180 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1144). Supervisor Richardson had already
petitioned Chief Bosworth on October 1, 2001— well before the release of the final
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environmental impact statement. Chief Bosworth did not act on this petition. This,
perhaps, suggests that Chief Bosworth remained unpersuaded that an emergency
existed as Supervisor Richardson had argued via his petition to the Chief. Whether or
not it was his intent, Chief Bosworth’s failure to respond to Supervisor Richardson’s
request left the impression that he did not support acting under the umbrella of
“emergency.”
Importantly, the government’s principal legal argument, both in briefs and during
trial, was based on an “emergency situation.” Such fundamental contradictions in
logic do not play well in court. Wilderness Society v. Rey notes,
At the January 3, 2002 oral argument I asked counsel for the United States to
explain why the Chief would not exercise the legal authority vested in him to
permit the logging while an administrative appeal was pending, but at the
same time would argue in court that the Temporary Restraining Order should
be dissolved because emergent conditions this winter require immediate
logging. The issue involves the same logging identified by Rodd Richardson.
No answer other than empathy with the Court's conundrum was offered (180
F.Supp.2d 1141, 1144).
Judge Molloy’s opinion continues,
Perhaps the explanation lies in what happened next, the extra legal effort to
circumvent the law. On November 23, 2001 Chief Bosworth instead asked
Mark Rey, the Department of Agriculture Undersecretary for Natural
Resources and Environment, to sign the Record of Decision for the BAR.
Chief Bosworth reasoned that having Undersecretary Rey sign the ROD
would relieve the Forest Service from any administrative appeals process,
which Bosworth reckoned would delay implementation of urgently needed
restoration actions. This unique approach looked to create a non-existent
statutory exception by relying on a strained textual reading of the governing
statutes and regulations. Chief Bosworth then asked Undersecretary Rey to
delay any decision until December 10, 2001 so the Forest Service could
provide notice that Undersecretary Rey would sign the ROD. This too was a
novel approach to the law (180 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1144).
Specifically, government attorneys failed to successfully address the Appeals
Reform Act (16 U.S.C. § 1612). From a legal perspective, this omission could be
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interpreted as poor lawyering through a lack of thorough preparation. The likelihood
of such outcomes increases where political motives, as opposed to the strength of a
case’s particular facts, dominate the government’s criteria for defending a particular
case (Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005). Molloy noted of the government’s violations,
By its plain language, the Appeals Reform Act requires the Secretary to
implement an appeal process for decisions of the Forest Service on proposed
actions of the Forest Service concerning projects and activities implementing
land and resource management plans. Title 7 C.F.R. 2.12 allows the Secretary
to exercise authority she has previously delegated, but it does not eliminate
the statutory right to an appeal of a Forest Service decision codified in the
Appeals Reform Act. The Secretary is required by statute to have an
administrative appeal process; the regulation does not alleviate her statutory
duty. Simply having the Undersecretary or Secretary sign a record of decision
of the Forest Service does not diminish the fact that the record of decision is a
decision of the Forest Service. To hold otherwise defies common sense. All
the work on this case from start to finish was done by Forest Service
employees or administrators. The implementation of the project, whatever its
parameters, will be by the Forest Service and its employees. The notion that a
signature by the Undersecretary transforms the action from Forest Service
business to the business of some other agency is mystical legal
prestidigitation. The decision, not the signatory, is the operative fact for
purposes of the Appeals Reform Act. The Secretary may not escape her
statutory duty to provide an appeals process by completing the signature line
of a Forest Service record of decision (180 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1148).
In short, government attorneys and USFS officials simply did not have their story
straight. Conspicuous contradictions undermined their arguments. This is glaringly
apparent independent of whether one agrees with Judge Molloy’s interpretations of
the NEPA and the ARA (16 U.S.C. § 1612). Some did not agree with Judge Molloy.
A lobbyist for the Montana Logging Association, Julia Altemus, noted of the BNF’s
attempt to bypass the appeals process,
I think... there is a perfectly legal [explanation], unfortunately, Judge Molloy
doesn’t know about it or doesn’t care to respond, but there’s a perfectly legal
alternative within NEPA. CEQ [(President’s Council on Environmental
Quality)] is in charge of NEPA. CEQ is under the administration. At this
point this is Bush, [but] the Council of Environmental Quality exists because
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the President wants it there. Now it doesn’t matter which President. It was
[there] under Clinton. I mean, it’s been [there] under other ones. But because
of that, there is an alternative arrangement that can happen under NEPA that if
you have an emergency... you can ask for an emergency exemption from the
Secretary, which is what the Forest Service did. It was the first time it had
been used, maybe ever. I don’t know, but certainly in a long time. And
because it was a CEQ-sanctioned act, [Chief] Bosworth decided that
[Undersecretary] Mark Ray was the one that should sign it. Perfectly
legitimate. Probably where I would have suggested that they go also.
The environmentalists didn’t like that. It was the first time that the Regional
Forester or the Chief of the Forest Service had not signed a record of decision
and they didn’t like it. And that’s why they filed. They felt that there was
some kind of back room, behind-the-scenes discussions going on. I mean,
they looked at salvage as some kind of a give away to the timber industry
which, you know three’s not a lot of value in salvage. But we’ll do it because
it needs to ecologically be done. There wasn’t any back room dealings. It
was just because o f... this language and that was what they decided to do.
Now, the environmentalists in their motion stated that that was illegal and
they couldn’t do that, and they cited other things in forest law as why they
can’t. However, they didn’t cite [the alternative arrangements], which is also
law, and it does take precedence in an emergency situation. And Molloy’s
motion says that the environmentalists are right and so that’s why he gave
them the temporary restraining order (Interview 10:4-7).
Judge Molloy’s opinion in Wilderness Society v. Rey addresses each legal issue in
the aforementioned commentary. But, like the USFS’ attorneys, Ms. Altemus
assumes an action to be legal because it had not before been challenged in court. For
instance, segregated schools, buses, and diners were once “legal” by virtue of having
never been challenged. Brown v. Board o f Education (347 U.S. 483 (1954)) and a
series of subsequent cases clarified germane law.
The law is dynamic. Moreover, Ms. Altemus seems unaware of administrative
law and the importance o f a complete agency record as provided by the
administrative appeals process. It is the spirit of administrative law—in addition to
its letter—that should tell a federal manager that the BNF’s actions were illegal.
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Finally, as did the USFS’ attorneys, Ms. Altemus looked upon the NEPA’s vague
alternative arrangements language, and imputed contemplation of the fact pattern at
hand. This imputation would perhaps be tenable in some scenarios, but not when
weighed against the clear language and intent of germane administrative law,
including the specific statute (the ARA) which required the USFS to provide an
opportunity to administratively appeal any action relating to implementation of land
management projects (106 Stat 1372, 322).
In the end, the Court found that the BNF/USFS violated procedure in its
attempted avoidance of the administrative appeals process. Judge Molloy noted that
the USFS’ ostensible reason for attempting to circumvent the administrative appeals
process was “to speed the matter to its likely destination, this Court.” Further, Judge
Molloy stated that this motive was based upon invalid assumptions and that the
administrative appeals process must be followed (180 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1148). In
light of this violation, Judge Molloy granted the Plaintiffs a temporary injunction and
remanded the case to the USFS for reconsideration (180 F.Supp.2d 1141,1149).
The Court did not address claims beyond that of the appeals exemption, as the
USFS was found to be in procedural violation (180 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1150). In effect,
the plaintiffs’ suit garnered injunctive relief on procedural grounds before substantive
issues could be addressed. An example of a substantive issue might include the
federal attorneys’ claims that salvage logging has “no negative environmental
impact” (Missoulian, December 29, 2001). Notably, procedural claims tend to be
more straightforward and less costly than substantive claims, which can require
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voluminous document review, expert testimony, and otherwise more vast
expenditures and consumption of judicial resources.
In the meantime, Defendant BNF/USFS took two weeks to file its appeal of Judge
Molloy’s ruling, which had, in no uncertain terms, rebuked USFS officials at both
local and national levels. Judge Molloy’s opinion and the official record, bespeak the
Judge’s frustration with the behind-the-scenes gamesmanship of Washington D.C.based officials who seemed content to allow local managers bear the burden of
responsibility when chosen and de facto management strategies failed. Further, the
Judge exhibited little tolerance for the inchoate and contradictory arguments
propounded by the government’s attorneys. Why would the government take two
weeks to file an appeal when it repeatedly argued that the BNF needed to conduct
immediate emergency action? Certainly there were bureaucracy-related delays as
might be associated with any agency action, but no matter the explanations, the
undeniable effect was that of weakening and ultimately rendering moot the
government’s own claim of emergency.
Meanwhile, the lawsuit sparked a backlash within the timber community and
wood products industry. They took their concerns to Montana Governor Judy Martz
who stated in reference to the pending litigation: “The obstructionists got ahead of us
while we were making a living... It’s not going to be an easy haul, but we are not
going to let them walk all over us anymore” {Missoulian, January 31, 2002). While
elected officials like Martz oversimplified and polarized the debate (Vaughn and
Cortner 2005), associated issues came to dominate local, state, and even federal
politics (if for a short time).
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The adversarial posturing and filing of related motions continued in Federal
District Court in Missoula until early February of 2002. Issues relating to
“democracy” and rights relating to public participation began to stand out among
competing arguments and viewpoints. Is administrative process and legal redress
“obstruction” as Governor Martz noted, or are such rights inherent to democratic
processes? Governor Martz, who served as Chair of the Western Governors’
Association, told reporters, “I would like to do away with appeals period” (Vaughn
and Cortner 2005:153). Thus were spun the inherent value conflicts within the story
of the aftermath of the wildfires of 2000. Martz’ comments embrace a technocratic or
unilateral decision-making paradigm, while environmentalists were fighting for a
more deliberative process.
On February 1st, attorneys for the federal government told the Court that
emergency restorative action on 5,400 acres of the burned area was required within
21 days. This stood in stark contrast to their initial arguments relating to “the
productive use of dead trees” {Missoulian, December 29, 2001). Ostensibly,
government attorneys now took a different argumentative tack—this time based on
potential harm to endangered salmonid (Salvelinus conjluentus, Oncorhynchus clarki
lewisi) populations within the burned watershed. Specifically, the government argued
that five separate proposed salvage harvest operations needed to be carried out before
spring thaws posed increased risk of erosion and sediment loading to associated
streams.
The government noted,
Failure to proceed with winter work will harm bull trout and westslope
cutthroat trout by delaying and jeopardizing the ultimate completion of
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roadwork necessary to reduce stream sedimentation; increase the future risk of
unusually severe fires by delaying and jeopardizing the ultimate completion of
fuel-reduction harvesting; and harm local businesses whose operations have
been curtailed, first as a result of the fires, and now as a result o f the Court’s
injunction (.Missoulian, February 1, 2002).
Federal attorneys were crafting arguments that would, in their judgment, comport
with Judge Molloy’s interpretation of the NEPA, the APA, and the ARA. Although
their legal advocacy was likely zealous (as all legal advocacy should be), it was not
rigorous (as effective legal advocacy should be). In response to the government’s
emergency motion, Judge Molloy ordered the parties to enter a mediated settlement—
and to take no longer than two days to reach a compromise. Judge Hogan, a federal
District Court Judge from Oregon, would conduct the mediation process. On the eve
of the settlement conference, BNF Supervisor Rodd Richardson stepped down from
his supervisory role to take a more specialized position in the USFS Regional Office,
although he would still participate in the negotiation (Missoulian, February 5, 2002).
Being an experienced and well-regarded judge, Molloy understood that
negotiations and settlements are of little value unless all decision makers are at the
table. Despite what would prove to be novel and unforeseen occurrences with regard
to the post-settlement outcome, Judge Molloy attempted to gather the appropriate
decision makers in one room to iron out differences and enforce resulting promises.
Despite his signing the ROD and being formally involved in the BAR conflict,
Undersecretary Rey attempted to avoid participation in the settlement negotiation,
which seemingly irked Judge Molloy. In a formal motion (request) to the Court, U.S.
Attorney William Mercer asserted, “Representatives of the United States with
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ultimate settlement authority will attend, even if Mr. Rey does not attend.” Judge
Molloy’s responding order stated,
The Court specifically ordered Mr. Rey to be present in person in
Missoula on Tuesday, February 5 and Wednesday, February 6, 2002 to
participate in mediation. Further, the United States already asked that Mr.
Rey be excused from attending and the Court denied that request.
The purpose of the mediation is to get all parties together to reach a
solution. Allowing one of the named defendants, in fact the very person who
approved the plan, to avoid attendance would undermine the legitimacy of the
session.
Acordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED [(sic)] that Defendant’s Motion
to excuse Mark Rey’s attendance at the mediation is DENIED, [(sic)] Mark
Rey shall be in Missoula, Montana as ordered on February 1, 2002. (CV 01219-M-DWM 44).
The following exchange is that to which Judge Molloy referred in his
aforementioned order. The transcript sheds light on a sometimes tense dynamic as
between the federal judiciary and executive agency political appointees... the
separation of powers doctrine, divided government, and the checked-balance of
power in action:
The Court: Now, when we get off the phone you are all going to be able to
get on the phone with your airline reservation people and, Bill and Richard,
you will have to tell the following people that they will be in Missoula on
Tuesday and Wednesday: Rodd Richardson, Mark Rey, and Dale Bosworth.
They’ll be here on Tuesday and Wednesday. And then each of the plaintiffs
will have somebody with the ultimate authority to make a commitment to the
mediator. And you will be here, everybody’s going to be in Missoula on
Tuesday and Wednesday. And that includes counsel and the three named
defendants and whoever has ultimate authority for each of the plaintiffs’
organizations must be here.
Mr. Mercer: Judge, if I have the ultimate authority, does that obviate the
need to have Mr. Rey here a n d ---The Court: No.
Mr. Mercer: - - Bosworth?
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The Court: You don’t have the ultimate authority, because apparently, these
decisions are being made in Washington D.C. And he must be
here, (emphasis added). (CV 01-219-M-DWM 44).
Judge Hogan, who noted that mediation work was “the hallmark of [his] career,”
conducted the proceedings leading to a settlement agreement as he would most court
ordered mediations (Interview 13:1). The negotiation was not collaborative or
cooperative in the conventional or deliberative democratic sense. Parties were given
an overview o f the process, placed into separate rooms, and subsequently relayed
messages to opposing interests via Judge Hogan. Judge Hogan then massaged
compromises out of each party, wielding as a tool the information that he had gained
from the individual interests in private (Interviews 13, 16, 17, 19). This mediation, as
do a great many court-ordered mediations, worked upon the notion that only the
mediating judge knows the participants’ “bottom lines.”
The Judge, as the mediator, pursued a middle ground whereby all participants
gave a little or a lot. He moved back and forth between isolated parties and
manipulated them (in the literal, objective sense of the word) based on their
incomplete knowledge of the other parties’ interests and resources.
This casts no aspersions on Judge Hogan, but rather illustrates the realities of
court-conducted mediations. “Manipulation” is apt, and judicial efficiency is critical
in driving this strategy to a satisfactory conclusion. This was done in order to quickly
remove this particular conflict from the docket of the overtaxed federal court system.
Judge Hogan accomplished just this, although participants from every value-base and
viewpoint involved expressed dissatisfaction with the process (Interviews 26 A-D).
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However, no participant likely made their judgments or spoke from the criteria of
judicial efficiency—which was of great importance to Judges Molloy and Hogan.
At 2 a.m. on Thursday February 8th, U.S. District Court Judge Michael Hogan
concluded the settlement negotiations over which Judge Molloy had requested he
preside. The parties agreed on a figure of 60 MMBF to be salvaged from 14,700
acres in 19 separate timber sales. 2,000 acres of proposed logging sites would be in
roadless areas (Missoulian, February 8, 2002). With regard to restoration, the USFS
representatives promised stream restoration on 16 miles of stream, reforestation on
33,150 acres, road obliteration on 45 miles of roads, and road storage on 102 miles of
roads. The USFS promised, further, to allocate $25.5 million to this end (Oregonian,
March 9, 2003). The agreement was memorialized in writing in the form of a formal
legal document—the settlement agreement, which was akin to a contract and trumped
all previous plans (interview 13).
Following the settlement Judge Molloy ordered Defendants (upon Plaintiffs’
motion) to pay more than $200,000 in Plaintiffs attorney’s fees and costs, and noted
that the government’s argument was “novel,” but wrong (Missoulian, May 27, 2002).
Broken Promises & False Assumptions
As of March 2003, the BNF had completed 13 of the 500 miles of promised road
upgrades to accommodate timber hauling. Approximately half of the 45 miles of road
obliterations had been carried out (Oregonian, March 9, 2003), while 4,000 of more
than 300,000 acres to be reforested had been planted (New York Times, March 4,
2003). USFS officials attributed the unfulfilled promises to diversion of budgetary
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funds to fight wildfire in subsequent fire seasons, without adequate reimbursement
from Congress (Interviews 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 26B, Oregonian, March 9, 2003).
As of January 2004, 14% of promised Best Management Practices upgrades had
been accomplished, 29% of promised road decommissions had been carried out, 19%
of road storage projects had been carried out, 56% of culvert replacements had been
completed, 56% of fish habitat improvement projects had been completed and 24% of
promised reforestation had occurred (FOB 2004). As of February 2004, $18 million
of the more than $25 million promised for restoration “[was] just gone. It’s not there.
We are not going to get a windfall of $18 million. If s just not going to happen,” said
BNF spokeswoman Dixie Dies, referring to Congress’ diversion of the funds to fight
fire. As of Dies’ statements, more than 9,000 acres on the BNF had been salvage
logged {Environmental News Service, February 9, 2004).
John Grove, a member of the FOB and a retired USFS District Ranger noted,
“The reality on the Bitterroot is that the restoration rhetoric from [USFS] Chief Dale
Bosworth, Undersecretary Mark Rey, and Bitterroot Supervisor Dave Bull has proven
hollow. Actions always speak louder than words” {Environmental News Service,
February 9, 2004).
On February 7, 2005, the Missoulian headlines read: “Group simmers over
wildfire funds: Environmentalists, Forest Service at odds over recovery plan for 2000
blazes” (sic) {Missoulian, February 7, 2005). The same article noted,
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Environmentalists said Friday they “swallowed hard” and agreed to salvage
logging in the Bitterroot National Forest after the 2000 fire season, only to
have the Forest Service violate their trust by not following through on
promises to also restore the burned watersheds and forests. ‘It was a matter of
trust. We trusted that the restoration work would happen,’ said Larry
Campbell, Conservation Director of Friends of the Bitterroot... Two years
after environmentalists, loggers and the Forest Service signed a courtmediated burned area recovery plan... the agency has completed just 17% of
promised road and watershed rehabilitation work... [a]nd most of the $30
million [(sic)] originally appropriated for the Bitterroot’s post-fire restoration
was recalled to pay firefighting bills on other national forests during the 2002
fire season (Missoulian, February 7, 2005).
Thus, the blame laying, distrust, value conflicts, and broken agreements continued
to characterize the Bitterroot settlement and salvage and restoration efforts.
Moreover, this enmity carried over into subsequent forest management actions,
including 2005 ’s controversial Middle East Fork sale—conducted under Healthy
Forest Restoration Act (HFRA) authority (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 6501-6591)— where yet
again, BNF management was shrouded in controversy.
The 2000 salvage and restoration conflicts are a long and convoluted story. The
foregoing account provides a cursory outline of events that transpired and continue to
evolve. Lessons to be gleaned from the saga are many and will continue to develop
over time.
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Chapter 6
Results: A Mosaic of Understanding, What Observers and Insiders Think of the
Perceived Success of State Trust Land Managers as Compared to the BNF
Themes: Leadership, Political and Financial Support, Management Culture
Ellen Engstedt, a Lobbyist with the Montana Wood Products Association, cited
DNRC leadership as contributing to what she perceived to be efficient removal of
burned trees and completion of significant environmental mitigation efforts.
It was the ability of the state, through leadership, to move quickly, to say OK,
this is what needs to happen on the ground. Politically, the [Governor’s]
Administration was 110% behind... Bud Clinch, [Clinch] was the
Administration... I mean, he worked for Montana Logging Association. So
he knows the resource, which is a real plus. [Clinch] had the ability and the
drive to say, look, this is what needs to happen. We need it to happen this
winter because you can be out there in the wintertime. It’s frozen. We can do
a lot of work this winter, which they did that very first year...
The stuff was still smoking, and they were out there seeing what they might
be able to do to clean it up, to do two things: clean it up and do some
restoration, reforestation. And within six months, seven months that was
pretty much accomplished. I mean small parts of it went on another year or
two, but the basic bulk of the cleanup, the salvage was done within a very
short period of tim e... You know, you pay attention to the Clean Water Act,
the Clean Air Act, all those others as well, fishery things. But they were able
to get in real quick on the ground and get work done.
The flipside of that was the Forest Service, the Bitterroot National Forest, and
they started scoping and doing an EIS to the tune of, I can’t remember the
final number, it’s like $1.5 million or something to produce the environmental
impact statement that they finally came up with. In their view... a very quick
timeframe. But it was oh, I want to say a year and a half after the fires had
finished (Interview 11:30).
Engstedt suggests that Clinch’s strong leadership and his ability to gamer the
political and financial support of Montana’s Governor allowed the DNRC to focus
prim arily on salvage while also conducting mitigation measures. Engstedt draws

what became a common comparison: that between the DNRC moving quickly to
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salvage log, and the BNF becoming mired in planning. She believes DNRC
managers conducted salvage logging with an eye toward mitigating ecological
impacts, while also successfully retrieving commodity values. In comparing the
DNRC to the BNF, she suggests that the sum the BNF spent on planning and
conducting an EIS was excessive. This perhaps evinces a negative perception of
NEPA planning and suggests a preference toward synoptic or technocratic models of
management. Engstedt also attributes Clinch’s abilities to lead a salvage operation, to
some degree, to his experiences in the logging industry and the expertise he gained
therefrom.
One DNRC manager attributed political and financial support (in the form of
funding to facilitate immediate management actions) from the Governor’s Office as
spurring prompt action.
It came basically from... the Governor. She was in strong support of Sula and
getting the job done down there. And in order to do that, some activities had
to occur before the ground froze, like in October and November, such as some
of the culverts we wanted to get upsized before spring runoff. We did a lot of
road work, bringing roads up to [best management practices]... because they
needed better drainage than what they had had, because with the fire you’re
going to have more drainage onto roads... So there was a lot of work we had
to get done before the ground froze up by December first or so... We got that
special money to be able to do that up front because we didn’t have any
salvage going on to pay for it yet.
But we got that money, I think, because the Governor was in strong support of
the salvage operation and wanted to see things go well down there and if we
didn’t have to salvage, like I say, I don’t think we would have gotten any
funding hardly at all. We might have been able to do a little bit of stuff. But
you’ve got to be able to make money to be able to fix things up. And, that’s
the way we operate. There isn’t any just pot of cash out there, in DNRC at
least, to be able to just throw at things like that very often, unless they’re
small projects (Interview 22:15-16).
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This commentary speaks to the importance of financial support from political
leaders as being critical to successful agency leadership and the completion of
management plans. This commentary also speaks to the institutional behavior
economist Randal O’Toole has described as “budget maximizing behavior” whereby
a forest management agency must conduct significant commodity extraction-based
measures in order to “fix things up” or, in other words, to replant logged forests,
mitigate erosion, maintain roads, and other non-commodity-extractive work (O’Toole
1988). Although O’Toole developed this theory in the USFS context, this DNRC
manager relates similar institutional behavior.
In the DNRC context, this behavior may be characterized by notions of
conducting the salvage logging activities preferred by political figures in order to
generate internal agency money to be put toward restoration or non-commodity
purposes. This occurs, in part, because legislatures tend to fund extractive
management actions to a much greater extent than restoration or non commoditybased management (Interviews 5, 9, 22, 27).
This budget maximizing or salvage-to-restore behavior and philosophy comprised
another source of tension between both state and federal land managers and their
critics (Interviews 8, 10, 12, 19, 20, 24, 26A, 26B, 26C, 27). This was the case,
because environmentalists preferred that restoration activities occur first, during
initial stages of ecological disturbance. Nonetheless, it is often the reality, that
agencies such as the DNRC and the BNF lack funds to conduct restoration until they
have generated such funds through salvage operations: thus, the “salvage to restore”
or “budget maximizing” model tends to dominate.
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Because the fiscal priorities of certain public stakeholders may differ from those
of political powers that actuate management and agency leadership through political
and budgetary support, there is often tension or conflict over what management
projects receive temporal and fiscal priority. This was certainly the case for the BNF
in the wake of the 2000 fires. This sort of tension was present to a lesser degree for
the DNRC and the Sula State Forest.
Bud Clinch directed the DNRC during its post-fire management on the Sula State
Forest. Clinch believes differences between the DNRC’s and the BNF’s responses to
the fires of 2000 relate to organizational structure and legal mission, but also to
leadership, management approach, and manager culture (Interview 20). He noted that
for approximately a decade, he promoted and promulgated the DNRC’s primary
mission on trust lands: to generate revenue.
Starting eight years before the fires, I was putting a fair amount of effort into
building an organization that understood their mission was to manage those
lands for revenue... For multiple years we worked internally building a
philosophy that understood about timber management, about sustainability,
and about what our mission w as... So we were in the process of building an
organization and a mindset within that organization, that forest management
was an acceptable thing to do (Interview 20:1-3).
It is important to note that terms such as “management” and “restoration” mean
different things to different people. There is, in public land management, an ongoing
battle between stakeholders and agency managers/spokespeople to control the public
dialogue (Clary 1986, Hirt 1994, Vaughn and Cortner 2005). This often manifests in
carefully-crafted word choice by those (of all interests and positions) communicating
with the media and the public. Moreover, it results in an ever-evolving natural
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resource management vocabulary— one that responds, in mercurial fashion, to public
perceptions and sentiments.
In the aforementioned quotation, the DNRC’s Clinch refers to “management” as
including all manner of resource extraction for commodity values so to jibe with the
state trust land mission. Nonetheless, Clinch also suggests restoration and mitigation
efforts would also fall under the “management” umbrella (Interview 20).
Clinch notes that DNRC had a “team spirit” from the director through Tom
Schultz, through the Forest Management Bureau, down to the foresters. Clinch seems
to suggest that by contrast to his agency, the BNF was ambivalent in its approach to
post-fire management.
[I spent time] building this philosophy that doing forestry was OK and that we
didn’t have to hide or be shameful of anything that we did. So that is
probably critical. In fact that when the year 2000 came along and we had that
massive fire year and all this work before us, we already had the group of
people who were poised, ready to respond. And I think that’s quite the
contrary to what the Forest Service [did].
I’m a firm believer... it was good forest management. It’s the type of stuff
that we learned about in forestry school. See, I’m a forester by trade, too,
which that may play into this scenario as well. And I’m the [DNRC] Director,
I’m pretty... supportive of that...
As September came around [we] started preparing for responses, and we knew
the big thing in those kinds of issues is public involvement process, the
environmental issues and all of that. And we learned early on that a couple of
issues were going to be critical, fisheries and water quality impacts associated
with it as well as wildlife. And quite frankly, we’d never dealt with a fire
salvage operation the size that we were faced with there.
So early on in the process, we made the decision that we were going to make
that our priority. We weren’t going to abandon our green program. We were
going to implement as much of our green timber program, but we were going
to do all of this salvage that we could get accomplished. And we did a
number of things that I think were critical to that. We authorized overtime
pay for employees. We brought out some contract and services so that we
could get the type of expertise we needed right now. And we didn’t want to
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siphon off a wildlife biologist that we had that was currently working on other
projects that we didn’t want to fall by the wayside. So we found a wildlife
biologist that we contracted with for several types of analysis that were
critical. And we set ourselves a fairly aggressive timeframe, trying to project
out when do we want to be doing the salvage in terms of winter operation and
then backing up from that, determining, okay, if we wanted to start operations
on January first, when do we have to be advertising logging contracts... [We]
often found out that we were really up against a timeframe. And so we
compressed the timeframes that we could and we did whatever effort we could
to alleviate the impacts associated with that. And we moved forward. And I
think, if I remember correctly, we even had a special Land Board meeting
somewhere around the first of December to authorize the sale of these so that
we could begin the bid process and to move forward.
And that’s another thing that’s kind of different, whereas the supreme
authority over state lands presides with the Land Board, who are five elected
officials here in Montana that are accountable to the people of Montana. And
that’s quite a bit different than you have with the Forest Service [which takes
direction from] Washington, D.C. And that is such an internal quagmire that
even if you had the ear of your Congressman or what, you really don’t ever
get that pressure applied to make things happen.
[W]hen you have the five highest elected officials of Montana engaged in the
process and they’re all tied in very keenly to the political pressures of the state
of Montana, that brings a whole different reflection to it. And I think that
worked to our benefit in that that summer when the Bitterroot burned, there
was an incredible outcry from the public about all kinds of things, everything
from the lack of forest management to lack of response time to, I mean, and at
the point of most of that criticism was the U.S. Forest Service. Certainly the
Land Board, Montana’s five highest political officials, they didn’t want to fall
victim to that criticism. And they saw an opportunity as this whole thing kind
of emerged, that the action of salvage logging was one that seemed to be
politically acceptable. And although they never encouraged or pressured us or
did anything for us to move forward, I think they started seeing the
handwriting on the wall right away that this was a highly supported public
process. And, yeah, probably bring some interesting political dynamics with
it as well because the question gets to be is how come you to work with 25
million board feet within 60 days of the fire, why were we not appealed and
all those types of things? And there’s several reasons for that...
I think that we are viewed differently than the Forest Service by most of the
environmental organizations. We’ve been very, very progressive in our forest
management. In fact, one of the leaders in forestry in the state has been state
lands associated with the DNRC and everything from developing our forestry
prescriptions to leading with the best management practices. And we work
with multiple environmental groups. So I think we had all the right things
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coming together there in that we had pretty good reputation asset on the
ground forestry group. We had timing to where it was immediately following
the fire. Everybody was still reeling from... the biggest devastation that ever
occurred... and then we had this political thing where the five highest officials
were kind of overseeing it...
We just didn’t have an outpouring of opposition. I mean, we met multiple
times with the Friends of the Bitterroot and some others. And ultimately they
came on board. We did engage them early on. We took their comments
seriously. We met with them on the ground, showed them restrictions. And I
think we developed the trust relationship. We did multiple show-me trips
before, during, after. And it’s quite a success story in terms of how that
proceeded compared to what didn’t happen on the federal lands and court
actions and all kinds of things (Interview 20:3-6).
Clinch’s comments are revealing. Interestingly, he reiterates what his managers
had noted regarding DNRC’s culture, and the agency’s clear mission to “manage” or
generate income. He also associates his leadership style with what he learned in
“forestry school.” The implication is that his expertise and professional experience in
the growth and harvest of trees, naturally influenced his leadership of the agency.
The idea that leaders influence an agency’s culture and manifestations of the agency’s
mission is important.
Also, that Clinch would be proud of his silvicultural knowledge and openly
promote timber-focused management or commodity-focused management stands in
contrast to some USFS managers, who increasingly portray many management
actions that include cutting of trees—both large diameter and small diameter, live and
dead—as “restoration,” “forest health,” “fuel reduction,” or “fire prevention”
(Vaughn and Cortner 2005). USFS managers rarely refer to a timber sale as a timber
sale (Interviews 2, 6, 12, 24, 27, 36, Vaughn and Cortner 2005).
A conspicuous result of this tendency to market and package management to
avoid controversy, is one whereby the USFS appears disingenuous or contrived in its
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policy language (Interviews 15, 19, 24, 27, Vaughn and Cortner 2005). The USFS’s
careful word choice—avoiding “timber sale” and other terminology evocative of the
agency’s timber-focused past—is often born of marketing approaches and political
strategists (Interviews 8, 13, 15, 24).
Vaughn and Cortner (2005) note that some environmental groups have used
comparable rhetorical tactics. The net result, no matter who is promulgating policy,
is typically obfuscation, confusion, the appearance of dishonesty, broken
communications, and, in many cases, the perpetuation of ecological ignorance or
misunderstanding among the lay public.
Former DNRC Director Clinch describes a working relationship with the Friends
of the Bitterroot, a litigant in the case(s) against the USFS/BNF. Both Clinch and
State Trust Land Administrator Tom Schultz, as well as the DNRC forester
respondents, describe relationships with NGOs such as the FOB in an objective tone.
Interviews indicate that compromises the DNRC made regarding green trees and
other management issues were matters of political expediency. One could say that
such compromises were impersonal, and the result of a political and economic
benefit-cost analysis regarding potential conflicts. However, one might also attribute
such compromises, in part, to a more deliberative democratic culture and the trust that
comes with the existence of a working relationship. That is to say, there seems to
exist a correlation between the absence of enmity and resentment, and the presence of
administrative compromise on the part of DNRC managers.
Clinch acknowledged the auspices of a mutual trust between the environmental
community and DNRC, but does not advocate collaboration at all costs.
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I’m not saying that I will advocate that you [collaborate] at all costs. I mean
at some point there’s a threshold where you say, hey I’ve done all I can. We
feel we have a good project. We’re just going to go ahead. Sue us if you
damn well want to. And I think that’s not a bad backup philosophy to have. I
certainly think you need to put the effort up front to engage people early, to
take their comments seriously. And I think above all, you have to establish
yourself as a credible organization to begin with. And we had already done
that. I mean, I think for the most part the proof was in the pudding. There
wasn’t a lot of accusations about us not coming through, or [not] fulfilling
obligations in the past or our practices... (Interview 20:6-7).
Clinch notes the importance of engaging people early in any process, taking their
comments seriously, and working through differences to the degree doing so does not
dominate the agency’s financial and human resources. He also stresses credibility
and trust, indicating that the DNRC did what it said what it was going to do. In
effect, the DNRC entered the post-fire management operations on stable footing, with
political capital. There was little pre-existing distrust or animosity. This was a
byproduct of successful leadership.
Since I came to the organization from the wood products industry, there
probably was a little apprehension that I was going to be this new aggressive
harvesting rape and run sort of a guy. And I think if you ask the serious
environmental organizations, none of them can say that. I’ve been successful
at expanding the timber program and getting a lot of that done. But
everybody would be hard pressed to show where harm to the environment
occurred, and it’s because we did it in a thoughtful manner and scientifically based.
I can’t say enough about building an organization that (1) that wants to do
what their mission is, and (2) [is] comfortable and [has]... the right kinds of
individuals that can build productive relationships with these other
organizations.
I don’t know enough about the Forest Service or even the Bitterroot National
Forest to be critical of individuals. But I would say it’s my observation that
generally... the people within the Forest Service timber program have really
changed over the years... [But] I don’t think that they’ve kept up with the
times. I mean, I think you have the old standby foresters that they’re either
retired now or they’re 30-year people that enjoyed the glory days of when you
do whatever you want and it was about how much wood you could get and
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how cheap logging you could offer. And there’s some of that left, people
clinging on. And I think that over the last 20 years they’ve not been very
good at building a timber management staff that kind of blends the new
environmentalism with... their productive capacity of timber harvesting. And
I think they’re kind of disjointed there. I mean, they have a great number of
people internally that have strong environmental beliefs and who tell you all
the reasons why you can’t get something done. And then they have all the
people that are disgruntled because it’s not the way it was in 1965 anymore.
They don’t have a very good contingent that blends that stuff together.
And I think, if I could say what DNRC has, [it] ha[s] that. [DNRC] ha[s] the
good staff of professional foresters that have kept abreast of public concerns
and those issues and they interact very well with that.
[The trust mandate],.. obviously is part of [our success] because that’s
become an issue in several of the lawsuits that we’ve been involved with.
[But], I certainly wouldn’t put it down to simply say that that’s the difference.
I think it’s much more complicated and integrated than that. And the reason
that I say that is oftentimes the issues that bring the Forest Service to their
knees are some of the same ones that are issues that get raised on our
[projects]. So it isn’t simply... that DNRC doesn’t have to comply with
multiple use... We still have to meet the water quality law, the Endangered
Species Act and all of those things. And if you look at the variety of lawsuits
against the Forest Service, those are some of the issues that are intertwined...
So we’re vulnerable on some of those very same claims in spite of having a
trust mandate. The trust mandate doesn’t exempt us from compliance with the
same things that the environmental organizations have litigated the Forest
Service on.
In Montana, if you’re unhappy with a proposed timber sale and you’ve
already looked at it at a local level and it’s still proceeding and you dislike it,
you can come to Helena and you can, well, first you go to Missoula and you
talk to the bureau chief and then you talk to Tom Schultz and then you can
have a meeting with the director himself. And then if you’ve still not got
anywhere, then you come to the Land Board on the day that the timber sale is
being approved. So there’s multiple ways to get involved to kind of get your
point across.
The other thing is we’ve gone through some battles. And I keep saying we as
if I’m still there... DNRC... engaged with some of the key environmental
groups relative to old growth and the Forest Management Plan and while
neither the agency nor the environmentalists came out of all those discussions
thinking that they got what they wanted, it was another example of a lengthy
dialogue and then there has been history of the department implementing that.
And I think even the environmentalists would say [DNRC] has implemented
its Forest Management Plan, its prescriptions and at each individual timber
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sale nobody has ever taken us back in the 12 years I was there and drug us out
to the timber sale and said, “look at this. You told us you were going to do a
selection cut and this is a goddamn clear-cut.” You know, “you told us you
were going to do this. You’ve ruined the bull trout.” Never, never once and
that’d be over maybe 300 timber sales. And so over time I think you build
credibility.
And while people maybe still don’t like it, and I say people, I’m only talking
about a handful of key organizations and their spokespersons, because that’s
really who we deal with. We deal with the few people that were the Friends
of the Bitterroot, the spokespersons there. We deal with Friends of the Wild
Swan and MEIC [(Montana Environmental Information Center)] and
Audubon a little bit. And collectively that’s ten people that are actually the
ones that engage. So if you do enough engaging with them over time and they
see meaningful recognition of their points and of things implemented, I mean,
they have to begrudgingly agree that you’re kind of in compliance (Interview
2 0 :8- 11).

Clinch, in the above passage, intends to dispel the notion that differences in
efficiency and public acceptability between the DNRC’s and the BNF’s handling of
post-fire management, related solely to mission and legal mandate. Clinch stresses
mission clarity, esprit de corps, trust by the various publics, collaborative approaches
to management, and integration of public sentiment into management plans. Also, he
stresses the importance o f having resource professionals trained in modem, integrated
curricula—those that understand both resource extraction, as well as the importance
and complexity of environmental protection, sociopolitical factors, and ecological
integrity. Clinch thinks that the USFS is behind the times in this respect. He suggests
that the BNF managers did/do not successfully approach management from a holistic
perspective. He also indicates that the DNRC follows through and actually
implements management compromises born of collaborative or cooperative
processes. This idea stands in contrast to the BNF, which, for many reasons, failed to
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timely accomplish management goals as dictated by the court-ordered settlement
agreement that followed the fires of 2000.
Theme: Capitalizing on Windows of Public Acceptability
Ellen Engstedt noted that the DNRC’s quick action during initial post-fire stages
capitalized in public fear and fickle public moods. She suggests public perceptions
changed as fires burned out, and thus opportunities to act were quickly lost.
The public... wanted something done. And the longer... the period of time
when you’re not choking in smoke, you know, the public forgets how horrible
it really was, and they forget the whole valley was on fire... [They] see the
devastation now and even did shortly after the fires, but it becomes a little bit
different. Your attitude is a little bit different...
And I think the other side of that is DNRC did do meetings and public contact.
They’re very good at their public interaction. They were also not only
promoting the timber harvest part of it, but they were saying this is what we
need to do to help the land recover. These are the erosion controls we need to
put in. Bull trout, you know, if you care about the fish, then we need to do
some mitigation to help that situation in the long term. And the short term,
it’s really a mess, but in the long term it’s much more beneficial to get in there
and do it, do it quickly. So that was the rationale, as far as I could tell, from
the state side.
On the federal side, now they painstakingly start with their NEPA process.
And the Forest Service, and I will say this to them as well, they’re very
process oriented, which is why they don’t accomplish a lot on the ground.
They get so hung up in how do we get there, that they never get there. Their
whole thing is taking the journey instead of getting to the station at some point
(Interview 11:5).
Engstedt characterizes public fear and frustration at having lived through wildfire in
their communities as contributing to what she belies is a broad base of public support
for salvage logging. She suggests that immediately following wildfire, community
members are supportive of salvage logging in order to garner economic benefits and
help the land. This support she says, diminishes with time.
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Engstedt notes that the DNRC promulgated management strategies and their
underlying scientific premises to the public. Importantly, the management premises
she attributes to the DNRC comprise scientific theories to which other stakeholders
from the environmental community do not subscribe. To this effect, a principal
tension between various stakeholders relates to questions regarding whether managers
can help burned forest ecosystems recover faster than might occur naturally if
ecological processes were left to run their course without interference by forest
managers. This was a major substantive difference between BNF managers and
environmental groups that litigated. Engstedt points out that the DNRC effectively
persuaded public observers that their management strategies would “help the land
recover” (Interview 11:5). Further, she draws a comparison between the DNRC and
the USFS, characterizing the USFS as process-oriented and the DNRC, by contrast,
as results-driven. Again, she seems to prefer a more technocratic or synoptic model
of management, pointing to delay as a salient cost of the NEPA and/or more
deliberative processes.
Themes: Humility, Working Relationships, Dialogue, Trust, & Candor
Tom Schultz, DNRC Trust Land Administrator noted,
Our [post-fire management] wasn’t without a hitch. Nothing ever is... We
were thinking simultaneously with the fire suppression efforts, we’re going to
be in here [and will]... keep the salvage and the restoration simultaneous...
They were both discussed at the same time (Interview 7:1-2).
Shultz’s comments acknowledge that Montana’s state management was not a model
of perfection. This attitude stands in contrast to stereotypes of what are commonly
referred to as “bureaucrats,” and “technocrats”— civil servants who tend to assert
their “technical expertise” (Hirt 1994:XVI, Rossi, 1997, Thomas and Sienkiewicz
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2005). Whether the expertise is legitimate or spurious is of secondary import where
agency-stakeholder relationships are concerned. Schultz’s candor does not fit the
“technocratic” characterization. Schultz notes that any portrayals of state
management following the fires as perfect are erroneous, thus suggesting humility.
Many stakeholders tend to value administrative, ecological, and intellectual
humility (Interviews 9, 14, 15, 19, 24, 26A, 26C). Some critique USFS managers for
lacking humility (Interviews 5, 14, 16, 18, 19, 24, 26A, 26C). Further, some have
cast the USFS in such terms as a “Stalinesque bureaucracy” (Hirt 1994:XVI). Others,
however, have lauded the USFS’ more recent efforts at soliciting citizen input and
holding public meetings, thus suggesting a culture that is evolving to be more open
and deliberative (Koontz 2002).
Larry Campbell of the Friends of the Bitterroot noted of the DNRC,
[DNRC] came up with a plan pretty early on. And they were actually pretty
straightforward. They came, took the initiative and came to us and let us
know what they had in mind when they were planning to get in there and
salvage log it. And you know as far as that goes, they are much easier to deal
with. They’re much more straightforward... Tom Schultz was there, actually,
for one of the trips. And for the most part they’re really personable and they
are straightforward... I think a large part of it is... just their demeanor and that
they would take the initiative to develop sort of this personal, you know, they
came to us and said, hey, come on, let’s go out there and look and we’ll tell
you what we do. And that I think is just their own personal character and
integrity. Some of it, and that they are more, I believe, more honest and
forthright (Interview 15:2-5).
Campbell noted of the USFS,
Whereas the Forest Service, sometimes I kind of feel sorry for them. They’re
in the position where their basic motivation, I believe, is get in there and cut
the big timber because that’s what’s worth the most. But they’re stuck in a
position of having to fabricate these long song[s] and dances about how it’s
good for the ecosystem or at least benign and blah, blah, blah. And so they
have to come up with these tortuous rationales for how they’re benefiting
restoration by salvage logging. Well, right away that puts you in a really
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indefensible position, you know. And yet they got to stick to it if they want to
get to retirement, you know, their retirement funds.
[USFS] basically need[s] to jump through a lot of hoops because of laws
protecting our national forests. Their mission is different. Their mission isn’t
simply to make money. It’s to, you know, protect the soils and the watersheds
and, you know, and then, and by the way, get some timber off the deal. So
basically they’re in conflict.
You’ve got people in there who have risen to the level of being line officers or
decision-makers that are essentially selected by the upper echelon of the
Forest Service which has been politically, you know, badgered and
manipulated into doing the will of the timber industry. You know, so on one
hand what’s really driving the Forest Service is this drive to get the timber out
because of PAC [(political action committee)] money going to politicians like
Conrad Burns and you name it. And even Mark Rey, you know, I mean it’s
really clear these days. Mark Rey, who is later in the story, I mean, he comes
to Missoula... He was directly involved with that. He’s like a timber industry
lobbyist. His allegiance is to the timber industry. And I don’t believe he’s
ever seen a timber sale he didn’t like. You know, so that percolates down into
the decision-makers.
But meanwhile, they are bound, you know, the checks and balances are that
people who are concerned about the environmental ecological health of the
forest can go to court and enforce the laws. And that’s the only thing we can
do... And we can try to get the public to understand, try to win the hearts and
minds of the public (Interview 15:2-5).
Campbell’s language exhibits a trust in and respect for DNRC managers.
Although he does not agree with the DNRC’s management mission for state trust
lands, he has a working relationship with DNRC managers, knows them by name, and
appreciates their proactive efforts at involving him and his organization in
management and planning. Campbell notes that the DNRC does not modify its
salvage plans to the degree he would like, but appreciates other policies that protect
ecological integrity. Campbell expresses distrust for USFS managers, but seems to
sympathize with what he suggests are institutional and cultural forces that work upon
those managers. Nonetheless, he dislikes what he perceives to be disrespect and
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dishonesty toward the public, and an underlying preference for interests that wield
influence through monetary donations to elected officials and political appointees in
Washington D.C.
Campbell’s comments bolster the notion that candor, trust, and working
relationships are built upon honesty and open dialogue as in the deliberative
democratic paradigm. Where processes are more closed, technocratic, or synoptic,
there is greater chance for misunderstanding and distrust.
Daniel Kemmis, Director of the O’Connor Center for the Rocky Mountain West,
noted that the conflicts in the Bitterroot Valley over federal land management were
(and are still) exacerbated by what he calls “intellectual dishonesty.”
[A]s is fairly typical of land management decisions, it was done in a
framework that encouraged people to seek out positions and take sides rather
than to try to resolve the issues up front. And in this case, we had a very
contrived and artificial pressure cooker effort at the end to come up with a
negotiated settlement. But those are not by any means the best conditions for
doing that kind of work.
And then I think that the situation was exacerbated by the fact that the two
sides, or at least the most contentious players on the two sides were both, in
my opinion, engaged in a certain kind of gamesmanship that was guaranteed
to undermine trust and the ability to work together. And what I mean is that
on the one hand, by that time the timber industry had kind of locked onto the
idea that they were arguing publicly that what cutting trees was all about was
forest health. I don’t know who’s supposed to believe that line or why
anybody should. But, yeah, I think that a certain kind of forest management
that involves cutting some merchantable timber can contribute to forest health.
I don’t deny that. I’m just saying that there was a kind of intellectual
dishonesty I think in the way that the timber industry was and still is saying in
effect, what we’re interested in is forest health...
There was, I mean, just going to the other side, then, you’ve got a whole cadre
of environmental organizations that are committed to ending all commercial
logging on national forests. But in any given situation they generally don’t
say that’s what they’re up to. They say that what they’re up to is just trying to
make sure that the Forest Service follows the rules, etc., etc., etc. Well, that’s
intellectually as dishonest as anything the timber industry is doing. If what
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you’re doing is trying to end all commercial logging, then just say that’s what
you’re doing.
So I’m just saying that I think there’s about equal intellectual dishonesty on
both sides in those cases and that it makes it very hard for either side to trust
the other when you’re not saying what your real agenda is. Then it’s hard to
work together...
I didn’t necessarily see that the Forest Service was even trying to encourage
collaboration. Maybe I missed it. But in cases where there has been
encouragement of a collaborative approach, then you have the agency
exercising its discretion in some way that’s contrary to what the collaborative
approach came up with. And that’s very destructive I think. So that’s a real
problem.
I think we need to be looking for ways to empower collaborative processes up
front to actually design the solution and then have that be the solution [where
participants know that their work will be in some way put to use]. That’s not
easy to do... I think that in those terms, that this was an instance that was all
too typical of how things have worked in the old system, that is, you
encourage people to come up with different kinds of solutions. And NEPA
does put an emphasis on multiple alternatives and so on. But if you’re
encouraging people to do that, and there’s really very little likelihood that
anything they come up with is going to be adopted, then you’re just inviting
more cynicism and frustration (Interview 24:1-4).
Kemmis notes that the semantic word-play and carefully-crafted, euphemistic
management and policy language contributed to the BNF becoming embroiled in
conflict. Kemmis believes the BNF’s critics sometimes engage in similar tactics.
Moreover, Kemmis suggests that the NEPA process is flawed or hollow in that
management alternatives preferable to participants in the planning process are rarely
chosen. By contrast to respondents’ perceptions of the BNF/USFS, no respondent
suggested that gamesmanship, “intellectual dishonesty,” or disingenuousness
characterized DNRC management.
DNRC Trust Land Director Tom Schultz described the DNRC’s proactive,
voluntary efforts to compromise with critics among the public.
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Tony Liane was the [DNRC/SSF] area manager. H e... wanted to make sure
we [did] not get into a pissing match over which trees are going to live and
which trees are going to die... [The Sula bum] was in mixed severities... You
can get endless debate over which trees will live and which trees will die...
Fires can be controversial. So we made a call quickly that if there was any
green in the trees, they will stay (Interview 7:2-3).
The DNRC made a voluntary, proactive concession to potential opponents
regarding live trees. This comports with a more deliberative approach to
management. If there was any question as to whether certain trees were still living,
noted Schultz, those would stay. The DNRC foresaw a controversial issue and made
a prospective and proactive concession. It did so for the sake of present and future
efficiency vis-a-vis “give and take” with those stakeholders apt to participate in
management planning.
Although the DNRC’s top-down culture was very much apparent in the agency’s
salvage focus, it was to some degree subject to “bottom-up” and/or exogenous
influences by virtue of its flexibility and openness to compromise and negotiation.
The DNRC seemed to exhibit a management and cultural model that mixed both topdown and bottom-up elements—a deliberative, cooperative, collaborative approach
within a military-like, top-down, synoptic management culture. The DNRC’s
mixture of military-like, top-down leadership with mission promotion and proactive
compromises regarding green trees and other issues, suggests a hybridized
management model.
The DNRC seemed able to compromise with stakeholders during post-fire
management. To this effect, one DNRC field forester noted that there was “no
internal discussion or disagreement as to how to proceed. [However], the decisions
that are made in what direction to take as we proceed down that path... there [was]
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some latitude there” (Interview 22:9). This forester noted further that the DNRC’s
decision not to cut green trees as dictated by the environmental assessment (EA),
“was a concession, or mitigation [effort]... a conscious decision... a compromise”
(Interview 22:9). Moreover, the forester described a working relationship with the
Bitterroot Valley’s primary environmental NGO, the FOB—a plaintiff in Wilderness
Society v. Rey, the case in which the BNF would become embroiled as a defendant.
We did [have a working relationship] with Friends of the Bitterroot. We dealt
with them regularly. I was kind of nurturing that relationship. Yeah. We
were taking them out on some of our timber sales, trying to show them how
DNRC operates, why we need to do what we do, how things, how we manage
the ground... and they were always commenting on our EAs..., wanting
things done a little differently... and yeah, we definitely had a relationship
there (Interview 22:15 -16).
Theme: Trust Mandate as Deterring Challenge from Environmentalists
Matthew Koehler, Director of Missoula’s Native Forest Network (NFN) noted of
the common comparison between the post-fire responses of the DNRC and the BNF,
To some extent it’s comparing apples and oranges. I’ve... gone down there
with some forestry folks and [a] Ph.D. soils [scientist]... They said that what
basically happened from a soils standpoint, they got lucky on the Sula, given
some different weather conditions that could’ve taken place. There would’ve
been some pretty big problems down there. But I know that no one really put
much time or effort into the Sula situation. Just a lot of it has to do with a
different mandate.
Of course all of us [in the environmental community] know [about the
different legal mandate]. I do think it’s rather ridiculous for the richest, most
powerful nation in the world to fund the education of its children like [that]. It
just seems to cause problems, not only on trust lands but on other lands as
well (Interview 16:1).
Koehler believes that the environmental community is well aware of starkly
different legal mandates, organizational structures, and political incentives as between
state trust land management and national forest management. Koehler suggests that
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the DNRC was not of primary concern to his organization, because laws guiding trust
land management do not facilitate inclusion in planning to the same extent those laws
governing USFS-managed lands do. Thus, he suggests, there is little incentive for
groups such as his to invest as much time in becoming involved with DNRC
management. In essence, Koehler suggests that it was the trust land mandate that
precluded significant legal conflict surrounding the DNRC’s post-fire salvage logging
efforts.
USFS Chief-Emeritus Jack Ward Thomas offered similar thoughts to this effect,
“It’s probably the size of the big game you’re after. Why hunt squirrels when you
can hunt an elephant?” (Interview 27:7). Koehler, further, suggests that serendipitous
(cold) winter weather allowed the DNRC to minimize erosive impacts of salvage
logging, and thus draw praise from various stakeholder groups. Nonetheless,
Koehler’s NFN is a nationally-focused group based in Missoula. It has different
incentives relating to participation than do smaller, locally-focused, more literally
“grass-roots” organizations such as the FOB.
Larry Campbell of the FOB noted:
And that, I think, relates to [the DNRC’s] mission. Basically, they can just go
up there and say, we’re going to salvage log this because we can make money
doing it. And then what are you going to say?...
And there’s no National Forest Management Act, you know. They’re not
bound to protect biological diversity and all. So environmentally it’s, you
know, the logging that happens on state land is as damaging, and probably
more so than what goes on... on national forest land. But they traditionally
haven’t been into clear cutting, which is nice. The state lands are much more
into selective cutting. They’re looking in longer term. They’ve got less land.
They need to manage it for sustained use.
But I will add that the Sula State Forest burned much more severely over a
greater percentage of the Sula State Forest and burned more severely than
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surrounding national forest lands because they hadn’t been dealing with the
slash. They’d been lopping and scattering slash because it’s cheaper.
And so they made more [money] doing it. And, boy, when the fire got in
there, whoosh, it went crazy. So, you know, what are you going to do? ...
[W]e couldn’t make any legal arguments. We pleaded for [DNRC] to
mitigate environmental damage [but] ... I don’t think they modified their
salvage timber sales very much to appease us. They [do] have a policy that
we appreciate— and that they were careful to enforce—of not allowing offroad vehicles to get off state road. [On] state land, you cannot take a vehicle
off of the road. And that’s especially important in burned areas like, ‘cause
boy, even when you walk through a recently burned area, all you have to do is
look at your footprints and see the sensitivity of the soil. You know, it’s just
crunch, crunch, crunch. And it compacts and it’s really a mess. So that was
appreciated. But no, I don’t think they modified their timber sale very much.
So 1 think part of the reason they can be so straightforward and forthright is
they don’t have to make excuses, other than we’re going to make some money
(Interview 15:2-5).
Like Koehler, Campbell acknowledges that the trust land mission successfully
deters legal challenge to DNRC management, but Campbell does speak to a more
collaborative, deliberative attitude among DNRC managers.
Theme: Assumptions about the Public as “Vocal Minority” or “Silent Majority”
A USFS Presidential Management Fellow (working in off road/highway vehicle
(ORV/OHV) use planning) expressed sentiments similar to some expressed by the
DNRC’s Bud Clinch. This manager noted that the USFS needs more holisticallytrained managers, but that the agency is largely aware of this need. Further, this
respondent believes that those participating in national forest management planning
hold different core values than the majority of the country’s population.
[W]e have a diverse group of people using the national forest nowadays.
People from local communities, people from urban areas, people from
suburban areas, and in addition to all those diverse groups, we have a clear set
of individuals and groups who now follow a more fundamental value system
based on probably a more, I wouldn’t say hard core, a fundamental value
system that they follow, that guides their life, whether it’s, they think that
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things should be more ecocentric so now they’re going to say, and they’re
going to follow that in terms of something that may be more of a religion to
them or a way of life than it is just something that they think about or read
about on a day-to-day basis. So I think that at the core of a lot of these
problems are fundamental values. If someone is following a, and I used the
example when we were talking earlier about if my fundamental value is, for
example, no commercial timber harvesting on national forests. And that’s one
of the guiding values and principles in my life now. Then every time those
issues come up and it’s in my area, I’m going to be involved in it and I’m
going to have interest in it. And it is likely that I’d probably be less willing to
compromise on alternatives that would meet other people in the middle.
So I think that right now we’re seeing a lot more people involved. And to me
it’s a small number of people. It’s an interested and vocal minority of people
that are involved who are entrenched in these issues and have pretty solid
fundamental values that are guiding their lives. And it’s making it very
difficult for forest managers and others to try and find a middle between
people on the right and left side of any issue...
And so for me, there’s someone who has to be the protectors of that real
public interest. Who is going to take care of that silent majority that isn’t part
of this debate? Yes, the interested minority, you know, their voice needs to be
heard. And that’s understandable. But someone across all of these fences has
to watch out for that public at large that really either doesn’t care or they just
don’t have time to be involved. And I don’t know whether that’s a public
manager, is it his job to draw that line? To make decisions that are in the
public-at-large interest? Or is it to look at local communities that they work
with or those interested minorities and say yes, they’re the ones involved and
we’re going to put more weight on what they want? So to me it’s a delicate
balance...
But I think there’s someone across the spectrum that’s going to have to keep
that silent majority’s interest in mind and make assumptions. You know,
someone’s going to be assuming that the public interest at large probably
wants this or probably wants this or probably wants this. And then they’re
going to have to weigh that against what the interested minority’s telling them
and at some point make a decision and draw a line and say yes, I’m willing to
make some compromises as a manager to address some of the things that you
would like to see on the national forest. But I also have to draw a line because
there’s other people out there that I have to protect in my job. And it’s a
delicate balance.
[F]or public land managers to make some type of competent decision in terms
of public interest, there’s a lot of training and understanding on their part
that’s going to have to be involved. They’re going to have to have more skills
to be able to weigh those things out. And, you know, unfortunately in my
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opinion at this point in time we do lack some of those skills in our technical
resource managers... I think somewhat intuitively... [of the] public interest...
I think a manager [shjould say, well, how can I achieve both objectives? And
the Forest Service is really looking to that (Interview 1:6-9).
Early in this passage, the USFS respondent uses the terms “vocal minority” and
later, the term “silent majority” in reference to environmental organizations or other
NGOs that provide formal comment and litigate. This suggests he believes that the
interests represented by involved NGOs are not the interests of the general
populous— or that the NGOs that submit comment and sue on USFS management
actions are a minority of the general populous in terms of values. While his is not a
wholly pejorative characterization, it marginalizes interests pursued by environmental
NGOs. It also seems to assume that because a small percentage of citizens participate
in land management planning processes, that their values and viewpoints are also
those of a minority of the general population.
In effect, this USFS manager makes the logical leap that the values of the
participatory minority represent the values of a minority of the general public. This
manager thus suggests that the majority of Americans do not share values with the
“vocal minority.” He believes that many Americans are unfamiliar with the nuances
of the national forest designation. This manager suggests that he tries to be inclusive:
“There’s other people out there that I have to protect in my job. And it’s a delicate
balance” (Interview 1:3). By “other” he seems to suggest the citizens who do not
undertake to become involved in land management planning, i.e., “the silent
majority.”
This manager notes: “And I think if we’re going to meet the demands of that
interested minority who has a great impact on the work that we do, but also watch out
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for the public interest, we’re going to have to do better in terms of integrated
management—understanding” (Interview 1:3). While he expresses belief in
integrated management, his words suggest bias with the presumption that the values
of “that interested minority” are distinct from “the public interest.” His assumption
may or may not be correct under any given circumstances, but his words evince a bias
against those participating in the USFS management process and thus suggest a
preference for more technocratic or unilateral management. This USFS respondent’s
words stand in contrast to DNRC respondents, whose words make no suggestions that
those who participate in management are distinct from “the silent majority” or general
populous (Interviews 7, 20, 22, 23, 28).
Similarly BNF Supervisor Dave Bull also referred to a “silent majority” and “the
squeaky wheel,” noting that the silent majority does not have time or energy to
participate as does the “squeaky wheel” (Interviews 8:47, 36:1). Supervisor Bull
expressed frustration at the abundance of press coverage of those who disagree with
BNF management, as opposed to the dearth of coverage of those in agreement, whom
he characterizes as the “silent majority” (Interview 36:1).
Thus, Supervisor Bull’s language suggests that those participating hold values of
a nature that differ from those of the broad population. Such thinking manifests
further in the way some USFS officials indicate they treat public comment solicited
under the NEPA process.
BNF spokeswoman Dixie Dies indicated that the majority of public comments
submitted addressing 2005’s Middle East Fork sale on the BNF were of little or no
import because they were submitted via e-mail or through an NGO’s server (Missoula
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Independent, September 22, 2005). Supervisor Bull also indicated that such manner
of public comment has little effect on his decisions (Interview 36:1). Bull asked
whether the 98% majority of the 11,500 comments were from “people that had
firsthand knowledge and interest in the project” (Interview 36:1). The 98% majority
to which Bull referred opposed the BNF’s preferred alternative for the Middle East
Fork Sale (2005) (Missoula Independent, November 17, 2005).
Managers stressing a silent majority versus a squeaky wheel place these categories
of public stakeholders into a hierarchy. This is an either-or way of thinking. This
binomial approach stands in contrast to comments made by DNRC forest managers
indicating incorporation of suggestions of those participating in land management
planning into final management plans. More generally, DNRC respondents’
comments speak to some level of compromise within the DNRC’s management
mission. The DNRC’s Bud Clinch notes that he dealt with “a handful of key
organizations and their spokespersons” (Interview 20:11). This language, in contrast
to that of multiple USFS respondents, contains no generalizations to the larger
population of Americans or implicit assumptions about a “silent majority”—as do
characterizations and labels such as the “vocal minority,” or “squeaky wheel,” or
“hard core,” or “fundamentalist.”
What can be said about this distinction? The DNRC managers’ seemingly more
objective characterizations of public participants in planning and management
operations suggest more objective, more deliberative, and more open working
relationships, and perhaps a more pragmatic approach to conflicting values among
public stakeholders and agency managers (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9). Independent of
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management outcomes, there was, among some USFS respondents, a distinct attitude
of dismissal toward environmental NGOs (Interviews 1, 3, 2, 8, 9, 12, 26B, 27, 36).
It seems likely that non-agency participants in the USFS management process would
be cognizant of such attitudes if they interact with USFS officials. This likelihood is
reinforced by the notion that 65-90% of communication is nonverbal (Warfield 2001).
And thus, where such attitudes are pervasive, participatory processes are likely to
be unfulfilling for both managers and participants. Under this model of USFS
management, assumptions as to the validity of public comment are made on the basis
of the manager’s preconceptions and assumptions about participants. Under such
circumstances public comments are not likely to be given much weight. It follows
that participating citizens are unlikely to derive satisfaction from their participation.
This reality would logically increase the likelihood of enmity, resentment, litigation
and associated direct and opportunity costs.
Theme: Holistic Management, Holistic Managers
One USFS manager described the increasing need for integrated management,
You know, this theory of integrated management to satisfy diverse interests is
becoming extremely important in the agency. And I think if we’re going to
meet the demands of that interested minority who has a great impact on the
work that we do, but also watch out for the public interest, we’re going to
have to do better in terms of integrated management—understanding. Our
managers have to have more skills than just one natural resource skill. They
need to know more about forest management than just forest or wildlife. I
mean, they have to have that whole toolbox of skills to ever be able to weigh
those things out effectively...
And, you know, there’s people who say, well, we still need specialists and,
you know, all of a sudden we’re going to end up with a bunch of generalists.
But maybe that’s all we need. Maybe that’s all society’s going to ask us for,
you know, a small number of specialists to support a larger number of
generalists who can, at least in public land management, who can better weigh
these types of conflicts and find creative ways of satisfying both of those
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interests, that of the interested minority and protecting the public interest at
large and what they do. So I think it’s essential for the forestry schools, other
schools to somehow be more integrated in their learning cells...
And one example of that... after being on the [national forest] for one week
was that we went out, looked at some restoration work that was done by a
group o f foresters who had been with the Forest Service for a long time. And
they were doing restoration projects that were opening up stands with that old
typical park-like, big ponderosa pine, open vegetation understory. And wow,
look, we have user created OHY trails all over the place because when you’re
going down the road and you’re saying, hmm, where can I ride today? It’s an
open invitation. It’s saying, ride through me because you can ride wherever
you want in a stand like that.
So in terms of, well, if forest managers were better trained on how to do
landscape architecture or what effects recreation can have on the ecosystem,
then maybe they would change their silvicultural prescriptions. Maybe they
would put in a 50 foot buffer along any road so that when someone’s driving
down the road and they’re looking in it doesn’t appear to be an open stand.
Because in other areas where we saw that there was heavy understory
vegetation you don’t have user created trails because they just don’t have the
ability to ride freely.
So understanding, you know, if I look back, and I didn’t have much training in
recreation, if I was out doing a silvicultural prescription as a forester I
wouldn’t have thought of that. And that’s probably the last thing I would
have... Or, you know... the recreation people have seen where the foresters
just aren’t closing the roads when they leave. Well, here come the OHVs. So
a lot of that type of stuff, the more we understand it across all those
spectrums, I think the better we’ll do in all of our decision-making in terms of
how do w e... To me it’s not about restoration work. It’s about how do we do
preemptive management? And that’s my term. Is that preemptive in the sense
of, okay, I have a forest stand and I want to create a better condition than what
it’s in now. Now should I take it back to something that it used to be? Or
should I put it in the stage that it’s ready for what is coming, so it’s ready for
maybe global climate change, so that it’s ready for the number of OHV users
that are going to come up there. Something that maps, you know, we need
better abilities at prediction of what things are going to look like in the future
and try and maybe adapt our stands to be ready for those conditions, whether
it’s OHV or climate or fire (Interview 1:6-9).
This USFS manager sees himself as part of a new generation of holisticallytrained managers. While this manager acknowledges a need for a more integrated
approach, he believes the USFS is on its way to meeting this need. While this
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manager acknowledges the importance of integrated management, he does not stress
public dialogue or discourse as being a prominent part of holistic or integrated
management, and thus would seem to prefer a more synoptic management paradigm
to a deliberative democratic model. That is to say, in his view, the knowledge and
information flows from managers and better training of managers rather than from
dialogue and deliberative discourse with stakeholders.
Theme: Political Pressures as Contradicting the USFS Management Mission
One USFS manager, who had risen through the ranks to an executive post, related
the pressures that worked upon him as a manager.
[SJometimes managers are placed in a difficult situation in that they get
direction and targets and expectations established for them by their superiors
and by the administration that’s in power at the time or in power at the time.
And so on one hand they’re dealing with trying to make their bosses happy,
meeting whatever the targets are for that period of time. And in those cases
where those targets aren’t consistent with what the public values are in an
area, in spite of the fact that they may have all the best intentions of
collaborating with the public and trying to come to solutions that are
acceptable to all sides, when they are under pressure to meet certain targets
and within certain timelines, it just puts them in a difficult spot and it makes it
much more difficult, sometimes, to be as fully open and take the time it needs
to do true collaboration that is probably the best way to at least get to some
point of public consent about moving forward with one program or another.
It’s both [a national and a local pressure]. And it varies. You know, it varies
from year to year, from administration to administration, from individual to
individual. But to the extent that there are national priorities set and to the
extent that people being held accountable where the emphasis is on meeting
targets and accountability for meeting certain targets, that puts a lot of
pressure on people to accomplish those objectives. And again, it just puts
them in a situation that sometimes is difficult for them to deal with in terms of
trying to get the, to have the time to get the collaboration that’s necessary and
to maybe not meet their target but get something that’s more acceptable to the
public on the ground...
I can’t speak for the state. I know the Forest Service, you know, has, in some
ways they may have an advantage in that they have I think a much vaster
array of specialists and skills and people available to them to bring to bear on
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particular issues. But they may not, but because they may be, on the federal
side, on the Forest Service side, because we have to deal with policies and
rules and regulations that are maybe in some ways more constraining than
state agencies may have to deal with, in that sense it could make things more
difficult for us to get things done on the ground and work through some of the
dilemmas and controversies.
I mean, we have controversies on both sides. I mean, on one side of issues we
have folks that are impatient with us for not moving ahead fast enough to get
things done on the ground that they see are important and those policies and
regulations sometimes are the cause of us not moving ahead as fast. At the
same time, the need to take the time to do collaboration to get consent for
getting things done on the ground also can be a reason for not getting things
done quite as fast as some folks would like. On the other side, there are folks
that want us to take the time, would rather have us not even take some
management actions. And so they’re more concerned about us taking the time
or delaying things or trying to keep certain projects from going forward
(Interview 5:2-4).
This USFS employee’s comments speak to political pressures, and to achieving
timber volume quotas or “targets.” BNF Supervisor Dave Bull expressed similar
sentiments, citing the leverage wielded by Montana Senators Max Baucus and Conrad
Bums (Interview 8).
It is important to note that timber quotas or targets as mandated or “encouraged”
by elected officials and/or political appointees are seemingly antithetical to notions of
ecosystem-based management, or of the idea that what you leave on the ground/in the
forests is more important than what you take, as expressed by USFS Chief Dale
Bosworth (Interview 12). However, if such quotas related to ecological thresholds,
then perhaps appropriate quotas could be protective of ecological integrity? The
difficulty, of course, relates to balancing competing management values in creating
such thresholds. To the degree thresholds are created based on Congress-influenced,
centrally-created budgets and influence from the administration, the driving force will
likely be economic return (Interviews 5, 8, 9, 12, 19, 27) as non-market values do not
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tend to be the driving force in public lands politics. Although the Multiple Use and
Sustained Yield Act certainly authorizes timber among its multiple uses, it is, again,
anyone’s guess as to what the appropriate management formula and ratio as between
uses should be under any given circumstances.
Chief Dale Bosworth noted of the USFS’ management mission,
The Forest Service is really focused on a different mission than what we were
on back in the ‘70s and ‘80s and ‘60s. I mean, I think the ‘90s were a period
of transition and I think people in the Forest Service accepted and embraced
an era o f restoration, outdoor recreation as our mission.
And you talk about the four threats to the nation’s forests which are really
restoration kinds of things. One’s fire and fuels, one is invasives, one of them
is loss of open space, and one of them is unmanaged motorized recreation.
And all those are sort of restoration and management focused. And the people
in the Forest Service I think have moved on to restoration philosophy. So I
don’t think it’s as uncertain in people’s minds today as it was during those
years of transition. But still in the public, particularly in the activist part of
the public, my view is that people are still fighting battles that were, that they
won by and large 15 years ago.
You know, we were selling 12 billion board feet [(BBBF)] up to the late ‘80s
and we’re selling 2 now, and that’s about what we’ll probably continue to,
2.2, somewhere in that vicinity. Now if they just look at that amount, it’s like
one cubic foot per acre per year. I mean, that’s a piece of wood that big. I
mean, that’s what we’re removing from the national forest today. Now, I’ll
agree that a lot of it’s wilderness and rock and ice and all that. But if you just
take an average across all the national forest lands, if you take just the forested
lands, it’s like 2 cubic feet. I mean, it’s a pretty infinitesimal amount. And
probably 70% to 80% of what were removed is being removed either for
ecological restoration purposes or for value recovery... That’s the only two
reasons we remove it. The only exception to that is the Tongass National
Forest in Alaska by and large. I mean, you’re not, any timber you harvest in
the Tongass you’re not doing for restoration purposes. You’re doing it for
jobs and economics...
Timber volume is a byproduct of our objectives in probably 70% of the timber
that we produce today. In the 1980s it was probably 90% of the timber that
we produced was to produce raw materials, to produce timber for the
economy and stuff like that. It’s a complete reversal from where we were 15
years ago...
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I’m a pretty optimistic person. And I do think that there are, that we can
emerge from these decades of conflict into a little more collaborative
approach. On the other hand, if you look at our 100 years history from the
date the Forest Service was formed and the national forests were moved to the
Department of Agriculture we’ve been going through controversy, I mean, of
one type or another. We might go through a decade where it’s relatively calm,
and then we get into something again. So it’s been that way from the time
that we started trying to map the boundaries of the national forests and get
them under control. And it’s still that way.
But I don’t think it has to be quite at the fever pitch that it’s been in some
places. In other words, there are other places around the country where I’d
say that it’s relatively quiet regarding controversy. A lot of the Southeast
now, a lot of the country around say Colorado, Wyoming, the central part of
Utah other than water issues, it’s relatively quiet right now. In the Southwest
it’s actually pretty quiet in terms of controversy, except for grazing. And
there’s a place in the Southwest where grazing is a big issue (Interviewl2: 1719).
Chief Bos worth’s comments, when taken with those of the aforementioned USFS
respondents, suggest a discrepancy between the USFS’ internal goals and mission and
the de facto goals and mission that result from exogenous influences, the realities of
congressional and USFS central office budget making, and other intervening forces.
In effect, it appears that despite the goals and desires relating to ecosystem-based
management and ecological integrity, such concepts can be trumped by executive
branch demands, congressional politics, and political “horse trading.”
This appears to have been the case following the wildfires of 2000 in the
Bitterroot Valley. Supervisor Bull, District Ranger Dave Campbell, Chief Bosworth,
as well as anonymous USFS respondents related such political pressures as
influencing management (Interviews 2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 26B, 27). Nonetheless, these
realities are rarely, if ever, mentioned in explaining budgetary problems to the public.
According to some of the same USFS respondents, this “silence” is, in part, a result of
agency culture (Interviews 5, 8, 9, 15, 26B). Complaining to Congress or elected
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officials about the paradoxes of USFS management is taboo (interview 8). This may
be a cultural reality of the USFS, but when such realities exist, and a manager cannot
relate the truth to an angry public for risk of losing her job or suffering workplace
alienation (Interviews 8, 9, 15, 19, 24, Matson 1996)—then an insoluble paradox
exists (Interviews 5, 8, 24, 26B).
Multiple Truths
Science involves the continued and intense pursuit of knowledge and truth. Yet
successful conflict resolution requires acknowledging multiple “truths” or multiple
constructions of reality (Berger and Luckman 1966). Can science accommodate
multiple political realities? Can the multiple political stances find a common
scientific truth? The interview process followed here makes apparent that there are
indeed multiple divergent perspectives, which are likely regarded as “truth” by
respective subjects. Thus, if managers and policy makers hope to mitigate or avoid
protracted legal/political conflicts, it is logical to acknowledge the existence of
applicable divergent “truths.”
It is, then, logical to work toward reconciliation of conflicting views and finding
common ground rather than, or in addition to, analyzing these myriad truths in a
hierarchical framework upon which management decisions might be based.
Examination of the data associated with this study suggests that before any
substantive progress may be made in the management of federal lands, managers of
these lands and their counterpart environmental NGOs and industry-related
stakeholders must move beyond personal enmity, disrespect, and vitriol toward better
working relationships as exhibited by the DNRC and the NGOs of Western Montana
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and elsewhere. Although some NGOs from both ends of the political spectrum may
be characterized as conflict prone or litigious (Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005), many
stakeholder groups are not inherently litigious. Many stakeholder groups simply
respond in kind to behavior of those already acting (or failing to act) within their
particular spiral of conflict.
Core value differences aside, persons interviewed in the course of this study
communicated a distinct tendency among DNRC managers to engage, involve, and
solicit information and advice from diverse stakeholders—to a degree beyond that
required by applicable law (Interviews 1-37). This would tend to comport with more
deliberative models of governance. DNRC managers and executives communicated
active promotion of an inclusive management culture. In a sense, DNRC managers
injected public involvement into the management of lands whose designated
management purpose is economically driven (Sienkiewicz 2006).
One can reasonably theorize from data that in the case of the aftermath of the
wildfires of 2000, the DNRC’s voluntary, prospective, proactive involvement of
stakeholders into management decision making begot diminished controversy and
avoided conflict-related costs over the longer-term. Importantly, DNRC managers
compromised with environmental interests from the beginning. These compromises
were manifest in tangible, concrete planning and management successes.
By contrast, there was a pattern among USFS respondents to regard participants
in the NEPA process as “other,” “interested minority,” “squeaky wheel,” “hard core
environmentalist,” or “fundamentalist.” Without empirical data suggesting these
interests are, in fact, different than those of the general population, local population,
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or any population to which a manager is generalizing—then such characterizations
evince a bias. The stereotypes described by some USFS respondents may, in some
cases be true. Nonetheless, the suggestion that all or many participants in the NEPA
process are outside of the larger population’s value-norm is problematic.
Whether or not this bias affects management is a separate issue, but such
appearances or perceptions seem likely to exacerbate controversy and mistrust. The
DNRC, ostensibly shares the management goal of significant timber harvest with the
USFS, however DNRC manager and forester respondents made no use of the
aforementioned marginalizing language. Vaughn and Cortner (2005:137-142)
describe the marginalizing language used by some USFS respondents as rhetoric.
Theoretical Applications
Neither the USFS, nor the DNRC, could legitimately be described as pure
manifestations of the deliberative paradigm as outlined by Dryzek, List, Poisner, or
others. The deliberative paradigm and its focus on direct, ongoing dialogue is
contrary to the historic and present management cultures of both the USFS and the
DNRC. Moreover, the complicated administrative structures, scale of management,
and political nature of public lands governance have so far precluded a purely
deliberative, or even a significantly deliberative, model of management.
Both the USFS and the DNRC are dominated by one or many natural resource
and forestry-related skill sets, which in turn, come with particular attitudes and
cultures attached. These cultures and attitudes influence what managers might feel is
right, just, or appropriate management given certain conditions. Such dominant
management cultures are distinct from the goals and values that would rise to the
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surface given the presence of deliberative democratic processes. Despite the presence
of technocratic or expert-dominated agency cultures, it would not, however, be fair to
describe either agency as purely expertocratic and closed to outside influence.
Within both agencies there exist technocrats and experts that believe they know
what the best course of management is. This belief is evident in respondent
comments suggesting an agency manager is attuned to the public good, to the
interests of “silent majority,” etc. Nonetheless, the NEPA paradigm (and its state-law
counterpart for DNRC) and its mandated consideration of public input, reduces
technocratic unilateralism to the extent managers are prompted to address a wide
range of management considerations. Moreover, the USFS and the DNRC both
exhibit synoptic traits, in that management must synthesize across many different
natural resource disciplines: forestry, ecology, biology, hydrology, economics, and
others. This further reduces the likelihood that USFS and DNRC management is
purely technocratic or expertocratic in nature.
Nonetheless, the comments of both agency managers and public stakeholders
seem to bear out Grumbine’s assertions (1992) that the expert-dominated agencies do
not readily accept participatory citizens’ movements. Specifically, comments of
USFS respondents to the effect that those participating in planning constitute a
“squeaky wheel” or “vocal minority” suggest prejudice against citizen involvement.
DNRC respondents, however, exhibited a more deliberative attitude than did
USFS respondents. DNRC respondents, seemed collectively less expertocratic and
more deliberative in their approach to citizen involvement than did USFS
respondents. This is so because, DNRC managers tended to allow informal
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negotiation, spontaneous interactions, and proactive concessions to influence the
agency’s overall approach to post-fire management. Although, the deliberative traits
exhibited by DNRC managers did not dominate the DNRC’s post-fire management
process, they certainly facilitated the trust, dialogue, and working relationships which
benefited DNRC management. It is fair to say that the ongoing dialogue DNRC
managers enjoyed with interested stakeholders led to diminished conflict and more
rewarding processes (despite philosophical differences) for interested citizens and
stakeholder groups.
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Chapter 7
Promises vs. Obligations: The BAR Project’s Lost Restoration Funds
On February 5, 2005, the Missoulian published what had become almost a ritual
piece—the newspaper’s anniversary article addressing management status for the
Burned Area Recovery Plan settlement agreement relative to the salvage of timber
resources and ecological restoration of forests burned in the wildfires of 2000. The
Missoulian article (February 5, 2005) noted that certain interest groups (and by
implication, their constituents) were dissatisfied that the BNF had given management
priority to economic values such as timber sales, while ecological restoration projects
were proceeding at a pace under which their completion could take many years
(.Missoulian, February 5, 2005).
The BAR settlement agreement was a court-ordered, judge-mediated, mutuallyagreed-upon, and (theoretically) contractually-binding document. During its time of
relevance, it (theoretically) trumped all previous planning documents, including the
forest plan. Nonetheless, its omissions with regard to funding sources, timelines,
scheduling, and prioritization of projects actuated further controversy. The BAR plan
perpetuated a vitriolic dispute concerning public land management priorities in the
Bitterroot Valley and the nation in general. This chapter explores the following:
1) What was the obligation of the BNF to complete its plans under the courtmandated settlement agreement?
2) Were budget constraints a legitimate excuse for inaction?
These questions go to the heart of the conflicts that pervade contemporary public
land and resource management in the United States. The Bitterroot BAR and
settlement agreement are emblematic of greater problems in the realm of the
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management of natural resources on federal lands and in the American polity.
Questions linger as to what degree public lands are public. What is the appropriate
role o f the individual citizen and NGO realm in the management of these lands?
Though the national forests have long been known as the land o f many uses, what is
the formula that delineates the appropriate balance between management for the
myriad values the public lands are expected provide? Is balanced management per
the Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-531) and other
germane statutory laws to occur at the stand level, the forest level, the regional level
or nationally? Is it always the place of the courts to answer questions of statutory
interpretation?
Put another way, if certain laws speaking to forest planning do not address critical
issues such as scale, timing, funding, and other nuances of public land management,
the question is begged as to whether an agency’s discretionary undertaking to manage
in a certain way is, then, legal or illegal. Should public land and resource
management reflect democratic ideals? If so, how does an agency or other
government entity translate such ambiguous philosophical concepts into useful,
effective administrative rules and policy? What are the outer bounds of an executive
agency’s discretion to manage with the methods and priorities of its choosing in
compliance with the law? Are natural resource management agencies merely
purveyors (de facto or de jure) of the administration’s chosen policies? To be sure,
these queries are fraught with complexity. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider and
distill those queries and responses to those queries, particularly with regard to
conservation of the nation’s public lands and resources.
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In 1958, USFS Chief Richard E. McArdle noted,
A timber sale—a timber harvesting program on the national forest—is no
longer a matter just between (the logging industry) and the Forest Service...
More people are seeing firsthand the results of our management. More are
ready to criticize if they do not like what they see (Clary 1986).
Richard E. McArdle (1899-1983) was the eighth Chief of the United States Forest
Service (1952-1962). He was the first Chief to hold a Ph.D., and was Dean of the
University of Idaho School of Forestry. Before becoming Chief, McArdle was a
career researcher with the Forest Service (Forest History Society 2005). McArdle’s
words (1958) predate much of modem public land law and, in turn, suggest the
degree to which conflicts relative to public land timber-sales are not a new
phenomenon. Chief McArdle’s insightful words also suggest the importance of
pursuing conflict resolution as a formal component of public land and resource
policy.
What Was the BNF’s Obligation to Complete its Plans?
The BAR settlement agreement was unique and should be distinguished from
conventional agency planning. Planning under the BAR ultimately hinged upon a
formal legal document, the BAR settlement agreement, and its interpretation. Thus,
planning under the BAR settlement agreement is not wholly subject to conventional
analysis. Further, the BAR settlement agreement/management plan is distinct from
conventional forest or management plans because the settlement agreement arose
from a fact pattern o f first impression in the jurisprudence and history of public land
and natural resource policy. The settlement agreement’s court-mandated nature gave
the plan a unique status.
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Although disputes following wildfire over salvage and restoration are nothing
new, the particular chain of events surrounding the Bitterroot fires of 2000 was, in
fact, novel. These events and their circumstances resulted in significant monetary and
political cost to the agency for BNF’s actions and omissions. Judge Molloy’s opinion
in Wilderness Society v. Rey condemned the USFS’ arguments as flawed, and
declared the USFS’ attempt at exempting its actions from administrative process to be
illegal.
The ostensible claimed motive of the Forest Service for attempting to
circumvent the administrative appeals process is to speed the matter to its
likely destination: this Court. This motive is based on assumptions that are
not valid. First, the agency now asks this Court to declare an emergent
situation as a justification for dissolving the temporary restraining order. The
agency itself refused to make this determination for portions of the BAR that
Supervisor Richardson determined fell under the emergency situation
regulation. Instead the agency opted to push the full BAR before the Court
(180 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1148-49).
Further, Judge Molloy seemed intent upon educating the involved USFS/BNF
officials and Department of Agriculture executives such as Undersecretary Rey as to
how their actions violated the spirit of core administrative laws governing
government activity in the American polity:
The administrative appeal serves legitimate functions in the deliberative
process the agency is required to follow. The administrative appeal is a means
for interested participants to question the accuracy of assumptions or science
relied upon in the agency decision. It is a means of permitting the agency to
exercise its expertise prior to judicial intervention, if that takes place, by
answering the specific allegations of an appellant. The administrative appeal
assures compliance with applicable standards, science, and sound analysis. It
provides the agency the opportunity to explain why the ROD complies with
the applicable standards and statutes. Most importantly, it completes the
administrative record so that proper judicial deference to agency decision
making can be measured and applied. It is the one time when interested
appellants can find out if relevant data was relied upon or ignored and it
provides the agency the opportunity to flesh out conclusive statements or
findings that lack the requisite close look or analysis at first blush.
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From the agency's perspective the administrative appeal provides an
opportunity to correct mistakes or to reconcile inconsistencies, thus narrowing
issues that might be subject to judicial review. It also provides a complete
record for judicial review and enables a court to realistically assess whether
the proposed action is arbitrary or capricious. The agency might alter, amend,
or reconsider its decision depending on the issues raised in the administrative
appeal. The appeal may avoid a legal challenge or narrow the issues that can
be reviewed. Ultimately its force is to allow the democratic process of
participation in governmental decisions the full breadth and scope to which
citizens are entitled in a participatory democracy (180 F.Supp.2d 1141, 114849).
Moreover, Judge Molloy observed that the USFS/BNF drew a hard line—
grouping every aspect of post-fire management into an overarching plan and, then,
summarily attempting to exclude the public from participating in the decision making
process. In so doing, wrote Judge Molloy, the USFS/BNF polarized the issue, forcing
citizens into a “black position” or a “white position”—evacuating middle ground, and
leaving only legal battlegrounds:
Unfortunately, the BAR is often seen in a false polemic. Too frequently it is
couched as if it is a zero-sum or all-or-nothing proposition. This is not the
way the Congress intended the participatory process to work. The Forest
Service could have excised the exigent portions of the project for separate
consideration under application of the emergency regulations. The agency
could have parsed out the portions of the project that are not in controversy
and proceeded separately. Whatever the motivation of the agency to proceed
as it has, the agency could have addressed the concerns of all parties in
administrative appeals, and this it has refused to do.
Another purpose of an administrative appeal is to address the second tier of
public participation demanded by the statute before any matter can proceed to
court. Standing to sue is garnered only after exhaustion of the statutorilydefined administrative remedies. A plaintiff cannot sue the Forest Service
over a record of decision until she has exhausted her administrative appeal
remedies. By circumventing the appeals process, the Forest Service seems to
be attempting to create jurisdiction and standing in this Court without benefit
of exhaustion of the statutorily-required administrative remedies.
Reducing the government's argument to its essence leaves the parties with the
simple proposition that the agency thinks there has been enough public input
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and no more is needed. The reasoning seems to be that if a decision by the
Forest Service involves a large project with great public interest and comment,
then there should be less opportunity for public participation after the ROD is
made. The scale of the project does not dictate the level of opportunity for
public participation. Logically, the converse is true, the more participation at
the comment level before the ROD, the greater the need for administrative
appeal, especially where the alternatives considered have expanded or
changed. (See e.g. Swan View Coalition v. Turner, 824 F.Supp. 923, 932
(D.Mont.1992)) (J. Lovell discussing standing for ESA claim: "The mere fact
that the Forest Service is not bound by the recommendations of FWS [(U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service)] and that a redrafted biological opinion would not
necessarily result in a modified Forest Plan is irrelevant. The asserted injury
in this case is that 'environmental consequences might be overlooked ... as a
result of deficiencies' in the biological opinion. The fact that the Forest
Service might not alter its course in any way following the completion of a
new biological opinion does not negate this asserted injury.") (180 F.Supp.2d
1141, 1148-49).
The administrative appeals exemption catalyzed a backlash by some local
residents and environmental groups (Missoulian, December 19, 2001). The Bitterroot
case is unique and, yet, offers timely lessons that portend increasing complexity in
public land and resource management that will be expensive in time and resources.
If this salvage and restoration conflict was indeed a fact pattern of first
impression, history teaches that the initial policy response to such a circumstance will
likely be imperfect. This is so because complicated new problems are not usually
solved with ease. While natural resource use conflicts are, perhaps, as old as
humanity itself (Diamond 1999, 2005), their resolution under novel and increasingly
complicated circumstances will likely require continuous revision of law and policy
through the common law and/or the cycle of policy creation and revision (Lester and
Stewart 2000). The cycle of public lands conflict and piecemeal responses seems
likely to continue until Congress undertakes reconciliation of the sundry laws that
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influence public lands management and/or clarify the USFS mission relative to
competing policy priorities (Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005).
In addressing the issue of completion of action required under the BAR settlement
agreement, it is necessary to examine the actual agreement and compare that which
was (or was not) outlined in the document, to the actions that played out on the
ground and in the public arena (CV 01-219-M-DWM). The BAR plan’s chain of
events steered the conflict into an ongoing battle of semantics and legal
interpretations. Under these circumstances, the nuances and obligations of plan
completion under the settlement agreement were and remain, at best, unclear.
The Importance of Perspective
Depending upon the interests and positions of participants in the settlement, one
stakeholder’s error or omission relative to the settlement agreement could be another
stakeholder’s boon or auspice— i.e., perspective is critical (Fisher and Ury 1981).
What seems a contractual violation to one party may comport, for all intents and
purposes, with the agreement’s tenor according to another party. What one
stakeholder may see as an abandoned management project may, for another
stakeholder, comport with the Chevron Doctrine (467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984)) of
deferral to agency discretion. As in the greater society, if such resource-related value
differences come to a head in the court system, only a legal entity wields the authority
to settle the dispute. Thus, the judiciary became and remained a cornerstone in the
BAR conflict and is, moreover, a cornerstone of civil society.
The mediator’s shibboleth holds that there are multiple truths. It is these multiple
truths that keep the legal community gainfully employed. These multiple truths also
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ensure that a common or court-made law will perpetually evolve. Though slow to
develop, this evolution of the common law serves as an important cultural filter where
statutory interpretation is concerned. In other words, an evolving common law helps
to reflect changing values, norms, and cultural mores. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes once noted,
The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching,
consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it
always retains old ones from history at the other, which have not yet been
absorbed or sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it
ceases to grow (Holmes 1881 in Woodfield 2000:29).
Thus, what happens in courtrooms during trials and court-ordered mediations is
critical to the evaluation of applicable common law. These events contribute to the
dynamism of the common law and the evolution of public land and natural resource
management (Woodfield 2000). The enduring conflicts surrounding the 2000 fires,
and other public lands-related conflicts, present opportunities for making policy
revisions as well as establishing criteria for improving the outcomes of negotiated
settlements and alternative attempts at dispute resolution (ADR) in general. The
unique circumstances surrounding the BAR conflict set precedents that will influence
management and policy responses in future public land and resource management
disputes. In order to analyze the BAR settlement agreement and the issue of plan
completion, one must begin with the document itself.
Settlement Agreement as a (Poorly Drafted) Contract
The BAR settlement agreement was, in effect, a contract. Judge Hogan noted of
the agreement,
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It is [in effect, a contract between parties]. It’s legally-binding. The
advantage for [participants] in [signing the agreement] is that you can do
without all this litigation... the language says... that I’ll determine questions
[regarding possible breaches of the settlement agreement] based on
procedures and information that I believe is appropriate. And the whole point
of that is to give people a quick decision and enforcement if necessary. And
we have to do that [(enforcement)] sometimes. Now, because it’s without
appeal, the parties are well advised to try to work things out among
themselves. They probably will give each situation more time than I would,
and that’s probably appropriate (Interview 13:6).
Thus, the settlement agreement was legally-binding to the degree that its terms and
provisions were clear and not unconscionable or otherwise illegal. The settlement
agreement was to be treated as a contract—enforceable by Judge Hogan, and
ultimately, in a court of law. Thus, whether or not parties retained a remedy tied to
provisions of the settlement agreement was based strictly upon the document’s
language, and little else.
Persistent conflict over appropriate management following the wildfires of 2000
focused on the settlement agreement. This indicates that the settlement agreement,
itself, was an incomplete and imprecise document. With regard to clarity and
management efficiency, the document was, for all intents and purposes, flawed. To
this effect, BNF Supervisor Dave Bull emphasized the notion that the settlement
agreement made no mention of scheduling, timeline, or benchmarks for project
completion. Further, Supervisor Bull suggested that, as far as the agreement went,
the BNF was meeting its duties (Missoulian, February 5, 2005). Supervisor Bull’s
statements speak to the adage, expressio unius est excusio alterius— a canon of legal
construction holding that to express one thing (in a contract) is to exclude all others
(Gamer 1999). Thus, if a provision is absent from the contract, there is nothing to
enforce with regard to what may have been exogenous to the document.

115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

For involved citizens (and organizations) who preferred that restoration projects
be conducted at the same pace as timber sales or extractive projects, the document in
which they placed their faith failed due to its lack of specificity. Moreover, attorneys
representing such interests failed in allowing such glaring omissions relative to
timelines or priority hierarchies. The document’s failures seem to indicate that this
legal dispute resolution process failed. Such failures, in turn, further eroded public
trust in the USFS/BNF and faith in ADR as a useful process (Wondolleck and Yaffee
2000). Where dispute resolution efforts fail, the spiral of unmanaged conflict, by
default, can leave stakeholders with a sense of crisis. This may encourage (further)
litigation and costly adversarial strategies (Carpenter 1991).
The BAR settlement agreement did not contain a hierarchy of project priorities,
nor did it address the issue of timing. Further, the agreement set no deadlines (CV
01-219-M-DWM). Supervisor Bull cited these facts in suggesting that the BNF had
no obligation to do other than that which it had been doing, at a pace that comported
with the rate at which project funding became available. To this effect Bull noted,
The question comes up every year... Is restoration behind schedule or on
schedule? There was no schedule identified [in the settlement agreement].
We identified a list of tasks that were important for us to accomplish, and that
we would attempt, when we got funding” (Missoulian, February 5, 2005).
Despite erratic and lagging funding, the BNF ostensibly breached the spirit of the
settlement agreement, at least constructively speaking. The nature of the BNF’s strict
contractual obligation was a separate matter.
Ostensibly, the settlement agreement, for its omissions of timelines and
management priorities, provided the BNF/USFS with a measure of flexibility. With
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regard to interests based primarily in ecological integrity, the agreement failed to
achieve the desired level of USFS accountability {Missoulian, February 5, 2005).
The ambiguities regarding timelines for completion and prioritization of projects
effectively favored the BNF/USFS. This is so because instead of being a pro-spective
legal document that would actuate certain management actions to be given priority
over others, the document was ambiguous. Whether this ambiguity was intentional is
an open question, but the ambiguity, by default, provided the BNF with “wiggle
room” to prioritize management projects as it saw fit. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius... Thus, environmentally-focused groups were not able to pinpoint an iron
clad provision regarding timeliness of restoration projects or restoration project
priority relative salvage logging projects. Despite the semantic flexibility the
settlement agreement provided the BNF, the BNF, nonetheless, suffered criticism for
its very public failures to fulfill promises.
Re-active Policy and Special Jurisdiction for the BAR Settlement Agreement
Because the BNF ostensibly broke its promises (independent of the relative merits
of extenuating circumstances offered), environmental interests retained only an ability
to react to the BNF’s actions and omissions. The chance for the settlement agreement
to be a more efficient pro-spective policy tool had been lost. This “put the ball in the
court”— so to speak— of the environmental groups. Unless the BNF agreed to extra
judicial negotiations, the environmental groups were left with no option but to return
to Judge Hogan (the federal judge who mediated the settlement) for resolution of the
continuing conflict.
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In the case that environmental interests deemed the BNF to be in material
violation of the settlement, the involved parties could, having exhausted possible
remedies under Judge Hogan, have returned to trial in federal court. To this end,
environmental stakeholders repeatedly complained that the BNF failed to uphold its
end of the bargain. Because the BNF effectively failed to uphold its promises of
restoration in a timely manner, environmental groups’ complaints were valid.
Nonetheless, these same groups did not have a persuasive legal argument because the
settlement document failed to hold the BNF, political entities, or the U.S. Congress
accountable for budgetary support of associated management projects.
Judge Molloy placed a “gag order” on the settlement negotiations {Missoulian,
February 6, 2002). Thus, only Judge Hogan and the participants were aware of
impressions, promises, and suggestions made beyond that which was documented in
the settlement agreement. While ex parte communications may have influenced the
settlement, they were effectively meaningless if not incorporated into the settlement
agreement document. Furthermore, participants in the negotiation were obliged to
meet with the complete group of stakeholders in Judge Hogan’s presence before
seeking injunctions or otherwise filing motions, appeals, or additional claims (CV 01219-M-DWM).
These criteria for challenging the outcomes of the settlement agreement were
significantly onerous, so much so that it is unlikely that the case will ever resurface in
court. In failing to mount a legal challenge addressing the settlement agreement
promises, environmental and extractive/industry interests alike, lost an opportunity to
create formal precedent from the settlement agreement. This is particularly so in light
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of the fact that most participants are now critical of the settlement process and its
outcomes (Interviews 26A-D).
Nonetheless, the socio-political conflict surrounding post-fire management on the
BNF remained, in many ways, contentious long after the settlement conference
concluded. Following the settlement, the environmental interests felt betrayed, while
BNF officials privately deflected blame onto budget makers in the USFS Washington,
D.C. office and in Congress. Publicly, BNF officials blamed the happenstance of
ecological disturbance elsewhere as having diverted monetary resources that would
have funded BNF restoration projects.
It is clear that the settlement agreement should have addressed the critical issues
of funding, timing/scheduling, as well as the prioritization of management activities.
In light of these glaring contractual shortcomings, one questions the competency of
involved legal counsel. Corrective hindsight suggests that Undersecretary Mark Rey
and USFS Chief Bosworth should not have been relied upon to account for
restoration monies which would eventually be diverted by Congress. As fate would
have it, Rey and Bosworth could point to a short phrase within the settlement
agreement that would allow them to escape responsibility for their broken promises
under the settlement.
The bottom of last full page of the settlement agreement’s text notes: “Nothing in
this agreement shall be construed to commit a federal official to expend funds not
appropriated by Congress” (CV 01-219-M-DWM). This succinct phrase seemingly
allowed Rey, Bosworth and other government officials to throw up their hands with
impunity and blame Congress for lost funds. Despite this ostensible victory for
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agency officials in the series of tactical and adversarial maneuvers, this “win” came at
great cost to the USFS’/the BNF’s image, agency morale, and public standing.
Undersecretary Rey and Chief Bosworth did not sufficiently consider these
substantial costs born of their failure to keep their promises. That agency leaders
would stand behind slippery contractual verbiage, suggests a failure of leadership and
judgment.
In the end, all would learn that Congress was the entity possessing final authority
where the provision of the more than $25 million in restoration project funding was
concerned. Many environmental stakeholders would lose faith in the USFS’ ability to
stand by its word. Larry Campbell noted that he was quick to contact NGOs dealing
with Oregon’s Biscuit Fire salvage and others around the country dealing public lands
salvage conflicts and warn them not to trust USFS promises (Interview 15).
For those apt to blame Judges Molloy or Hogan for the settlement agreement’s
failures, it can only be said that it is not a judge’s role to make attorneys’ arguments
for them. Judge Molloy ordered parties to come to a compromise parties believed
reasonable. If environmental stakeholders’ counsel did not predict that
Undersecretary Rey and Chief Bosworth would call upon the “funds not appropriated
by Congress” escape clause, then it was not the place of either of the judges to stand
in the shoes of one stakeholder or another and propound the most effective
arguments.
USFS Obligations
What do these events suggest about the USFS’ obligation to complete its plans
under the settlement agreement—a management plan separate from all other planning
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documents? The BNF was obligated to finish the agreed upon restoration projects.
However, budgetary losses aside, the settlement agreement’s ambiguity provided
leeway for the BNF to give restoration projects low temporal priority. Notably, the
variable of diminished trust (whether warranted or not) seemed to be of secondary
import when BNF managers prioritized management projects and justified their
actions and omissions publicly. That is to say, no matter the misfortune and
happenstance that perforce diverted USFS funding to the chagrin of BNF officials and
environmental interests alike, the ongoing delays in accomplishing agreed upon
restoration projects and perceived preference for extractive values further tarnished an
agency that requires public trust in order to be successful. Further, BNF officials did
not successfully explain all of the reasons for their pitfalls to the public.
Top-Down and Exogenous Pressures
It is important to note that Supervisor Bull was a “local” USFS Employee, subject
to the whims o f executive branch appointees and the Congress-made budgets. As far
as the involvement of USFS officials at higher levels went, Bull indicated that the
notion of attempting to bypass administrative appeals was hatched in D.C. by
government lawyers and political appointees (Interview 8). This maneuver fanned
the controversy into a blow-up. Supervisor Bull noted that Chief Bosworth originally
opposed the plan to bypass appeals,
[‘N]o, I ’m not interested in doing that. And I’m not even going to ask Mark
Rey ... The decision needs to be made at the local level [,’] [said Chief
Bosworth.] And then the more that Mike Gippert talked about it and the more
others thought about Mike’s rationale about how the previous administration
had used it and how it allows us to get past the appeal which is going to
unnecessarily delay this project, people were saying, and go right to court, the
sooner we can get it resolved and the sooner we can get on with business. So
that started gaining some traction. And so by the time of this phone call, I
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guess it was, that I was mentioning with Max Baucus, there was pretty much
basically acceptance of the fact that we’re going to let Mark Rey sign this.
And so for all those reasons: bypass the appeal, going straight to court.
We’re going to win in court, we feel like. It’s been done by the previous
administration. We’re on solid ground. Mike Gippert [said] we’re on solid
ground.
So Mark Rey ended up signing the decision. He wrote something in the cover
letter about the intent of this decision is to make wood available for the small
timber interests in the state of Montana. We can’t say that only people in the
Bitterroot Valley or only people with corporations registered in the state of
Montana can buy national forest timber. We can’t do that. So that was, he
just tried to step around that one in a letter of direction to the Chief on making
sure that we did everything we could to allow this timber to be salvaged by
local workers (Interview 8:25).
Given Supervisor Bull’s invocation of USD A attorney Mike Gippert,
Undersecretary of Agriculture Mark Rey, USFS Chief Dale Bosworth, and Senator
Max Baucus; it is likely that powerful national and regional political forces worked
upon Supervisor Bull (as well as Chief Bosworth) with regard to management
priorities. Moreover, Supervisor Bull inherited the Bitterroot conflict when BNF
Supervisor Rodd Richardson left the post mid-conflict. Nonetheless, Supervisor Bull
did not argue that his handling of the conflict was perfect (Interview 8). Thus, some
USFS respondents related a web of local, regional, and national political pressures
that worked upon managerial discretion and local outcomes. These forces, in addition
to the adoption of the appeals bypass plan by USFS officials and other factors,
actuated the Wilderness Society v. Rey litigation.
For his part, Chief Bosworth did not specifically attribute the attempted bypass of
administrative procedure to USD A attorney Mike Gippert alone,
[T]here were a lot of people on my staff that were working and were well
aware of and were involved in this. Fred Norbury, who is the planning
director, was involved. Dave Tenney, who works for Mark Rey as the Deputy
Undersecretary was involved. I was involved. I’ve had conversations with
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Rod Richardson at the time, and Brad Powell. And so there was a lot of
people involved. And who first came up with the idea, well maybe, you
know, it’s been done before where you just have the undersecretary sign it.
I’m pretty sure the idea came up in the Forest Service, so whether it was at the
Washington office, region office, forest or... I’m not sure which. But the
decision to go ahead and do that had everybody involved in it. And in the end
I think everybody signed the decision, not just Mark. I think Brad did, too, if
I ’m not mistaken, and so did Rod. And I think I did... (Interview 12:8).
Candor and Qualification
Despite extenuating circumstances surrounding the BAR conflict—and there are
many—public agency officials lost an opportunity to gain trust by addressing the
appearance of imbalance or impropriety directly. This approach could have mitigated
tensions and skepticism. To cite ambiguous contractual language as Supervisor Bull
did, in effect, communicated to the environmental interests the message: “It’s not in
the contract, so claims o f impropriety are invalid.” The facts surrounding the
settlement bespeak the enmity that existed (and exists at the time of writing) between
some BNF officials and some in the local environmental community. Of note, such
enmity was largely absent between the same environmental advocates and the
DNRC’s state managers, whose agency mission is extraction-focused, as opposed to
multiple use-focused. The USFS/BNF did not present clear, fully-explained answers
as to why restoration projects continually lagged behind extractive projects.
The BNF had reasonable answers to these questions. Namely, the costs incurred
by the agency as a result of salvage are far less than those of restoration projects
(Interview 8). Also, elected congressional and state-level officials personally
pressured BNF managers to focus on salvage (Interview 8). Further, the burned
timber’s economic value was rapidly deteriorating, but this argument was less
persuasive to some, as it stood contrast to the government’s legal arguments to the
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effect that ecological restoration was the driving force behind the requested
emergency exemption and bypass of administrative appeals.
Complicating Supervisor Bull’s ability to divulge the more persuasive reason’s
for the BNF’s actions and omissions, was the notion that USFS culture did/does not
allow managers to complain to elected officials about administrative problems,
complain to Congress, or otherwise express the contradictions and perverse incentives
inherent to the agency’s multiple use mission (Interview 8). Thus, there is a disjoint
between that which BNF officials expressed to the public following the 2000
wildfires and that which they expressed during interviews conducted for this study.
This disjoint has implications with regard to the inherent tensions and contradictions
of USFS management culture.
The many publics, and agency managers alike, are keenly sensitive to pat answers
and disingenuous statements. Many stakeholders are also acutely aware of their
rights and remedies under germane administrative and public land law. Thus, BNF
managers might better have avoided conflict by conveying the full context under
which their decisions were/are made, to the degree this was possible. Nonetheless,
dialogue and trust are two-way streets. At a certain point following the 2000
wildfires, it became clear that neither managers, nor environmental stakeholders were
going to start or continue efforts at collaborative conflict resolution. The
relationships and sincere dialogue simply did not exist, and thus there was no
foundation for discussion.
In the early stages of the conflict, the BNF did not seem to be forthright about its
policy of “salvage to restore”— i.e., the policy of conducting resource extraction
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funded by congress-influenced budgetary allocations so as to generate internal
revenue that can be spent on non-commodity management. This issue would have
been best addressed as the fire burned out, or at the latest, during the settlement
conference, along with other details of timeline and budget. Some of the BNF’s
critics seemed unaware that USFS officials in the Washington, D.C. office—more
than individual BNF managers—determined where the balance of BNF funds were to
be spent. Nonetheless, USFS managers did not seem to exude a sense of candor and
transparency when confronted about budgetary issues. Equivocation on the part of
managers seems to have perpetuated significant public distrust. As Charles Bukowski
said (1999), “What matters most is how well you walk through the fire.”
With regard to the settlement agreement, the BNF continued, through subsequent
years, to conduct restoration projects at a diminished pace, while the balance of
timber salvage sales from the 2000 bums were completed far sooner. Supervisor Bull
noted that the USFS’ and the BNF’s budgets were significantly diminished as
compared to prior years (Interview 8). As a result of these circumstances,
appearances led many to believe that the BNF favored extractive projects over
restoration (Interviews 8, 19, 24, 26A, 26 C).
Supervisor Bull’s comments to the effect that the BNF had complied with the
settlement agreement under the language of the document, in spite of the obvious loss
of restoration funds, lent credence to de facto preference for extractive timber values.
Such a preference would comport with the congressional and budgetary pressures
Bull described (Interview 8). Critically, much might have been gained by asserting
the USFS’ legal right to harvest timber—including salvage logging operations—so
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long as proper precautionary and environmentally protective measures were taken.
But again, this would seem to contradict dominant agency culture, which currently
frames most management actions as ecologically beneficial or healthy (Interviews 12,
15, 19, 24, 27, Vaughn and Cortner 2005).
Forces Complicating USFS Management
Independent of one’s hierarchy of values, reasonable conclusions may be drawn
from the 3 year anniversary statistics: 80% of planned salvage acreage had been
logged (comprising 40% of planned volume to be extracted) while restoration
projects were between 20-30% complete {Missoulian, February 10, 2005). Among
these conclusions is one that asserts that the BNF gave salvage logging projects, at
least, temporal priority over restoration projects. By extension, the salvage projects
given temporal and budgetary priority suggested a preference for market-based
extractive values (on the part of the BNF, the administration, and
congressional/USFS central office budget makers).
One is reminded of the furor over 1970’s Bolle Report, terracing on the BNF and
other contentious events (Bolle et al. 1970, Hirt 1994, Behan 2001, Thomas and
Sienkiewicz 2005) leading up to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (16
U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-14). These events should have impressed USFS officials as to the
need to avoid appearance of imbalance or preference toward extractive values. It is
important, however, to keep in mind that USFS management is not simply USFS
management. That is to say, the USFS’ defacto management responses and the
appearances of primacy of the timber program are influenced by congressional
actions, timber-focused budgets preferred by the administration, and the USFS
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leadership in Washington, D.C. It is also well to remember the de facto timber
primacy as manifest by America’s consumer wood products economy (Thomas and
Sienkiewicz 2005).
The USFS is subject to the administration’s and Congress’ whims where budgets
and execution o f those budgets is concerned . James W. Giltmier notes in his essay
The Art o f the Possible,
The [USFS] chiefs belong first of all to the presidential administration, since
the Forest Service is an executive branch agency. The Chief answers to the
Department of Agriculture’s undersecretary for natural resources, who these
days also oversees the Natural Resources Conservation Service. Next up the
ladder are the secretary of Agriculture and his deputy. Above the secretary
are the Office Management and Budget, which sets the president’s spending
priorities, plus the Council on Environmental Quality, and other White House
desks, such as the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Department
of Justice, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Labor,
the Department o f Commerce, and several agencies of the Department of the
Interior may want to meddle, too. At the top is the president, who seldom gets
involved—unless his name is William J. Clinton or George W. Bush.
But the 535 members of the House and Senate know who really owns the
Forest Service. They do, because Congress holds the purse strings. Congress
does not sit up on Capitol Hill chunking out one law after another. Congress
spends a lot of time looking over the shoulders of the executive branch
agencies to see whether the laws it enacted are being carried out in accordance
with the desires of its constituencies, and it tries to put new shadings on
existing laws that the original authors never dreamed of. The agencies, in
response, dedicate a lot of their energy to avoiding the dictates that Congress
has given them against their advice. The result is a democratic game that
makes chess look like child’s play (Steen 2005:145-5).
Multiple Use, Market and Non-Market Values, Externalities
Under the MUSYA, multiple use management should entail harmonious,
coordinated resource management that does not impair the land’s productivity.
Further, multiple use management should incorporate adaptive principles reflecting
changing needs and conditions (Glicksman and Coggins 2001). The MUSYA
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outlines a policy stating that the national forests are to be managed for five value sets.
These include outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish
(Glicksman and Coggins 2001). The MUSYA does not address issues of scale or a
range of ratios which might comprise a reasonable balance as between the multiple
uses. Thus, the present ongoing discussion relative to “value-balanced” management
is one to which USFS officials should pay close attention.
The NEPA states in part:
All agencies of the Federal Government shall... identify and develop methods
and procedures... which will insure that presently unquantified environmental
amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decision
making along with economic and technical considerations (42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(B)).
The NEPA thus states that USFS managers and other public managers must examine
the values underlying management projects and attempt some measure of equity.
Although issues o f scale confound truly balanced attempts at multiple use
management, USFS officials can better avoid conflict by justifying management
actions and omissions in these terms (underlying values).
Extractive values can be associated with multipliers or positive externalities
linked with an infusion of timber into local and regional economies. This is so
because timber and primary wood products comprise raw materials on which many
extractive economies are based. On the downside, extractive activities can also be
associated with negative externalities such as ecological degradation associated with
road building, hauling, and other human disturbances (Gregory 1987, Lindenmayer
and Franklin 2002).
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In contrast to extractive projects, the restoration projects given lower priority in
budgets delivered to the BNF supported ecological/natural values associated with
mitigation of ecological and anthropogenic disturbance. These projects sought to
reduce or mitigate harm to ecosystems and natural processes. Prominent among the
ecological values at stake in the BAR plan were protection of salmonid habitat,
reductions in loss of topsoil, reduction in invasive weed proliferation, as well as
innumerable interactive effects that implicate flora and fauna at various trophic levels
(Lindenmayer and Franklin 2002).
These values became manifest in disputes over planned salvage logging primarily
in roadless areas and identified sensitive watersheds. Given these concerns, the
USFS/BNF might have avoided significant conflict by removing contentious roadless
areas and watersheds that were home to bull trout (Salvelinus confluentus) and/or
westslope cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki lewisi) from consideration for salvage
logging.
Ambiguity and Uncertainty Dominated the Process
With regard to the management plans derived under the BAR settlement
agreement, the BNF’s obligation to complete certain projects in a certain order and
style was, like many questions of policy and law, ambiguous. Until and unless the
involved parties engaged one another through ADR, conflict surrounding completion
of plans and interpretation of the settlement agreement resolution could only have
been realized through formal legal proceedings. In this respect, the BAR conflict did
not depart from conventional models (Carpenter 1991) of public lands conflict. There
were, perhaps, other avenues of challenge and other legal theories available to those
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dissatisfied, but the particular chain of events of the BAR controversy limited
settlement participants to Judge Hogan’s jurisdiction in the case that stakeholders
sought formal challenge.
Dissatisfied stakeholders were limited as to their recourse. The BNF, on the other
hand, let opportunity for a collaborative solution of the BAR controversy slip away.
Nonetheless, there are ongoing (e.g., 2005’s Middle East Fork Sale) and future
projects through which managers might begin to rebuild and/or enhance trust.
Following Wilderness Society v. Rey, the BNF chose to argue semantics of the
settlement agreement and let time render moot most of the important ecological
issues. The status quo tensions between some USFS managers and some
stakeholders still remain. Alternately, the BNF might have engaged dissatisfied
stakeholders and worked toward an extra-judicial solution. Doing so would have
acknowledged concerns of those dissatisfied. This would likely have proven to be an
auspicious gesture and might have mitigated weakened public trust. Instead, the
BNF/USFS avoided underlying tensions by citing contractual ambiguities. Enmity
resulting from the post-fire conflict carried over into 2005’s controversial Middle
East Fork sale, which also gained national attention surrounding issues of democratic
process and the integrity of public involvement under the NEPA.
Environmental advocate Larry Campbell noted the BNF’s breaking settlement
agreement promises to undertake certain restoration projects,
Some o f us are wondering, what are the options besides litigation? We tried
the court settlement. Now it’s really clear that it didn’t work. The trust just
isn’t there. Mainly... we just want to hold the Forest Service accountable.
They’ve clearly not satisfied the contractual agreement (Missoulian, February
5, 2004).
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BNF Supervisor, Dave Bull, noted,
Funding is going to continue to be a struggle. We keep hearing there is less
and less discretionary funding available. We’re looking at pretty austere times
here in the Forest Service. So it may take a longer time to finish the
restoration work. It is important to note, that the recovery of the burned lands
has exceeded the projections of the Forest Service... The land is healing
(.Missoulian, February 5, 2004).
Supervisor Bull suggests responsibility should fall elsewhere, perhaps with
Washington D.C. administrators and the politically-appointed officials that Giltmier
describes. Supervisor Bull is, in some ways, correct, but unless he publicly explains
the forces that work upon him and perhaps names specific responsible individuals,
then the burden of proof will, where observers are concerned, remain on his
shoulders. This is an inherent catch-22 of being a USFS manager or a USFS scientist
(Matson 1996, Steen 2004, Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005). One may reasonably
conclude that, in the more than five years since the fires of 2000, parties to the
conflict have made little progress with regard to ameliorating post-fire conflict and
discord.
Judge Molloy, in the original BAR lawsuit (180 F.Supp.2d 1141), ordered the
USFS to pay more than $200,000 in plaintiffs’ legal costs {Missoulian, May 21,
2002). This is, relatively speaking, an insignificant sum. Nonetheless, it was
unnecessarily spent. The notion that the citizenry should take consolation because the
sum was relatively small rings hollow. It was public money—large or small. It is
logical for managers and stakeholders of all value sets to consider the notion that
funds spent by the USFS and its litigants in legal battle—no matter how large or
small—might have accomplished some measure of ecological restoration if thus
applied. Moreover, the BNF’s/USFS’ actions precipitating Wilderness Society v. Rey
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were deemed illegal, and appear ill-conceived and capricious by most measures. The
USFS’ approach to the BAR plan openly defied administrative law and cost the
agency political capital. The order to pay attorney’s fees, for better or worse, further
sullied the officials that signed the ROD as well as their legal counsel.
The post-fire salvage and restoration conflict relative to the BAR and settlement
agreement, predictably, burrowed its way into subsequent BNF management projects
and sullied the USFS’ reputation nationally. This and other conflicts also provided
those prone to polarizing rhetoric and unilateral models of public lands governance,
such as Governor Martz (Vaughn and Cortner 2005), fodder with which to both
denigrate “environmentalists” and the appeals process through which citizens may
challenge agency actions (Vaughn and Cortner 2005).
Budgets, Congress, Federalism: Profound Complexity and Political Tensions
Budgets are key political documents as they register the allocative and distributive
choices as to what policies take priority (Mitchell 1983). As the BAR controversy
illustrated, budgets are perhaps the ultimate factor playing into policy formation and
prioritization (Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005). If there is no money, there is no
policy, and no on-the-ground management project—whether restoration project or
timber sale (Interviews 8, 9, 27). This idea underlies statutes such as the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act (2 U.S.C. §§ 658 et seq.), whose purpose is “to end the
imposition, in the absence of full consideration by Congress, of federal mandates on
state, local, and tribal governments without adequate federal funding...” (2 U.S.C. §
1501). Interestingly, this law targets unfunded mandates originating in Congress. It
does not, however, specifically address the circumstances of the BAR conflict
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wherein a federal judge ordered a binding mediation in which the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and BNF officials (not Congress) promised the completion of a suite of
restoration projects— the funding for which was, ostensibly, diverted by Congress.
And so, where BNF funding is concerned, the BNF must rely, for all intents and
purposes, solely upon the congressional and USFS central office budget allocation
processes— over which it has little influence (Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005). It is
thus important to note the degree to which the BNF’s overseers, including the
Department of Agriculture, USFS executives, and Congress, left BNF managers
(largely Supervisor Bull) to bear the onus of criticism. Even so, the BNF never
publicly and persuasively addressed the temporal priority it assigned timber sales
under the BAR settlement agreement. Unlike diverted agency funds, the question of
temporal priority as between salvage and restoration projects is possibly a
discretionary question better answered by USFS officials in Hamilton (MT) than by
any others. This is so, because the BNF, alone, conducted the minutiae of prioritizing
projects under the settlement agreement, shoring up contracts, and earmarking funds
for prioritized projects.
As much as the Bitterroot post-fire conflict appears simply to be a recent iteration
of the stereotypical “iron triangle” of timber policy disputes (environmentalists, the
USFS, and industry), the parties involved and the turn of events bespeak profound
political tensions and complexity. For example, Congress is to some degree
responsible for the diversion of $ millions that had been slated for BNF restoration
projects. The Undersecretary of Agriculture for Natural Resources and Environment,
Mark Rey, was the highest executive-branch authority to have signed the settlement
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document. Further, the settlement negotiation was a formal legal procedure ordered
by a federal Judge (Molloy). A second federal Judge (Hogan) presided over the
settlement. Thus, if environmental interests had forced the issue, and were Judge
Hogan unable to mollify all parties and clarify duties and rights under the agreement,
then the whole dispute might have returned again to federal court.
If this had occurred, a federal judge might have found herself in the unenviable
position of ordering that certain management actions take place or that the USFS re
analyze its planning conclusions; which, in turn, would require budgetary allocations
and/or re-allocations, perhaps by Congress.
This convoluted conflict comprises a web in which each branch of government is
tangled. The Judicial, the Legislative, and the Executive—the BAR controversy
implicates all three branches of government and thus presents complex questions of
separation of powers, checks and balances, and administrative law. In such a case,
would a federal judge order an agency to take action and re-prioritize management in
spite of congressionally-allocated budgets, thus overriding agency discretion? What
is the position of a federal judge to compel Congress to account for diverted funds?
Would a federal judge go so far as to hold Undersecretary Rey personally accountable
for lost funds (as he was the highest ranking official to sign the settlement
agreement)? Realistically, given such complexity and uncertainty, the conflict will
not likely come to such a head. So, these questions will likely remain unanswered.
But in a perverse way, one might prefer that circumstances had deteriorated further so
that the federal judiciary might be forced to attempt to resolve these conundrums. If
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we cannot rely on the federal judiciary to resolve our most wicked issues, cases, and
controversies, on whom can we rely?
Was the Settlement Agreement and the BNF’s Associated Management
Legitimate?
Webster’s (1991) defines legitimacy as, “the state of being legitimate^] lawful;
born in lawful wedlock, justifiable; genuine..

As bastard children are thusfar

absent from this particular settlement agreement, the story turns again to the law—to
that which is lawful, justifiable, and genuine. If the settlement agreement were
specific as to time constraints for completion of restoration projects and timber sales,
then determining the specific nature of lawful, justifiable actions would be less
complicated. As it stood, however, the legitimacy of the BNF’s actions and
omissions was tied to the notion of agency discretion. This placed the issue squarely
into the policy and jurisprudence of administrative law, relative to what duties and
rights attach to an executive agency, particularly with regard to details that Congress
has neglected to spell-out.
Agency Discretion
Administrative law, in one sense, analyzes the limits placed on the powers and
actions of administrative agencies (Gellhom and Levin 1997). Here, the critical
consideration was whether the BNF possessed the discretionary authority under the
settlement agreement to conduct timber sales prior to conducting restoration
projects—or to otherwise prioritize management activity as it chose. The question of
whether budgetary shortages provide a legitimate excuse is a subset within the issue
of agency discretion. This is so because, if the BNF’s decisions fell within the
discretionary authority authorized by Congress, then they were legitimate decisions in
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the eyes of the law. Because the settlement agreement is silent on the issue of
budgets, only a court could decisively determine the legitimacy of budget shortfalls as
an excuse for inaction. Context in such a decision is critical because such analyses
are fact-driven.
Congress has granted the USFS broad planning obligations and authority through
fundamental public land statutes such as the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (43 U.S.C §§ 1701 et seq.) (FLPMA) and the NFMA (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-14).
Likewise, the USFS is subject to environmental assessment and planning
requirements under the NEPA (42 U.S.C §§ 4321 et seq.) (Glicksman and Coggins
2001). The USFS is also subject to a host of other laws that authorize and/or mandate
broad planning discretion. This study does not attempt to reconcile the numerous
planning law complications under which the USFS must operate (Thomas and
Sienkiewicz 2005). Nonetheless, the US Supreme Court has upheld broad
delegations of authority and planning discretion to the USFS (Glicksman and Coggins
2001).

The notion of deferral to agency discretion—the Chevron Doctrine—is
fundamental to predicting whether the BNF could legitimately prioritize management
projects as it saw fit under the justification of budgetary shortfalls:
Chevron— a rule-like doctrine that requires courts to accept reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes (Percival et al. 2003).
In the modem administrative state there is a tendency in the public
and in courts to defer to government agencies for the specialized
handling of public problems... Agencies reflect the full diversity of a
society’s pressure, and thus can be less than vigilant, neutral enforcers
of public laws... Courts too typically tend to defer to agencies’
discretionary actions (Plater et al. 1998).
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As Percival et al. suggest, the reasonableness of an agency action is critical. Plater,
moreover, acknowledges the degree to which the Chevron Doctrine pervades modern
jurisprudence, but suggests this is problematic with regard to the frequency of its use.
Thus, a court would likely defer to the BNF’s discretionary choices as to what
management actions are granted priority under the BAR settlement agreement. This
is particularly true in light of the settlement agreement’s vagaries.
Agency Inaction and Delay
The BNF’s granting restoration projects lower priority likely falls under the
category of agency inaction or delay because the BNF effectively postponed
restoration projects indefinitely. The APA’s definition of “agency inaction” includes
“failure to act” (5 U.S.C.A. § 551(13)). Where judicial review addresses inaction,
courts tend toward greater deference to agency discretion than when an affirmative
action is at issue (Gellhorn and Levin 1997).
With regard to the BAR settlement agreement, the BNF did not fail to act in an
absolute sense, as it completed a certain percentage of planned restoration projects
and continued along those lines. This fact would likely weaken claims of inaction in
a court of law. Nonetheless, courts tend to be sensitive to the practical difficulties
described by BNF Supervisor Bull in the Missoulian (February 5, 2005). In
particular, courts tend to consider the practical realities of inadequate budgets,
personnel shortages, and opportunity costs (Gellhorn and Levin 1997). These
realities lend credence to the notion that the BNF would have been on fairly stable
legal ground had the BAR settlement issues returned to court.
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The USFS’s myriad planning requirements are regarded by many as
contradictory, unwieldy, and—when taken as a whole—largely unworkable (Thomas
and Sienkiewicz 2005). Nonetheless, objective and thorough administrative process
and the absence of arbitrary and capricious government action, despite associated
short-term burdens, is the foundation of American administrative law (5 U.S.C.A. §§
551-559, 701-706). To this effect, Judge Molloy, who initially ruled against the
USFS in Wilderness Society v. Rey, attributed his ruling largely to the notion that by
denying administrative appeals, the BNF left its own record incomplete, thereby
preventing proper judgment as to whether Chevron deference might be due in the
future (180 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1148).
Under Chevron, a court would likely acknowledge the uncertain and paradoxical
nature of USFS management. In discussing this uncertainty and complexity, Mary
Lou Franzese, a timber industry observer from Northern Idaho, titled a piece on the
USFS planning process: “Life inside the ‘Monster’” (Franzese 1988). In further
acknowledgement of complexity pervading the USFS planning process, John Hall of
the National Forest Products Association noted in a speech to Forest Service
employees,
Attitudes have shifted from optimism to sharp words. [USFS]
employees just shy of 20 years service, [are] ‘jumping ship.’ What has
been happening... ? Are the multiple use questions insolvable... ?
(Franzese 1988).
Such questions and statements acknowledge obstacles to efficient USFS management
and bolster judicial trends indicating an empathy and overall presumptive deference
to USFS management discretion.

138

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

While Judge Molloy’s ruling in Wilderness Society v. Rey, on its surface, appears
to contradict the presumption of deference to USFS discretion, Judge Molloy noted
that he could not properly consider the Chevron Doctrine because the administrative
record was left incomplete when the appeals process was denied to citizens (180
F.Supp.2d 1141). Wilderness Society v. Rey, in this respect bolsters the validity of
Chevron deference to agency discretion.
Obvious factors relating to surreptitious political influences and gamesmanship
hindered the USFS’/BNF’s defense. Judge Molloy sensed the gamesmanship and
potentially inappropriate entanglement of political appointees in the BAR conflict.
This entanglement became readily apparent when federal lawyers bungled arguments
and contradicted the stories of USFS managers with regard to claims of emergency.
The Judge’s opinion seems to communicate to involved parties, that the federal
judiciary is an improper venue for engaging in gamesmanship and brinksmanship
born of political maneuvering rather than firm legal questions—and that the
government representatives should know this.
It is not clear whether the BNF’s execution of the settlement agreement was or
was not equitable or lawful. Nonetheless, for any involved stakeholder to have
challenged the BNF’s discretionary authority would have been a Sisyphean
undertaking—akin to pushing a boulder uphill. However, as Judge Hogan suggested
of the American legal system, it is only those who undertake such Sisyphean financial
and political risks that will reap ‘victory’ (Interview 13).
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The Time Variable and Ecological Complexity
With regard to both extractive values and ecological values, the variable of time is
fundamental. The market-economic value of burned timber declines in over time,
while erosion and sediment loading from burned terrain are concentrated in temporal
proximity to fire events, tending to attenuate over time thereafter (Agee 1993). Thus
aside from project funding issues, the BNF’s granting of temporal priority to
extraction projects over restoration projects, seemingly exhibited a (short-term)
preference for market-based economic values because both economic and ecological
considerations required prompt action.
One could argue that the BNF/USFS exhibited a de facto preference for extractive
values. One could also argue, however, that this is not so, because the market value
of standing burned timber was quickly declining and quick salvage was required.
One might counter, arguing that ecological damage was of comparable urgency, and
that culverts needed to be upgraded and roads repaired in order to protect extant
stocks of threatened and endangered species. No matter one’s opinions, the BNF
conducted salvage first.
Given this fact, the BNF’s delay of restoration projects, de facto, de-prioritized
erosion risks associated with the period of time immediately following wildfire. This
is not to say that the BNF did not address soil erosion and species implications; the
BNF did significant early work through its BAER teams (USFS 2000A).
Nonetheless, Supervisor Bull’s later statements to the effect that streams in burned
watersheds are recovering naturally (Missoulian, February 5, 2005) was somewhat
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misleading in that it ignored the ecological reality that sediment loading to streams
following fire diminishes over time (Agee 1993).
Recovery often occurs independent of management. This is so, because
ecological disturbances, even “catastrophic” disturbances, often fall within historic or
natural ranges of variation (HRV or NRV) (Lindenmayer and Franklin 2002). That is
to say, most ecological systems, given time, will largely recover from ecological
disturbance within HRV (Lindenmayer and Franklin 2002). Given complex issues of
ecological disturbance, the BNF might have simply acknowledged the more obvious
ecological tradeoffs rather than arguing notions that salvage activities were
ecologically healthy with little or no qualification (Missoulian, February 5, 2005).
Again, such arguments suggest (whether accurate or not) a lack of ecological humility
and a lack o f candor. Candor and humility were critical factors facilitating the
DNRC’s successful stakeholder relationships following the wildfires of 2000.
The importance of restoration project timing relates to how soon ecological
recovery may or may not occur, as well as to the precise natural values or species of
flora and fauna on which restorative management will focus. Species of concern for
those conservation interests involved in the BAR settlement agreement included bull
trout (Salvelinus confluentus) and westslope cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki
lewisi).
Management actions designed to protect these threatened species should have
minimized short-term sediment loading. This is so because bull trout and other
salmonids require clean, cold, flowing waters and aerated gravels in which to dig
spawning redds (Behnke 2002). Thus, to the degree these species were meant to be
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protected, BNF management priorities would need to have specifically addressed the
critical consideration of timing of treatments. That said, in the context of other
considerations, fire, erosion, and other vectors of disturbance can sometimes be
ecologically auspicious.
In fact, ecological disturbances can have many beneficial effects in addition to
their detrimental effects (Reice 2001). Natural disturbance can “reset” the
successional state of riparian areas through mobilization and redistribution of coarse
woody debris and sediment (Bayley 1995, Lindenmayer and Franklin 2002), thus
speeding revitalizing aspects of watersheds and aquatic ecosystem (Gregory 1997,
Lindenmayer and Franklin 2002). Likewise, wildfires can, ceteris paribus, create
structural heterogeneity, leaving legacies of snags and logs and provide habitat for
cavity-nesting biota. (Thomas 1979, Inions et al. 1989, Lindenmayer and Franklin
2002). Thus, an ecological disturbance’s relative harm or benefit to a natural system
must be qualified with regard to the variable of time. Otherwise, general statements,
one way or the other, offer little utility where policy and management are concerned.
It is also important to note that the aforementioned ecological functions associated
with disturbances (within HRV) undergird arguments opposing salvage logging in
burned areas (Beschta et al. 1995, Donato et al. 2006).
That said, the most appropriate time to address restoration and issues of sediment
loading from forest bums is the period immediately following the bums—not four to
ten years later. This is not to say that all risk of erosion has passed within such a
period. Forest roads, as opposed to burned timber stands, pose an ongoing risk of
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sediment loading to watersheds that does not necessarily diminish over time (Havlick
2002).
Absolute statements and generalizations are problematic where ecological
systems and concepts are concerned. Complexity is the rule. Moreover, for USFS
managers to insist upon one particular body of science as the truth upon which all
post-fire management must rely is perhaps unscientific. This is so because science is
inherently humble, acknowledging uncertainty and change. Nonetheless, science is
only part of the debate. Entrenched interests will often selectively argue that science
which supports their interests. The debate over the effects of salvage logging,
restoration activities, and their nuances pertaining to the public lands context remains
controversial (Donato et al. 2006).
To the degree a “chosen” body of science supports salvage to restore policies that
speak to restoration as a byproduct of economically motivated salvage, then
environmental interests will likely claim USFS timber primacy. Candor and honesty
are tools managers can use to mitigate tensions and deflect criticism to other parties
or to institutional forces. If the agency’s primary goal is timber salvage, managers
can promote deliberative management and dialogue with citizens by directly
addressing the de jure and de facto goals managers have been given. Engaging in
such dialogue and deliberative mechanisms garnered state managers trust and
working relationships despite value-differences with stakeholders. BNF managers
seem to have lost trust by virtue of their framing salvage logging as primarily
ecologically restorative (Interviews 15, 19, 24, 26A, Vaughn and Cortner). To this
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effect, Vaughn and Cortner (2005) suggest that issue framing in public lands
management has become a problem of institutional proportions.
Budget Shortfalls
Because of traditional judicial deference to agency discretion, it is likely that,
from the standpoint of legal outcomes, budget shortfalls provide a reasonable
explanation for the BNF’s discretionary choices relating to project implementation.
With regard to other criteria, equity as between management values for example,
budget shortfalls comprise a tenuous excuse. From the equity standpoint,
conservation interests seem to have lost out to extractive interests by virtue of the
facts that 1) salvage logging was largely completed in short order, 2) the USFS
central office earmarked funds for salvage logging and the BNF consummated
contracts for those services thus securing those funds, and 3) the BNF (and USFS
forests in general) typically conducts restoration activity after salvage logging,
because proceeds from timber sales comprise the bulk of money the BNF will have
for non commodity-based management (Interviews 8, 9, 12, 15, 27, O’Toole 1988).
This is so because Congress’ budgets and those of the USFS central office tend
toward timber primacy (Interviews 8, 9, 12, 15, 27, O’Toole 1988). However, at
forest-wide spatial scales, some USFS managers pointed to the fact that almost 50%
of the BNF is designated wilderness, suggesting that it was actually non-extractive
values that won out on the BNF following the wildfires of 2000(Interview 25).
Herein lies a tension between underlying values.
Importantly this tension is largely due to stakeholders coming at an issue from
different criteria for analysis. That is to say, does “timber primacy” relate to total
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volume extracted versus total acreage burned? Does it relate to which activities are
conducted first? Does it relate to the cumulative 100 year management of national
forest ecosystems? Stakeholders and managers often speak in different languages and
from different perspectives. Thus, communication tends to be ineffective.
Value balanced-management is, of course, complicated. For example, wilderness
areas are increasingly impacted by use and do not necessarily speak to ecological
integrity foremost (Landres et al. 2001). At a spatial scale based on the BNF’s
burned area, evidence could suggest some measure of preference for extractive
management. This is so based on the temporal priority given extractive management
actions. Whether or not this preference is the result of the institutional habit of
salvage to restore, the value preferences of individual BNF managers, agency culture,
political influence, or other factors is unclear. All of the aforementioned factors
likely contributed to the BNF’s post-fire actions and omissions.
On the other hand, at spatial scale equal to the BNF’s burned area, evidence could
suggest some measure of preference for natural recovery. This could be argued
because the bulk of burned timber was in designated wilderness and would be left
alone. Thus, such management questions have no simple answers.
Citizen Recourse
The ability of citizens to respond to real or perceived problems regarding
implementation of federal plans is both a philosophical and a practical issue. The
USFS, the BLM, the National Park Service (NPS), and the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) are all distinguishable from most other federal agencies in that the public land
resource is unique, and directly implicates the personal well-being and quality of life
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of many, if not all, Americans. The USFS, for instance, must manage lands from
which citizens extract natural resources for economic gain; on which citizens graze
livestock; on which citizens recreate in sundry ways; in which citizens hold spiritual
values; from which flows fresh water (perhaps the most critical western natural
resource) (Powell 1879, Dana and Fairfax 1980, Stegner 1985 (1999), Wilkinson
1992, Sienkiewicz 2004); around which citizens build communities and derive a
sense of place (Berry 1990, Kemmis 1990).
In considering that citizens have and will increasingly build lives and
communities around proximity to public lands, Wendell Berry’s description of the
relationship between place and community is apropos:
A community is, by definition, placed, its success cannot be divided
from the success of its place, its natural setting and surroundings: its
soils, forests, grasslands, plants and animals, water, light, and air. The
two economies, the natural and the human, support each other; each is
the other’s hope o f a durable and livable life (Berry 1990).
Thus, public lands represent innumerable diverse values to many Americans.
Public land and resource agencies are distinct from the non-land executive branch
departments and agencies (for example, the Department of Commerce and its
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)). This is so
because the public lands agencies manage a tangible resource. The public lands
resource is intermingled with intimate, value-laden aspects of citizens’ lives to a
greater degree than the resources or policy genres handled by most other federal
agencies. One need not explore the literature long before being inundated with
testaments to fact that many do, indeed, consider the public lands to be a birthright
(Thomas 1995).
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Because the tangible nature of public lands is coupled with visceral human
attachment to these same lands and their resources, the obvious modes of
participation in the American democracy do not necessarily satisfy the need for
meaningful citizen participation. Voting, writing representatives and civil servants,
submitting comment, and, when necessary, suing: these mechanisms do not likely
sate the publics’ continued appetites for meaningful involvement in the management
of public lands. Citizens are not merely watching and criticizing— as USFS Chief
McArdle suggested in 1958 (Clary 1986)—but they are perhaps demanding greater
influence on public lands management (Kemmis 1990, 2001). This demand for
meaningful participation will likely increase as a result of shifting demographic
patterns and as a result of the per-capita diminution of American open space and
ecologically-intact land. Population growth, increased recreation, and economic
growth will further amplify this demand.
An Agency’s Obligation to Heed Public Input
A significant policy tension relating to citizen influence on management lies in
the fact that administrative law grants the USFS and other land management agencies
ultimate authority (within the confines of political realities) to craft their own rules
and regulations. This is so even if public input under both the APA and the NEPA
processes overwhelmingly supports rules or policies that are antithetical to those
finally promulgated by agencies. In other words, agencies are often obligated to
solicit, but not necessarily incorporate, public input into final management actions.
This discrepancy between solicitation of input and its actual incorporation underlies
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many of the major public lands conflicts (Carpenter 1988) such as that of the Clinton
era Roadless Rule as replaced by the Bush Administration’s Roadless Rule.
By way of example, in 2005 the Lewis and Clark National Forest solicited
comments under the NEPA for its travel plan revisions on Montana’s Rocky
Mountain Front. 98% of the 37,000 comments preferred alternative 3, the USFSgenerated alternative that maintains traditional modes of travel (horse and foot) and
eliminates motorized travel on existing trails. Lewis and Clark National Forest
Supervisor, (former BNF Deputy Supervisor) Spike Thompson, noted,
It’s really an important decision and we are giving it a lot of thought.
Flowever the number of comments for or against a proposal doesn’t drive the
review process. It’s not really a voting process. It is good for us to know
what alternative but even more than what alternative, it is good enough to
know what do people value on the Front. Once you know that, you can craft a
decision that may not give everyone what they want, but can address their
values and concerns {Great Falls Tribune, Oct 12, 2005).
Thus, the tension between agency discretion and citizen participation is
fundamental to understanding modern public lands conflict. Despite lacking “a vote,”
citizens are not helpless. They retain the ability to sue agencies over process under
the APA and other statutes. Lawsuits, however, are an extreme remedy and place
agencies and citizens in antipodal positions—communication having ceased,
perceptions distorted, and judicial remedy the only possible resolution (Nie 2004).
Moreover, litigation can harm relationships and halt productive dialogue. It is
difficult for any party named in a suit to remain objective. As BNF Supervisor Bull
noted, it’s hard to retain composure when people attack you personally (Interview
37). Likewise, BNF/Darby District Ranger Dave Campbell related a website that
vilified him personally and conveyed false information. Ranger Campbell confronted
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the website’s proprietor noting, that he would not stoop to similar tactics, and would
always take the high road (Interview 9).
USFS officials are not elected, and thus have no direct accountability to citizens.
It is true that elected federal officials at times exert tremendous pressure on USFS
decision makers, but this occurs “behind the scenes.” In the case that citizens find
USFS management to be unacceptable, senators and representatives should, with
regard to outcomes they precipitated, be held to account. This however is a difficult
proposition, as evading public lands management controversy is relatively easy for
such officials, and is often the most politically expedient tack. There is an ever
present tension between managers and the nature of their accountability to the public
(Dunn 2004).
Voting for or against elected officials might mitigate citizen frustrations if the
forces influencing the policy process were more visible—if elected officials would
take direct responsibility for policy direction they actuated. But more often, elected
officials seek refuge in the face of conflict, leaving local and regional agency officials
to absorb political strife (Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005).
Where citizens are dissatisfied with policy content and/or implementation, the
American suite of environmental and administrative laws is, generally, conducive to
extreme actions. This is increasingly the case as many citizens feel that the ostensible
middle ground provided by notice and comment rulemaking and the NEPA scoping
process is really a mirage and that their input is meaningless (Interviews 15, 24).
For example, the BNF spent more than $160,000 marking 2005’s Middle East
Fork Sale while the project was still open for public comment. BNF officials had no
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explanation relating to the NEPA, noting only that the marking crew travels and the
BNF took its services when they were available (Missoulian, October 9, 2005). A
BNF District Ranger noted,
The regional marking crew availability is limited. They rotate around the region
to wherever there is a need. Community members here are interested in seeing
something done as soon as possible. It just made sense to follow the intent of
Congress [in reference to the Healthy Forest Restoration Act]. We never
thought about the controversy that the decision would bring {Missoulian,
October 9, 2005).
The BNF’s actions likely prove that USFS decisions were here (and perhaps on
other occasions) made prior to public comment or scoping. These profound
implications suggest that the NEPA process is, in effect, often, but perhaps not
always, a charade. By virtue of her comments, the District Ranger seems unaware of
this fact’s implications as to the NEPA and the notion of public participation in
national forest management. The intent of Congress to which she refers includes all
public land laws, not just the Healthy Forest Restoration Act (HFRA) (16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 6501-6591) under which the Middle East Fork Project was marketed to the public.
Given this District Ranger’s ostensible ignorance of the NEPA and the APA and
her invocation o f the HFRA, readers of her comments are left to assume she is
unaware of many important public land laws. Occurrences such as the BNF’s Middle
East Fork tree-marking incident prompted participating citizens to wonder why the
USFS wasted their time {Missoulian, September 23, 2005). Moreover, in
circumstances where political/budgetary forces predetermine management priorities
(Interviews 8, 9, 27), USFS officials may tend to view public comment as a mere
exercise and will perhaps resent having to go through hollow motions by virtue of the
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NEPA, the APA, the NFMA, the ARA, and other germane laws (Vaughn and Cortner
2005).
The District Ranger suggests that she understands how congressional intent
translates into management. She suggests that she knows the interests of community
members, but does not specify what community. To what community is she (by law)
obligated? How does she know? Her words are problematic and suggest a pre
decided course of action. A similar attitude cost the BNF/USFS much credibility
when Wilderness Society v. Rey was filed in federal court only a few years prior.
Judge Molloy’s opinion vehemently communicates as much (180F.Supp.2d 1141).
The attitude manifest in the District Ranger’s comments is antithetical to the principal
ideas underlying American administrative jurisprudence (Gellhom and Levin 1997).
Whether the characterization is just or not, her ostensible attitude lends credence to
stereotypes of technocracy and timber primacy. The problems manifest in her
comments are reminiscent of BNF managers’ comments during the BAR conflict.
Whether or not the District Ranger’s quoted words are indicative of her expertise,
her comments speak to efforts to “control the message” (Interview 36) in their
selection of information to include and exclude. One senses that USFS managers
such as this District Ranger are unfamiliar with laws other than those laws internally
promoted. Perhaps this is not the Ranger’s fault, but rather the result of priorities
passed along from executive branch political appointees all the way to Sula, Montana.
It is perhaps the result of agency priorities as dictated by executive branch policies,
and by Congress-influenced budgets (Interviews 8, 9, 27). While USFS employees
serve at the pleasure of the executive branch, they must also heed every public land
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law still in force— including those laws the executive branch and local managers may
find onerous. To the extent laws allowing for public participation are discounted,
participating members of the public will perceive a resistance to deliberative
democracy, and a salient effort to reestablish a more technocratic paradigm.
From both the managerial and stakeholder perspective, piecemeal awareness of
laws pertaining to federal public land management comprises a problem. It is
difficult to sympathize with USFS managers on this front. Many qualified applicants
compete for jobs such as District Ranger posts—many with germane doctoral-level
degrees (USFS Human Resources 2005). Such jobs are located in some of the most
desirable communities in America—trout streams, snow capped peaks, wildlife... the
mythical West. Generally speaking, filling public land management jobs with
broadly qualified natural resource professionals would entail overriding a system that
often grants hiring preference based on criteria other than quality and talent
(Interviews 14, 35, USFS Human Resources 2005).
USFS managers, in some cases, are not equipped for the complexities with which
they struggle (Interview 1, 13, 14, 20). Thus, coping with modem public lands
complexities requires some grasp of the challenging interactions between science,
law, policy, and politics. Judge Hogan noted, “[Fjrom the Forest Service standpoint,
I think it probably ought to have some folks who have that sort of litigation gene,
litigation DNA, as a good part of their training” (Interview 13:3). Further, it is clear
that USFS managers must wield, in addition to legal knowledge and political savvy, a
thorough understanding of ecological science—at multiple spatial and temporal
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scales. Such holistic training would largely encompass the skills taught in
forestry/silviculture-focused curricula.
Principles of public involvement, democracy, germane law, and ecological
competence all play significant roles in modern public land management. A wellrounded mix of such skills will help prevent and ameliorate much conflict. This
remains true even with a staff of experts, as synthesis and informed analysis of an
array of arcane knowledge requires significant exposure to many disciplines. Having
public relations skills, or silvicultural skills, or administrative skills alone is
insufficient.
Citizen Participation and Lawsuits
Importantly, there are situations in which traditional methods of citizen
participation are highly effective. In particular, while environmental interests are
often criticized as being litigious, the right to sue under natural resource, public land,
and environmental laws is a fundamental check on unlawful agency action. Legal
recourse is important with regard to private enforcement per citizen suit provisions,
but also, it is important in the contexts of judicial review, the separation of powers
doctrine, and federalism.
Judicial review, for its inefficiencies, promotes rational, empirical agency
decision making, while also ensuring that agency action does not exceed authority
delegated by enabling legislation (Gellhom and Levin 1997). Thus judicial review
does not merely protect citizens and resources, but is a fundamental component of our
checked-and-balanced system of government. In the BAR lawsuit for instance, the
Court declared the exemption policy the USFS formally adopted to be illegal (180
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F.Supp. 2d 1141). The federal judiciary’s pronouncement would not have occurred
had not private interests sued the BNF/USFS.
Jack Ward Thomas has observed the proliferation of NGOs dedicating their
resources to the primary end of suing agencies and private entities for conservation
purposes. Thomas dubbed this phenomenon, the conflict industry, noting the
economic and political incentives to join this industry and thus perpetuate the vicious
cycle of extreme actions (Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005). Nonetheless, the right to
sue is likely here to stay. This is so, because sometimes collaborative methods are
precluded; sometimes collaborative efforts are attempted, but fail (Coggins 2001).
Moreover, agencies sometimes, accidentally or intentionally, break the law. Thus
traditional methods, including litigation, remain important tools of citizen
participation for which managers and policy makers must account.
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Chapter 8
Important Lessons
Of Agencies and Individuals
The USFS and other land agencies do not, in every case of protracted public lands
conflict, deserve to be vilified. In a chapter titled, the Art o f the Possible in the Native
Home o f Hope, Daniel Kemmis goes so far as to call federal agencies in the West “a
version of imperialism.” Kemmis describes the “feds” as “remote” and “powerful”
(1990:126-128). There is some truth in what Kemmis says, but he might qualify his
descriptors by noting that “fed” district rangers and biologists and office managers
send their children to the same schools and pay the same property taxes as nonim perialist ” citizens. USFS managers in many cases are indistinguishable from local
citizens.
Kemmis suggests that federal public lands are largely local resources and could be
managed effectively as such, absent federal “imperialism.” Ironically, many USFS
managers—by virtue of preferences for what they perceive to be local sentiment as
well as a disregard for “form letter input’7“e-mailed comments”—tend to favor local
residents (Interviews 6, 8, 9, 37, Missoula Independent, November 10, 2005,
Missoula Independent, November 17, 2005). Jack Ward Thomas has spoken of the
USFS’ tendency to move its employees around the country as being partly due to a
concern that employees might “go native”—that is, come to favor local sentiment to
the detriment of the national forests (Interview 27). Given that evidence suggests that
USFS managers may have a logical tendency to favor local residents with whom they
share a community; perhaps it is simply the fact that power lies with employees of a
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federal, as opposed to a local, agency that rubs Kemmis wrong? Perhaps it is the
potential for arbitrary and value-biased decision making that Nie (2004) describes?
Kemmis’ words speak to the auspices of a more deliberative, democratic process.
Nonetheless, they are undermined by a resentful tone. The “imperialist” line of
thought discounts fundamental concepts that would protect federal lands, such as
economies o f scale tied to federal budgets and the protection of these lands from
tragedies o f the commons born of unregulated open access to common-pool
resources.
Mr. Kemmis’ ostensible purpose in writing the piece is that of promoting a more
collaborative policy process. Many argue collaborative management and/or conflict
resolution is auspicious (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Brick et al. 2001). On the
other hand, there is some danger in localist tendencies that would tend to pigeon-hole
USFS managers as do Kemmis’ comments; the complexities of bureaucracy,
economics, and our systems of federalism and divided government should remain at
the fore of any discussion. This is not to dismiss the problems inherent to federal
public land governance, but some measure of federal control may always be
necessary to prevent a wholesale taking of nationally-owned resources. The federal
lands are, as the moniker suggests and until Congress decides otherwise, the property
of all Americans.
Further, it is important to embrace the concept that bureaucracies as a whole
manifest values and behavior that sometimes contradict the values and behavior of
individuals within those same bureaucracies (Wilson 1989, Matson 1996, Waterman
et al. 2004). Moreover agency culture is akin to the common law in its inability to
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make dexterous changes. USFS culture in particular, is known as being, for better
and worse, particularly entrenched (Clary 1986, O’Toole 1988, Flirt 1994,
Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005). Bureaucratic inertia
is the rule.
The USFS and the Law— an Awkward Dynamic
The Bitterroot salvage conflicts illuminate the reality that the USFS’
organizational structure does not mesh well with the legal system. The BNF employs
no staff attorneys. No BNF employees hold law degrees. The BNF’s lawyers in
Wilderness Society v. Rey were generalist U.S. Attorneys—having little intimate
experience with the day to day management of the BNF lands. U.S. attorneys, in
reality, likely focus most of their time and energy on cases dealing with more
mainstream issues such as drug trafficking and free speech. Supporting the notion
that U.S. attorneys may be too busy to have intimate knowledge of case details, much
less the ecological conditions of a national forest, Montana’s Chief federal Judge
Donald Molloy wrote U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales urging him to replace
U.S. Attorney William Mercer—one of the government attorneys who represented
BNF in Wilderness Society v. Rey. Judge Molloy noted that Mercer was neglecting
his work {Missoulian, November 15, 2005). Although it is unclear whether Mercer
has the combination of substantive expertise required of a complex public lands case,
this episode lends credence to the fact that generalist U.S. attorneys may have neither
the time, nor the expertise to do justice to complex public lands litigation.
Perhaps some of U.S. attorneys in Wilderness Society v. Rey possessed a general
knowledge of natural resources and public lands, but based on their arguments, they
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seemed to lack significant understanding of the Bitterroot Valley’s socioeconomics
and pertinent interactions with public lands, natural resources, and ecological science.
This is perhaps so, because many Department of Agriculture attorneys may live and
work in Washington, D.C. or a satellite office as does Mercer, spending significant
time in transit to and from Washington, D.C. (.Missoulian, November 15, 2005) and
working on a wide variety of cases. Moreover, decisions as to what cases get settled,
defended, or otherwise pursued are made in Washington, D.C. by political officials
(Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005)—not in Hamilton, Montana by a local Forest Service
staff attorney with local knowledge of ecological, social, and political circumstances.
By virtue of their diverse caseloads and professional constraints, it is unlikely that
federal lawyers from the Departments of Agriculture or Justice have sufficient
expertise in local natural resources and ecological science, the interactions between
law and science, and the actual fact patterns and stakeholders with which/whom they
must work when conflict makes its way to the federal judiciary. This was at least so
in Wilderness Society v. Rey. Inadequate lawyering, and poor judgment for defending
the suit to begin with, cost the U.S. tax payers hundreds of thousands of dollars in
attorney fees, and judicial and executive branch opportunity costs.
Lending credence to the notion that U.S. attorneys may be ill-suited to represent
national forests is the BNF’s attorneys’ argument that salvage logging has “no
negative environmental impact” (Missoulian, December 29, 2001). Government
attorneys representing the BNF appear not to have performed the due diligence
necessary to argue a science-related case. Further, it would seem that this
misinformed legal argument/strategy was bom of motivations to defend the case for
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political reasons (as opposed to the strength of legal positions) (Thomas and
Sienkiewicz 2005). Most any management action has ecological impacts (Interview
27), or as Jack Ward Thomas noted, every manipulation of nature— great or small—
impacts the environment to one degree or another (Interview 27). Complexity is the
rule. Proponents of ecological integrity will often challenge assertions from
managers or U.S. attorneys lacking such knowledge, or appearing to lack such
knowledge. In the Bitterroot case, failure to openly acknowledge this reality seemed
to beg controversy. By contrast, acknowledging the ecological realities of
management will, if relationships are not burdened by enmity, allow stakeholders and
managers to move on to more practical matters.
Though by no means crystalline, perhaps germane public land law offers more
clarity than managers may admit. Yes, there are many laws to know. Further, the
letter of the law is difficult and expensive to follow, particularly for managers
untrained in the nuances of preempting, pursuing, and defending litigation.
Nonetheless, the USFS’ legal clumsiness is exacerbated by a lack of (official)
collaborative conflict resolution policies and an ostensible unwillingness to adopt
such strategies unless forced to do so by a court. The USFS’ tendency to draw suit is
further exacerbated by enmity between certain USFS officials and certain
environmental interests. Although all parties to this enmity contribute to the
dysfunction, it is the USFS—the government agency—that is obligated to keep forest
management professional and not personal. If certain environmental or extractive
interests prove unruly or unreasonable, dialogue and discourse can help managers to
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remain on high ground. As John Dewey said (1927:44) “the cure for the ailments of
democracy is more democracy.”
Value Conflicts
The 2000 salvage and restoration conflicts highlight the notion that human values
are central not only to the position or stance one takes on a natural resource issue, but
also to the underlying interests (spoken or unspoken) one might have for taking a
certain position or stance. Values are central to one’s perspective with regard to both
fire and other aspects of natural resource management. Importantly, values are
complex and difficult to deconstruct or reduce to simple categories.
It is clear, for example, that certain of the plaintiffs valued wildland fire and
leaving burned areas intact. This value was expressed in spite of fire’s capacity for
short-term ecological disturbance. Some with differing values frame the
aforementioned stance as a “do nothing” approach (BBER 2001). Phrasings such as
“do nothing” comprise rhetoric, polemic devices, and/or oversimplifications (Vaughn
and Cortner 2005). The University of Montana’s Bureau of Business and Economic
Research (BBER) used “do nothing” language in a survey the BNF commissioned to
determine how local residents felt about post-wildfire management (Bureau of
Business and Economic Research 2001). The survey the BNF commissioned asked
as its first question:
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1. This summer’s fire season brought attention to areas where people build
homes in wooded lands near national forests. These areas are called urban wildland interface [(WUI)]. The Bitterroot National Forest wants to know
what you think about possible management actions in the urban - wildland
[(sic)] interface. Please rate the following actions from one to five, where one
is not at all important and five is very important.
a. Reducing fuels and fire hazards on BNF Lands
b. Educating Landowners about fire hazards
c. Helping Landowners reduce fire hazards on their lands
d. Using prescribed burning
e. Thinning trees
f. Doing nothing
g- Other (please describe)

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
(BBER 2001).

The aforementioned question prompts one to question the survey’s design.
Definitions were not offered for any resource management terms. How does the BNF
or the BBER define “fuels,” “fire hazards,” “prescribed burning,” “thinning,” “doing
nothing?” Did respondents understand these terms? Is natural recovery “doing
nothing?” Were the telephone operators hired to administer the survey trained in the
nuances of ecological terms of art or the nuances of the USFS’ definitions of forestry
terms? Why did the authors of this survey exclude wildlife and fish, watershed,
recreation, and range for which USFS/BNF must manage under the MUSYA? Is
timber the only of the five multiple use values under the MUSYA that applies to the
WUI? How does the USFS define “WUI?” Where does the “WUI” begin? Where
does the “WUI” end? Does this question address public lands or private lands? If
both, what is the nature o f the USFS’ obligations to private landowners who
knowingly build and live in fire-prone ecosystems? Did the BNF’s/the BBER’s
association of “doing nothing” with natural recovery for which environmentalists
advocated as applied to roadless lands suggest an institutional bias?
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To the degree the BNF based its conclusions as to public sentiment on devices
such as the BBER’s survey, the BNF perhaps exhibited biases. This is so, depending
upon the degree to which BNF employees participated in the survey’s design and
utilized the survey to bolster management choices. This survey had divisive
consequences following the wildfires of 2000 (Interviews 15, 16). The cumulative
data surrounding the Bitterroot conflicts suggest the issues were more complex than
doing something vs. “doing nothing” (BBER 2001).
The BBER survey seemed to exacerbate controversy (Interviews 15, 16) because
it suggested to the reasonable observer that conclusions were made prior to seeking
input and information from the public. Further, a reasonable person might conclude
that the survey was propounded to support management that had already been decided
upon, or at least, was propounded to attempt to undermine proponents of natural
recovery in burned roadless areas. Characterization of proponents of ecological
integrity as “do nothing” was not a politically expedient approach to what were
already complicated public land management issues.
In retrospect, analysts have the privilege of asking whether economic values to be
gained by salvage logging on burned roadless areas outweighed the costs of
defending federal lawsuits, reducing trust, and sullying the agency’s image? Such
lines of inquiry prompt further questions as to whether there were not sufficient
stocks of timber in burned roaded areas, or in other areas over which
environmentalists were less opinionated and concerned? Pervading the post-fire fact
pattern is a spirit o f personal enmity between BNF/USFS employees and
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environmentally-oriented stakeholders. This seems to have significantly influenced
the turn of events that followed the Bitterroot wildfires of 2000.
Environmental Values
Looking behind the environmental interests should be of concern to agency
managers as these were the stakeholders that filed suit. Environmental stakeholders
valued fire for its naturalness and its wildness, for the ecological values it can create,
such as structural heterogeneity, age-class and species diversity, and cavity-nesting
bird habitat. They valued the post-fire patchy mosaic and forest legacy structures that
eventually succeed a burned landscape (Lindenmayer and Franklin 2002). Such
stakeholders valued untrammeled natural recovery as opposed to human-actuated
efforts to achieve desired conditions.
This is not to say that these same stakeholders did not value the utility o f salvaged
burned timber and the positive economic externalities that may be gleaned from its
harvest, but perhaps economic/utilitarian values for such stakeholders were of
secondary importance. These stakeholders believed that chosen management
strategies favored extraction over ecological values. Moreover, it is apparent that
scarce un-roaded forest land (Havlick 2002) and protection of endangered species
were priorities for those concerned with ecological integrity (Interviews 15, 16, 18,
19, 26A, 26C). Such values were ostensibly secondary or tertiary considerations on
burned forest land for industry stakeholders and some local residents.
Timber Industry Values
Some of the extractive interests that marched in Hamilton and sought recourse
from former Governor Martz gleaned their economic livelihood from extracting the
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timber resource. This is not to say that extractive interests did not care to protect
environmental quality and ecological values such as those of bull trout (Salvelinus
confluentus) or west slope cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki lewisi); but extractive
commodity values were simply paramount for these stakeholders. Perhaps those who
supported the BNF’s early proposals of harvest on 86,000, and later 46,000, acres
believed that these figures provided a fair compromise in light of the more than
300,000 acres that had burned. Thus, those stakeholders favoring increased levels of
extraction tended to view the Plaintiffs as “obstructionist” (.Missoulian, October 11,
2001).

Inter-temporal Scales and Ecological Humility
In contrast to those favoring economic primacy of national forest management
were those who favored ecological primacy. Some believed that extensive ecological
harm to national forest ecosystems resulting from 430,000 linear miles of roads
(Predator Conservation Alliance 2005) and many years of “aggressive” commodityfocused management comprised an ecological “debt,” not soon to be remedied by a
few years during which extracted timber volumes are far less than historic levels—
burned or not (Interview 19). Noted ecological advocate, Howie Wolke, expressed
such sentiments:
The Forest Service has probably butchered more national lands, public lands
than any other agency. Hard as the BLM has tried to do their share, if you
simply look at the results of Forest Service management over the last 100
years in this country, take an over-fly of most national forests, it is, it’s
appalling. If you fly over the non-wilderness sections of the Bitterroot
National Forest, what you find is massive environmental destruction. We’re
not even talking about controversial forms of resource management. We’re
talking about massive environmental destruction in terms of trashed
watersheds, weed infestations, complete loss of old growth habitats, the
destruction of riparian areas and streams, the loss of local wildlife populations
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due to open road densities that in some cases are three or four times what the
forest plan standards are. And if you then take that small plane and plop it
over in some of the forests in the Cascades of the Pacific Northwest, it makes
the Bitterroot look like small potatoes. We’re talking about millions and
millions of acres of unmitigated, massive environmental destruction under the
guise of Forest Service multiple use management.
And, you know... having seen these crimes against nature perpetrated over
and over again, having been involved with many negotiating sessions with the
Forest Service and seeing how deeply ingrained this bias towards resource
extraction and intensive management in general is, I long ago lost confidence
that the Forest Service could be whittled down, that the Forest Service’s
timber program could be whittled down at least voluntarily by the Forest
Service into the type of program that the forest could really sustain.
I witnessed from post-World War II, well, I didn’t witness it right after World
War II because I wasn’t bom until 1952, but from post-World War II until the
Clinton Administration, the Forest Service was roading and developing a
million acres of roadless de facto wilderness, the roadless areas. They were
whittling the roadless areas away at the rate of a million acres a year. And
Max Peterson finally fessed-up to that. I can’t remember exactly what year,
but in an interview... back in the early ‘80s I believe it was.
So unless the Forest Service were to get some very stiff directives on slowing
this program down from the top, which was beginning to happen... under
Clinton [and] Dombeck... You know, Dombeck was slowing down the timber
program. He was basically putting the skids on the road building program.
They had come up with the roadless rule to try to protect the wilderness
areas... [B]ut that only lasts as long as that person and his administration’s in
power (Interview 19:15).
Underlying stances such as Wolke’s and others’ within the various schools of
thought in the environmental community, is the notion that the USFS does not tend to
approach management actions with a sense of ecological and intellectual humility.
Those clashing with the BNF felt cut out of the planning process on lands to which
they believe they have a rightful claim. Others, however, criticize “the law” as
shackling the USFS (Harrington 2003). This viewpoint is more common among land
managers (Interviews 2, 8, 9, 12).
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In reality, the law shackles most any who do not understand it. Thus, non-lawyers
tend to hire lawyers to do their legal work. Before attributing conflict causality solely
to the many laws protecting ecological values and public input, critics of current law
might consider the nature of the USFS’ attempts to deal with those laws to which it
must conform. Likewise, those who tend to write-off the USFS’ actions as being
primarily related to bias might look to the pressures that work upon managers in the
form of centrally-made budgets and house-calls by elected officials.
Hard Lessons: Court-ordered Mediations
Court-ordered mediations are often appropriate in purely private conflicts, but
must be carefully considered before being imposed upon public land and resource
conflicts. It is likely that both sides of the salvage and restoration lawsuit were
engaging in strategic posturing and tactical maneuvering. This is part of zealous legal
advocacy and motion practice (written pre-trial motions to the presiding court). It is
part of what many would consider to be good lawyering. As a federal judge, Judge
Molloy was beholden to interpret that which parties present to him, and apply the law
accordingly. After granting the Plaintiffs a temporary injunction preventing
implementation of the BAR project, Judge Molloy reacted to the Defendant USFS’
motion requesting emergency action by noting that Defendant took two weeks to file
its appeal—this, while government lawyers already argued that time was of the
essence.
Nonetheless, Defendant USFS’ strategy of claiming ecological emergency
seemed to give Judge Molloy pause. If he denied the USFS’ request to take action, he
might stand responsible, in the eyes of some or many, for any realized ecological or
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economic harm associated with delay. But if Judge Molloy granted the USFS’
request to take emergency action, and management actions on the ground did not
reflect what had been promised, then Judge Molloy might appear to have been
manipulated by agency officials and political appointees who had illegally denied the
public an administrative appeals opportunity. It was reasonable under either scenario
to expect a return of all parties to Judge Molloy’s Court for further proceedings.
Judge Hogan noted in a 2005 interview,
[When] someone [is] a mediator, people come and say this case is too
complicated to be mediated... [F]rankly, the truth is usually opposite. Those
that really have the untenable problems and complications are good candidates
for mediation. The only thing was this one was sort of unique is that the
Bitterroot Valley is a fairly concentrated area and there was the real possibility
of even physical confrontation between people who had really opposing ideas
in that valley. And so there was a sense in which a mediator could call them
to their highest and best thoughts in treatment of other human beings. But
settlement of this type of case ordinarily is something that - it’s kind of a
trading match where people have to look at what’s really important to them,
pick the two best things they’d like to have happen (Interview 13:4).
Perhaps, it is plausible that Judge Molloy ordered mediation out of default. In
doing so, he would possibly avoid what would—for any judge or court—be a
controversial, expensive, and difficult trial process that might eventually have had to
decipher dueling science and ecological and biological vagaries, and balance
economic and non-market values. More likely though, Judge Molloy was simply
trying to think creatively, to look for an efficient solution to complex, timeconsuming public lands litigation.
Were the interests at stake solely private, Judge Molloy’s decision would have
been a success, at least from the standpoint of conserving judicial resources and
taxpayer dollars. As it stood however, the mediation order failed to account for some
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important details: (1) No single USFS administrator or political appointee can
guarantee future budgetary allocations from Congress (2) By ordering select private
parties to determine land management practices with a public agency—behind closed
doors—USFS management was subjected to “capture” by those same select parties.
Passage of time would highlight the settlement agreement’s foibles. Interestingly,
although most participants in the mediation were dissatisfied with both process and
outcome (Interviews 26 A-D) certain parties seemed to win from the criteria of
gamesmanship.
The absence of project timelines from the settlement document in essence allowed
the BNF to prioritize its budget and timelines as it saw fit, thus allowing restoration
commitments to occur at a snail’s pace with full legal impunity. Impunity, however,
is a separate issue from costs in diminished trust and goodwill, and exacerbated
public tensions. The USFS’ national leadership underestimated the political
importance of the Bitterroot controversy. USFS leaders lost an opportunity to shine,
whatever this might have required, while all eyes were on the Bitterroot. Instead,
local officials, such as Supervisors Richardson and Bull, were left to equivocate and
fumble through the political process in order to compensate for failed leadership in
the agency’s upper echelons.
Some would argue that the settlement agreement reduced the BNF’s original
proposal in both harvest area and volume significantly, suggesting a victory for those
who advocated for ecological integrity over economic gains (Interview 27). It is
difficult, however, to gauge victory when gamesmanship and brinksmanship
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dominated the process. Further, the notion that public lands management would be
intentionally adversarial at all is suggestive of systemic institutional problems.
Agency Ties to Congress
Hindsight illuminates what attorneys for environmental stakeholders overlooked.
As far as budgets go, the BNF and other agencies are, to a significant degree, subject
to the whims of Congress and the USFS’ central office in Washington, D.C. Where
promises as large as the $25.5 million in lost restoration funds are concerned,
mediated settlements are tenuous at best. Whether the loss of this funding was a
comedy of errors or entailed some manner of malice and political horse trading is
now largely irrelevant. The possibility of the USFS’ promises being broken was
always present. Nonetheless, it was imprudent for USFS officials to make promises
they could not keep. Significant political capital was lost as a result. Because
budgets originate in Washington, D.C., Undersecretary Rey and Chief Bosworth—as
the agency’s executives— should shoulder the balance of blame. This is so, because
of their intimate familiarity with budgetary realities and their knowledge of the
likelihood of losing restoration funds not shored-up.
For his part, Judge Molloy might have realized that federal agencies cannot, with
respect to mediated settlements, be treated as would a private party. The private law
mediation model is not readily applied to public land conflicts. Nonetheless, it is
apparent that Judge Molloy was striving for an effective solution to a complex
problem. Despite the unanswered questions and time constraints, Judge Molloy
might have ameliorated tensions by making the difficult ruling on the motion for
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emergency action that was before him. All involved would learn the hard way that
those representing the USFS did not, in this instance, possess deal-making authority.
To his credit, Judge Molloy ordered the Under Secretary of Agriculture, Mark
Rey, to participate in the negotiation, in spite of Rey’s efforts to avoid involvement.
Furthermore, most would assume, as did Judge Molloy, that an executive such as Rey
would wield penultimate authority. Nonetheless, this was not the case, and neither
Rey nor the USFS were held to account for unfulfilled promises that were reached as
part of the settlement. It remains unclear as to whether Undersecretary Rey and
USFS officials in Washington, D.C. could have replaced lost restoration monies with
alternate budget lines or accounting methods.
To this effect, Undersecretary Rey and his superior, Secretary of AgricultureMike Johanns, regularly award discretionary grants. In fiscal year 2005 these totaled
more than $4.4 million in the category of woody biomass utilization alone (USDA
2005). These awards were given to entities within the wood products and timber
communities. Certainly, grants for research, specialized kilns, and small diameter log
mills are for many reasons auspicious. Nonetheless, these grants allowed critics to
think that Rey and Johanns ignored the BNF’s loss of restoration funds when they
could have mitigated circumstances (Interviews 14, 15, 26C). Despite his political
fumbles, BNF Supervisor Bull does not seem to have been primarily responsible for
failing to actuate restoration projects in a timely manner. To some extent, Supervisor
Bull and other local agency managers seem to have been pawns in a political chess
match.
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Had the right decision makers made it a priority, significant monies could likely
have been found and applied toward fulfilling the USFS’ promises of ecological
restoration under the settlement agreement. Whether or not it is the reality,
Undersecretary Rey’s and Chief Bosworth’s failure to keep their word per the
settlement agreement is problematic and perhaps suggests a bias. Whether the facts
bear out this suggestion is debatable. For his part, Chief Bosworth said that there
were other national priorities that took precedent over replacing the missing
restoration funds (Interview 12).
Nonetheless, the Department of Agriculture’s grants totaling millions of dollars to
the timber and wood products industries are difficult to ignore relative to the lost
ecological restoration funds. Local officials on the Bitterroot National Forest were
left to absorb blame and criticism while Undersecretary Rey and Chief Bosworth
returned to Washington, D.C. to address national priorities. It seems however, that
given the negative media coverage and lost political capital, USFS and USDA
leadership would have benefited by treating the Bitterroot conflicts and settlement
agreement as a national priority as well.
The settlement agreement was a legally binding contract, enforceable in court;
and so the story may not yet be over, but it likely is. Parties have moved on to the
next conflict. Importantly, congressional budget makers were the public servants
who wielded ultimate deal-making authority where the BNF’s restoration promises
were concerned. Nonetheless, Undersecretary Rey and Chief Bosworth failed to
exercise their penultimate discretionary authority to mitigate circumstances for
proponents of ecological integrity in the Bitterroot Valley.
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Agency Capture and Public Perception
Agencies are most always subject to some degree of capture by competing
interests (Hirt 1994, Nie 2005, Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005). This relates in part to
individual values, funding sources, decision making authority, administrative process,
organizational structure, agency culture as well as other issues. It is important to
know that stakeholders may capture Congress-made budgets by virtue of influence
over key delegates, and thus indirectly capture agency management regimes.
However, some would argue that such is the nature of the American political system.
No matter, the notion of capture is merely a mechanism through which to analyze
power or control over agency decisions. This may be direct power, indirect power, or
somewhere in between. Agency capture applies to the Bitterroot conflict in a few
ways.
The first relates to credibility. Coming out of the 2000 fires, BNF officials
proposed salvage logging and thinning on more than 79,000 acres. As the agency’s
final request was for the emergency treatment of 5,400 acres, it is apparent that the
USFS might have fostered more trust if it had initially proposed a lower harvest
volume. From the beginning, the perception among environmental groups was that
the USFS was, in effect, captured by logging interests by virtue of its post-fire focus
on salvage logging. This perception was solidified early on by the USFS’ salvage
proposals which were to change drastically over time. As elsewhere, values underlie
the conflict surrounding management priorities. The decision as to whether to
salvage on 79,000 acres vs. 5,400 acres is one that cannot be made without pitting
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extractive and ecological values against one another. That is to say, early exploration
of middle ground might have saved time, money, and energy.
The notion of perception is important in and of itself. The post-fire conflicts
showed that it is o f secondary importance whether or not perceptions are true. The
BNF would have benefited by being better aware of public perceptions to begin with.
The BNF might have benefited by openly promulgating a management strategy that a
majority of stakeholders would consider to be value-balanced. How does this
occur—most likely, through processes the BNF has not embraced. If BNF officials
were not aware of public perceptions, then the Forest’s communications strategy was
insufficient. Alternatively, if the BNF believed any of its initial proposals were
indeed value-balanced, it needed to make this argument affirmatively and early in the
process. That is, perceptions and misperceptions should be addressed promptly.
The BNF’s initial salvage proposal as compared to the final settlement indicates
that relationships with the environmental community were already deteriorated before
the 2000 fire season had ended. Otherwise, USFS officials might have foreseen the
distrust and controversy that their initial salvage proposal was to foment. Ostensibly,
the USFS sought extensive salvage of burned timber, and conducted participation
processes knowing the agency’s primary goal was always to maximize salvage. The
pressures to maximize timber extraction relating to budget constraints, pressure from
elected officials, political appointees, and timber targets would support this
conclusion. Moreover, BNF managers including the Supervisor and District Rangers
are foremost among those relating such exogenous influences upon the course of
post-fire management (Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005, Interviews 2, 5, 8, 9).
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It was predictable that the BNF’s attempt at circumventing the administrative
appeals process would exacerbate existing distrust and resentment. The decision to
deny administrative appeals communicated the message to stakeholders that federal
court was the only venue for discussion. Cutting off formal participation in this
manner left the public to perceive managers acting upon notions of timber primacy—
whether those perceptions were accurate or not. Administrative remedy and formal
dialogue had ended abruptly. This encouraged some to think industry interests had
captured the BNF management. Importantly, perception of agency capture can be as
powerful and controversial as capture itself.
The notion of capture also plays into the Bitterroot conflict with regard to the
court-ordered settlement. By ordering the Plaintiffs and the USFS to determine postfire salvage and restoration management, Judge Molloy elevated select members of
the public to positions where they could exert influence over national forest
management. These individuals influenced post-fire management on the BNF. Other
members of the public had no say in this process. Had the cases been argued in trial,
Judge Molloy, being an experienced arbiter of complex cases, would have decided
what the just and fair outcome would have been. In effect, he would have made a
decision that justly balanced divergent values, as he has done many times before.
Notably, the rigor of legal arguments and evidence presented indicates the
Plaintiffs were sincere in their convictions and entertained no frivolity in the process.
Nonetheless, the incentive created by the settlement order is one whereby suing the
USFS becomes an attractive strategy should one desire to influence public land
management. Thus, the court-ordered public lands settlement possibly encourages a
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tendency toward litigation, as well as a disincentive to pursue traditional
administrative processes and negotiation.
It might also be said, however, that Undersecretary Rey, Chief Bosworth, and the
BNF, whether by misunderstanding the law, engaging in power politics, or because of
mutual enmity with environmentalists, encouraged a legal battle by summarily
denying the right to appeal and exhaust rightful administrative processes. Outcomes
suggest both managers and stakeholders would have better avoided conflict by
engaging in more deliberative, collaborative, and cooperative efforts at management
on a regular basis— not solely following political crisis or ecological disturbance.
Administrative Process
Evident from the controversy is the overwhelming concern on the part of various
stakeholders that they had been cut out of the process to which they were legally
entitled. This punctuates the importance of process by which citizens might voice
concerns to USFS officials and feel that they have been heard, particularly in cases
where administrators have reached final decisions. Even if USFS officials are
decided on a general or specific course of action, the Bitterroot saga showed that
although the process of scoping projects and subsequently accepting appeal is perhaps
time consuming in the short term, it better avoids costly legal battles in the long run.
The U.S. District Court affirmed as much by holding that the BNF had violated its
lawful duty to accept administrative appeals and by awarding attorney fees to the
plaintiffs.
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Perspectives on Wildfire
The Bitterroot fires of 2000 illustrated that fires are harmful relative to certain
values such as protecting human domiciles, protecting live trees, and minimizing
sediment loading to aquatic habitat. With respect to other values, fires are positive.
Fires create landscape heterogeneity through burning patches into both matrix and
reserve lands (Lindenmayer and Franklin 2002). Fires can create habitat for cavitynesting birds in the form of large diameter snags (Lindenmayer and Franklin 2002).
Fire cycles nutrients to the soil and opens serotinous cones (Agee 1993). Thus, the
relative utility o f fire depends on one’s value hierarchy; so too does the relative utility
of a burned landscape.
Natural systems are overwhelmingly complex. Fire severity, intensity duration,
return interval, terrain slope, terrain aspect, terrain elevation, human fire suppression
practices, interactive effects with insect populations, weather patterns before, during
and after the fire, climate changes... these all contribute to the effects a fire may have
on the landscape. The point being, that any post-fire management action will speak to
some values while discounting others. Therefore, land managers will better avoid
tensions by acknowledging complexity. Fire’s effects are both positive and negative
depending upon one’s values. Further, it is impossible to manage for all values on a
single burn site.
Managers can ease their burden by stating up-front the values or value that is
manifest as a management priority in any given scenario. It is disparities between
what is promised or advertised and what actually occurs on the landscape that most
ignite controversy. This is so whether the incongruity is due to happenstance or
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otherwise. Once major values at stake are brought to the fore, the discourse will be
clarified and managers may then begin to take an honest and holistic approach that
addresses the array of values at hand while outlining a realistic focus. When the
discourse is thus clarified, the courts may be more likely to grant administrative
discretion to the agencies where managers show they have considered the broad array
of values before deciding upon a course of action.
For all o f the criticism leveled against the NEPA and its scoping process, it is
clear that the public stakeholders are process-oriented people. For all of the short
term inefficiencies, the long-term gains perhaps lend credence to what agency
officials believe are onerous administrative processes. The present trend toward
“categorical exclusions” and diminished public involvement in public lands will
likely prove costly in terms of lawsuits, diminished trust, and reduced agency stature.
Executive Agencies Serve at the Pleasure of the Executive
USFS managers are placed in a difficult position. This is so because their elected
and appointed counterparts tend to promote policies with oversimplified, misleading
rhetoric, and often expect managers to do the same (Vaughn and Cortner 2005). For
example, when asked to define a “healthy forest,” “restoration,” and “catastrophic”
during a panel discussion at the University of Montana, a Lolo NF District Ranger
offered only an ambiguous answer about taking members of the public out and
showing them on the ground. Though diplomatic and personable, she appeared,
otherwise, stumped (Native Forest Network Healthy Forest Restoration Act Forum
2005). Information, clarity, and specificity are critical to effective dialogue; informed
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stakeholders will oppose most any policy promulgated on imprecise notions and
ambiguity.
In accordance with models of deliberative democracy and the associated
processes o f dialogue and discourse, it would behoove USFS managers to willfully
incorporate any and all stakeholders opposing proposed management projects into the
decision making process. As DNRC managers illustrated, proactively offering
compromise to potential litigants speaks to prudence, equanimity, and political savvy.
In contrast to the DNRC managers, the BNF managers appeared, during the wildfire
aftermath, aloof, largely protective of their power, and generally unwilling to yield
any discretion to collaborative processes in which members of the public might
influence final outcomes. In defense of managers, however, there exist salient risks
to stepping outside of traditional agency policies, culture, or traditions (Matson 1996).
Precise Language
Because agency managers serve at the pleasure of the administration, they are
bound to promote executive branch policies and associated rhetoric (Interviews 5, 12,
15, 16, 24, 27). For a USFS employee to do otherwise might risk job security or at
least alienation (Matson 1996, Interviews 5, 9, 15). In the least, it seems that
managers are discouraged from aggressively speaking out against executive branch
policies while wearing their Forest Service hats (Matson 1996, Interviews 5, 9, 15).
USFS managers can, however, mitigate such political pressures and restraints, by
stating specific project goals, defining terms, and providing specific evaluation
criteria that communicate resource values that benefit as well as those that suffer from
a particular management action. Importantly, there are always resource values that
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suffer from any management action. This is the reality of complex ecological and
sociological systems. To deny this reality is imprudent. Managers might avoid such
appearances by acknowledging both benefits and costs. “Forest health,” and
“restoration,” and “ 100 years of fire suppression” (Vaughn and Cortner 2005) are
inadequate descriptors without specific context.
It is difficult enough to plan forest management around complex and stochastic
ecological forces. When complex socio-political forces are overlain in the process,
policy and management tend toward a morass. Congress, USFS central office
administrators, judges, managers, stakeholders, and their attorneys would benefit by
attempting, where possible, to qualify laws, mandates, rules, plans, negotiations, and
agreements in terms of specific criteria. Important among these criteria are: time
(short-term and long-run); specific ecosystem components (species, locations, inputs,
outputs); funding; project prioritization; scheduling; and underlying values, among
others. Of course much must, by virtue of expediency alone, be left to agency
discretion. However, the BAR controversy has proven many such qualifying criteria
to be critical. To ignore such criteria is to ignore the significant complexity of natural
systems and the fundamental principle of ecological humility. To the degree that
agency actions ignore these principles, proposed action will likely draw challenge.
Harvesting Timber is Legal on National Forest Lands
As DNRC managers expressed, there is no shame in harvesting timber or salvage
logging because some citizens find the practice unpleasant (Interview 20). The
DNRC’s Bud Clinch promoted an openness and understanding of the DNRC’s
mission as including logging as part of a suite of revenue generating management
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actions (Interview 20). A significant problem arises in federal land management
when USFS managers propose harvesting timber, but insist that the management is
primarily a restoration project. Along these lines, federal managers run into trouble
when terms such as “thinning” and “restoration” are utilized to justify a project, but
remain undefined and unqualified. When large diameter trees are cut, critics tend to
challenge the USFS even though such harvest may be legal. It is not to say that
salvage and restoration are always incompatible, but explanation is always required if
the dialogue is to retain integrity.
Again, restoration of what? For whom? What is the definition of “thinning?”
What age classes and diameters are subject to “thinning” treatments? What are the
social, ecological, and economic costs of a particular project? What are the social,
ecological, and economic benefits? Most importantly, what are the criteria or goals
driving the management action? What are the desired future conditions? Does
preferred “agency science” contradict science propounded by stakeholders? If so,
how can divergent scientific conclusions be reconciled? Given differences, what are
appropriate compromises that will satisfy potential litigants? Relative to the reburn
hypothesis, the effects of post-fire salvage logging, or the minimum number of snags
to retain after a fire, what diameter, etc.; why has the agency chosen one scientific
school of thought over another?
Any deception or equivocation on these fronts tend to perpetuate the age-old
resource-conflict paradigm. Moreover, it is actions as opposed to words that do the
most to earn public trust. Controlling the message, as Supervisor Bull noted that his
superiors suggest he do (Interview 36), can be done best by addressing all issues, then
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countering critics with legal and ecological rationales. This is how a good attorney
approaches a legal brief, by addressing every issue that might arise, so that the
opposing counsel does not surprise her during trial.
USFS and Local Economies
Some USFS and non-USFS respondents described pressure to supply timber for
local economies as being exerted by such external sources as local citizens,
Undersecretary Mark Rey, Senators Conrad Burns and Max Baucus of Montana, and
Governor Martz of Montana (Interviews 8, 9, 27). Given such pressures, whether
legitimate or not, involved political figures might have openly considered the less
divisive trend toward restoration as a USFS-influenced boon to local economies. If
the political pressures to support local economies described by respondents were not
euphemisms for maximizing timber harvest, then it would seem logical to explore
other mechanisms for local economic infusions.
While ecological restoration may not always provide as many multipliers or
positive externalities in the form of timber supplied to markets, ecological restoration
projects can certainly provide jobs and deliver social benefits by virtue of the natural
resource restoration industry. The Bitterroot Valley, in fact, is home to one of the
nation’s preeminent private restoration companies—Bitterroot Restoration, which
employs more than 80 full time and 50 seasonal employees (.Associated Press,
October 2, 2001). Moreover, ecological restoration projects bolster myriad nonmarket or indirect market values: intrinsic values, health values, recreation values,
spiritual values, and others (Rolston 1994, Power 1996, Sienkiewicz 2004,
Sienkiewicz 2005).
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Some USFS respondents speak of the agency’s obligation to contribute to local
economies by generating timber from the national forests (Interviews 6, 8, 9).
Providing timber is one way to bolster local timber-based economies. (Although, it
remains unclear how often national forest timber ends up in local economies and also
whether or not local economies are the legal priority for national forest management.)
Nonetheless, the notion that extractive projects are the only manner by which the
USFS might support local and regional economic development is outmoded. If local
economies are a de jure or de facto USFS priority, then the myriad means by which
the agency might bolster such priorities deserve plenary, open discussion in the policy
arena.
Due in part to the suite of federal environmental laws, today’s natural
resource/ecological restoration market is burgeoning. This indicates some measure of
structural shift away from resource extraction-dominated, public lands-based
economies (Power 1996). The growing ecological restoration market suggests the
onset of a natural resources-related/structural economic diversification, which, in
turn, tends toward community stability (Power 1996). Such positive economic
indicators reinforce the notion that value-balanced, multiple use management is a
realistic and propitious goal for USFS managers on the BNF and elsewhere.
Congress and the USFS Washington, D.C, office, of course, ultimately decide
whether such management actions are funded.
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Multiple Use Balance: Overall, Not Everywhere
Current statutory mandates indicate that economic goals relating to wood fiber
production should not, across a large spatial and temporal scale, be dominant, but
rather be considered alongside other co-equal uses:
It is the policy of the Congress that the national forests are established and
shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and
wildlife and fish purposes...
(a) “Multiple use” means: The management of all the various renewable
surface resources of the national forests so that they are utilized in
combination that will best meet the needs of the American people; making the
most judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or related
services over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic
adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and conditions; that some
land will be used for less than all of the resources; and harmonious and
coordinated management of the various resources, each with the other,
without impairment of productivity of the land, with consideration being
given to the relative value of the various resources, and not necessarily the
combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return for the greatest
unit output.
(b) “Sustained yield of the several products and services” means the
achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular
periodic output of the various renewable resources of the national forests
without impairment of the productivity of the land (16 U.S.C.A. § 531).
Thus, the elusive multiple use balance is the present paradigm, and managers
must embrace that paradigm in all aspects of discretionary decision making.
Importantly, sometimes a single use will be dominant at smaller scales of analysis.
This is legal so long as other legal mandates are followed (Glicksman and Coggins
2001). Managers would benefit by acknowledging this phenomenon when it occurs.
That is to say, all management projects do not necessarily need to benefit all resource
values all the time. A timber sale held primarily for economic purposes is legal so
long as other requirements are met. Managers will benefit by saying as much
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publicly. BNF managers lost credibility by arguing post-fire salvage operations were
primarily conducted to promote ecological restoration and species protection. This
rationale was unpersuasive.
Obey the Law, Tell the Truth, Embrace Conflict, Honor Complexity
When faced with conflict, USFS managers would benefit by holding fast to
ecological and policy realities. Continually changing terms and reframing core issues
begets conflict. This pattern of reframing issues intentionally or unintentionally
confuses matters. As a consequence, the agency may often appear disingenuous to
those stakeholders who demand precise language and remain suspect of undefined
terms such as “forest health” or “restoration” (Vaughn and Cortner 2005).
By way of example, Kootenai National Forest (KNF) Supervisor Bob Castaneda
recently removed the term “wilderness” from the KNF’s most recent forest plan
revision. “Wilderness,” Castaneda said, has become “a conflict word” (Missoulian,
October 21, 2005). Though Supervisor Castaneda does not spurn the idea of
wilderness {Missoulian, October 21, 2005), his tack is common among USFS
managers: reframe controversial issues in vague terms (Vaughn and Cortner 2005).
If it hints of conflict, call it something else. Political appointees, congressional
representatives, and rhetoric writers perpetuate and promulgate such behavior in the
interest of securing favorable public opinion (Vaughn and Cortner 2005). This
pattern is often ironic in that it attempts to manipulate public opinion in support of
particular management, but begets an opposite result among those who follow agency
policy. Agency managers are left to address discrepancies between rhetoric and
reality. As occurred when the BNF marked 2005’s Middle East Fork Sale before the
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agency had completed the public comment period, any explanation of ostensibly
arbitrary and capricious agency action appears to be contrived relative to what has
already occurred on the ground.
Lawsuit Success vs. Lawsuit Volume
The pervasive rhetorical warfare now associated with modem public land policy
(Vaughn and Cortner 2005) is as old as politics itself. One wonders why semantic
wrangling of the present degree did not burden the public lands sooner. But beyond
the war of words, USFS managers would benefit by acknowledging the importance of
meaningful relationships with traditional enemies and embracing a spirit of
experimentation by implementing exogenously-generated or collaborative (in the
literal sense) management alternatives. Without such experimentation, stakeholders
will continue to sue the agency whenever a persuasive fact pattern presents itself as it
did in the Bitterroot Valley following the wildfires of 2000. Some are apt to cite the
USFS’ success in litigation as proof of legitimacy. This however is a dangerous
notion. Even if polls show a 78-82% public approval rating (Interview 12), the
presence of a significant litigation volume is, in and of itself, an indicator of
significant management and policy problems.
A 2005 Forestry Source article described the USFS’ overwhelming success rate
in defending lawsuits (Forestry Source 2005). The article comprises an incomplete
presentation of germane statistics. The fact that the USFS wins most of the cases
filed against it does not appear to be the critical issue. Students of administrative law
understand notions of agency deference and that high probabilities for litigation
success apply to most federal agencies. The telling statistic relates to the actual
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volume of cases filed against the USFS. From 1989 to 2002, litigants filed 731
lawsuits against the USFS that “challenge national forest management decisions or
allege that the agency has failed to follow statutory requirements” (Forestry Source
2005). Independent of win-loss percentages, such suit volumes are indicative of
broken stakeholder relationships and the absence of ongoing of dialogue. It would
thus be imprudent to deny the underlying policy problem. Moreover, what are the
direct and opportunity costs of defending 50 - 60 federal lawsuits each year? They
are significant to say the least.
The Society of American Foresters’ Forestry Source continues, quoting the cited
study’s primary author, Professor Bob Malmsheimer:
If there’s a message here that needs to get out there to the public, it is that the
courts find the Forest Service does things correctly the vast majority of the
time (Forestry Source 2005).
Professor Malmsheimer’s above conclusion misses critical issues. His advocacy of
the stated position fails to account for the notion that deference to agency discretion
or decision making does not equate to doing things correctly—in effect, many cases
such as Wilderness Society v. Rey are pursued on procedural grounds because this is
the most expedient approach. As occurred in the post-fire litigation on the Bitterroot,
power players in the environmental community (by virtue of legal staff and litigation
budgets) often abandon substantive claims surrounding the agency’s scientific
conclusions and their application to local ecosystems. It would make sense that those
footing the bill should prefer the least expensive course of action. Thus, whether or
not the USFS obeys the law as a matter of procedure or as a matter of substance is an
important distinction.
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One cannot claim that the Forest Service does things correctly the vast majority of
the time, without discussion of particular facts of each case. Nonetheless, the Healthy
Forest Restoration Act’s associated rhetoric teaches that validity varies drastically
depending upon how one defines critical terms (Abrams et al. 2005). Here defining
the term “correctly”—as in doing things correctly a vast majority of the time, is of
critical importance.
The Forestry Source article and Professor Malmsheimer’s quoted words paint
with a broad brush. Moreover, no matter what a court holds, if an agency is subject to
suit more than 700 times in approximately one dozen years on land-related issues
alone, then it may not be “doing things correctly [a] vast majority of the time.” The
notion that public sentiment does not matter unless a court says it matters would tend
to place the USFS in a technocratic, expertocratic, or synoptic paradigm, and is
contrary to models o f deliberative democracy as applied to public land management
agencies. In this sense, the agency that does what it pleases until a court dictates
otherwise is an agency destined to experience significant problems, on many fronts
and at multiple spatial and temporal scales. By establishing a more deliberative
democratic paradigm, by reaching out, by moving past existing enmity, and honoring
public input, by making final decisions reflective of input, USFS managers may better
achieve success in balancing preservation of public resources with the sustainable
extraction of public resources.
The DNRC was Effective at Maintaining Working Relationships
The USFS would benefit by examining the DNRC’s 2000 post-fire cooperative
efforts as a management model. If avoiding lawsuits and their formidable direct and
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opportunity costs is desirable, then the USFS would not look merely to minimum
obligations for citizen participation under the law, but to proactively include “the
squeaky wheels” in the planning process. In some instances this is perhaps akin to
asking Jewish and Palestinian militants to sit down and develop a plan for the
equitable habitation of the Gaza strip. There exists between some managers and some
stakeholders enmity, hatred, animosity, history, and culture with which to contend.
One need only observe the interactions between particular USFS managers and
particular stakeholders during public meetings or other fora to draw such a
conclusion. Here again, managers unable to function as both diplomats and
multifaceted experts in natural resources and public lands will be unable to effectively
manage publicly lands and resources.
It is dangerous and perhaps disingenuous for USFS managers to classify,
categorize, or pre-judge opposition to management projects based on the manager’s
instinctual notions of national support for the administration or for its policies. This
is so for many reasons, but practically speaking, it is so because supposed supporters
will not be apt to sue the agency; it is the spurned opposition that will sue the agency.
For this reason, the “squeaky wheels” must be taken seriously, no matter the values
they represent. They matter because they wield the power to sue, to burden, and to
actuate diversion of scarce resources away from land management. For these reasons
and perhaps others, such interests deserve respectful inclusion in the management
process. Such an approach is pragmatic, and need not be personal.
DNRC managers proved that long-term personal relationships with stakeholders
have tangible benefits. As counter-intuitive as it might seem to federal managers
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(who wield final discretion to either ignore or account for public comment on land
management projects), it is the dissent to whom managers must reach out. The
DNRC was able to do this following the 2000 fires, and did so without resentment or
insecurity.
Spin Begets Spin
Some agency critics, including advocates for zero timber cut on public forests,
respond to rhetorical manipulation of ostensibly propitious concepts such as “forest
health” and “restoration” (Vaughn and Cortner 2005) with comparably euphemistic
tactics, which may include marketing and data selection which tends to ignore any
instances o f positive management or data that might undermine their unspoken cause.
Moreover, some environmental interests will seize upon the inevitable administrative,
procedural, or implementation-related mistakes, when such mistakes might well be
forgiven as a byproduct o f behemoth bureaucracy. This vicious cycle is nothing new
to the agency, but what managers fail to see is that a policy of incorporating
traditional enemies into the planning process in a meaningful way would do much to
break the cycle of conflict. USFS managers might experiment with relinquishing
some measure o f their final discretion on management projects. Doing so might deter
lawsuits that can—after much expense to all involved—render the same final
discretion moot. Importantly, DNRC managers showed that this exploration best
takes place before a project proposal.
Public Land Law: More Burdensome than Other Genres?
Environmental and public land law is manifold and complicated, but is perhaps no
more confounding than tax law, or constitutional law, or international trade law. The
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BNF and the USFS, and the agency leadership generally, do not address germane law
and legal-scientific issues on a forest by forest basis. What USFS leaders do
understand o f law, they tend to spurn as it hampers technocratic or expertocratic
public land management models. Thus, there exists a tension between USFS
management models, and the more deliberative, less technocratic models promoted
by environmental and public land law. Public land law stymies unilateral discretion
and as a whole embraces ecological and intellectual humility. This reality stands in
opposition to the USFS’ historical culture (Pinchot 1947, Flirt 1994) and the culture
of forestry as a profession (Pinchot 1947, Clary 1986). Perhaps mirroring its inability
to account for ecological notions at multiple temporal and spatial scales, the USFS
has not understood the import o f addressing law, politics, and conflict across various
organizational and regional levels.
Professor Jerry Franklin once said that humans have a perceptual bias against
appreciating temporal and spatial scales beyond our own (Franklin 2001). To this
effect, the Bitterroot conflicts suggest that the USFS has been unable to perceive
conflict resolution and negotiation of the legal maze at scales other than that of a
behemoth national bureaucracy. Sending in a team of lawyers from Washington D.C.
or a regional office to handle a local forest’s legal troubles will usually accomplish
little but pecuniary waste. Thus, the government attorneys’ failure to grasp the basic
inadequacies of their own arguments in Wilderness Society v. Rey, or their being
forced to argue a certain way for political reasons (Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005) is
not surprising.
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Political Speak & Forest Management
The debate over public lands issues is ineffective in that it fails to address
underlying values and acknowledge trade-offs that might be relatively straight
forward and conflict-free were they not mischaracterized by appointees, managers,
and elected officials. Some USFS managers at local and regional levels seem simply
to be victims of their own narrow training. Some fail to see that the language they
perceive as protecting an image of science, equity, and ecological integrity in
actuality bespeaks the technocratic language of traditional forestry. If a manager
speaks of restoration and ecological integrity, then in order to avoid conflict, she must
understand, from an ecological perspective, the import of every aspect of an
ecosystem from bark beetle invasions, to root fungus, to drought and climate change,
to wildlife, to wildfire and other disturbances of varying severities, scales, and
degrees.
Certainly, within the holistic management context, knowledge of wood fiber
production is a valid part of multiple use management, but the holism embraced by
ecology naturally encompasses “forestry” and its inherent commodity-based focus on
wood production. During the aftermath of the fires of 2000, the BNF aggressively
marketed an extensive salvage logging operation as ecologically restorative. Again,
forestry is for many reasons auspicious, but as Jack Ward Thomas noted, sometimes a
cigar is just a cigar, arguing otherwise is asking for trouble— especially absent
important qualifying details (Interview 27). The BNF post-fire salvage and
restoration activities might have generated less conflict if marketed in economic
terms.
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Lifelong Learning
It is critical that the agency fill its leadership positions with not merely
intellectually and ecologically humble managers, but managers committed to
embracing both internal and exogenous science, reading and researching an array of
germane knowledge regarding any single management decision as a federal judge
would approach a complex case with her team of clerks. Statutory and common law
are key among critical knowledge bases. It is insufficient to rely on a career specialist
to be the perpetual source of best science and information on any management-related
matter. There simply exists too much pressure and incentive to respond in
accordance with de facto agency culture rather than questioning core assumptions
about ecological, political, and social relationships between humans and the public
lands ecosystems (Matson 1996).
The USFS might encourage managers to constantly seek out the latest science—in
many genres—not merely that promoted by the forestry infrastructure. Forestry is
based in economic values. Thus to the extent forestry culture is dominant within a
multiple use agency, controversy will continue (Interviews 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24,
26B, 26C, 27). The USFS might look to giving all managers access to online
databases as universities do for their professors and students. Scientific information
is expensive to access, but likely worth the expenditures in the context of public
lands. A manager should be part researcher, part scientist, part administrator, part
lawyer.
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Looking Beneath the Turmoil
Managers must use intuition as much as esoteric knowledge to balance values and
avoid stalemate. The Bitterroot conflict was manifold in its variety of issues, but the
crux issues seem obvious in hindsight. What opponents of USFS-generated
management plans fought for were roadless areas, sensitive watersheds, associated
ecological values, and some measure of influence over outcomes on the public forests
of the Bitterroot Valley. To the degree the BNF wanted (or needed) to generate
timber for local markets, it could have invited stakeholders to the table to develop a
collaborative plan to meet common needs and address concerns. It was the
BNF/USFS’ decision-making unilateralism, de facto preferences, and traditional
forestry culture as much as any substantive issue of forest science or ecology that
generated conflict and enmity following the fires of 2000. The same can be said for
2005’s Middle East Fork Sale. Importantly, as Supervisor Bull argued,
congressionally-influenced budgets and USFS central office decisions appeared to
drive the BNF’s post-fire decision making as much as any other factors (Interviews 8,
9, 27, Giltmier in Steen 2005).
While acknowledging budgetary constraints and political pressures working upon
managers such as Supervisor Bull; the USFS might look to the DNRC managers’
infusion of deliberative democratic traits.
While the DNRC wielded clear legal authority under the trust land doctrine to
operate in a more unilateral fashion, it embraced critics, made significant concessions
to stakeholders concerned with ecological integrity, and did not hesitate to do so prior
to deciding upon major management details. The DNRC and its managers continue
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to benefit from ongoing goodwill and working relationships with those same
stakeholders that some BNF employees consider to be enemies. The DNRC
embraces openness, cooperation, pro-spective inclusion of stakeholders, and does not
tend to marginalize stakeholders or generalize to core values of the larger society.
To the degree ecological integrity is important and sustaining ecological integrity
is important then USFS managers might acknowledge these impacts publicly so that
stakeholders might make informed decisions as to what forest values should take
priority in any given circumstances. To the degree that the dialogue is ineffective,
incomplete, or dishonest, then notions of public input into public land management
are fallacious. Without a clear picture of desired short, mid, and long-term ecological
conditions— then any discussion or argument as to appropriate management is for
naught.
Deliberative Democracy and Public Participation
The USFS might move toward breaking the vicious cycle of litigation by better
responding to citizen participation, by maintaining an ongoing dialogue in the spirit
of deliberative democratic principles. Without shirking its congressionally-delegated
responsibilities, the USFS might better incorporate into management the broad and
diverse input it receives regarding discretionary management. Adoption of a formal
process allowing the USFS to do so would effectively counter political pressures
being exerted from other fronts.
Public Lands, Public Ownership
The concept of public lands is self evident. They are meant to be maintained and
managed for the whole citizenry. The sense of entitlement to these lands felt by
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diverse stakeholders will not likely diminish. In a strident defense of nationally-held
public lands from the County Movement (that would have seen those lands privatized)
former USFS Chief, Jack Ward Thomas, invoked public welfare and its dependence
on the public lands:
Speaking for myself, I won't stand for [making public lands private]
for me and I won't stand for it for my grandchildren and I won't stand
for it for their children yet unborn. This heritage is too precious and so
unique in the world to be traded away for potage. These lands are our
lands—all the lands that most of us will ever own. These lands are
ours today and our children's in years to come. Such a birthright
stands alone in all the earth. Hell no! (Thomas 1995).
Public lands are of great personal value to a diverse citizenry. It is thus critical
that USFS officials remain mindful of balancing management priorities, especially
where public image is concerned. Adding complexity, these management priorities
change over time (Hirt 1994, Thomas and Sienkiewicz 2005). Certainly, for many
reasons, a literal balance of management activities would prove impossible at lesser
scales, but the USFS must appear to be striving for this goal. On-the-ground action
should always comport with what agency officials are relating to the public and to the
media.
Customer Service
Where the USFS’ public relations and the BNF’s handling of post-fire conflict are
concerned, one might invoke the business model of McDonald’s luminary CEO, Ray
A. Kroc. Kroc believed that serving the customer was the overriding priority. If
customers were happy, then the business would follow. The public attitude of
employees, thought Kroc, was “make or break” with regard to customer satisfaction
(Brooks 2005). Though the USFS is not a business per se, it could benefit from the
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application of this model. As applied to the USFS, Kroc’s truisms would simply
translate into incorporating broad interests into planning activities, before being
ordered to do so by a judicial body. The short-term inefficiencies of doing so are
obvious, but it is likely that such a strategy would provide long-term gains under
many criteria. Moreover, the USFS would be well served by managers who consider
full public participation to be a job requirement, not a burden limiting would-be
untrammeled discretion to manage the public estate. Candor, humility, and
acknowledging both risks and benefits would garner the USFS much trust (Interviews
15, 16, 19, 24, 27).
A New Paradigm
Addressing the issue of citizen influence on public land management exposes
innumerable sociopolitical interactions and profound complexity. Statutory law and
common law can both be slow to change. This study offers no policy panacea, but
moreover does not argue that traditional modes of participation in resource policy are
always particularly effective, as every situation is different. Any mode of
participation, voting, submitting comment, or filing suit, might be conducive to
success under certain circumstances. Generally, however, these methods leave
citizens dissatisfied.
The unique, personal, and visceral nature of the public land resource would
ideally reflect a citizen-policy relationship that is more democratic, in the deliberative
democratic sense, than that of other policy genres. Many of the values attached to
public lands and resources; wildlife, open space, recreation, grazing opportunities,
flowing water, wilderness, renewable extractive resources; are inherently public in

196

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

nature. They can be thought of as being simultaneously owned by all and owned by
none. Thus, the management process might better reflect the public qualities inherent
to the federal lands. Indeed, the tumultuous history of the public lands and resources
suggests their contemporary policy directives require a different approach.
As Wallace Stegner suggested in the famous Wilderness Letter (1960), there is
much of the public lands in the American character. Likewise, there is much of the
American character in the public lands. Perhaps, a new direction beckons the land
agencies. Without invoking quaint concepts, the USFS (and perhaps, to a lesser
extent, the other land agencies) might consider moving toward more inclusive
management in the deliberative tradition. Inclusivity, in this sense, must entail going
beyond the limits o f public participation required by the APA, the NEPA, and other
statutes within what Poisner (1996) considers to be the extant synoptic, nondeliberative paradigm.
This would entail relinquishing some, but not all, rightful agency discretion. It
would entail some measure of power transfer, not merely to local communities, but to
all of the legal owners of public lands—to all Americans. These need not violate the
strictures of non-delegation of agency duties, but would simply comprise a better
response to those that take the time to participate, especially where it contradicted the
decision maker’s personal values. Those who vote determine the makeup of political
leadership. Those who show up, make the rules. Of those USFS managers who tend
to discount form letters and e-mailed comments (Interview 36, Missoula Independent,
November 10, 2005, Missoula Independent, November 17, 2005), one is tempted ask
what would happen if state voting boards discounted absentee ballots, online votes, or
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standard ballots that did not include an expository essay explaining the voter’s
choices? In the complex and cumbersome American polity, one who does not speak
up is not heard. Should public lands governance differ from other policy arenas?
Measures to a more collaborative end would couple well with extant processes
such as notice and comment rulemaking and NEPA planning. Participation
thresholds might be used to gauge prevailing popular sentiment regarding specific
policies, such as roadless area protection or weed spraying in wilderness areas. Some
democratization of management policies would be allowable under the present legal
scheme (Wondolleck and Ryan 1999). The true obstacles to such a paradigm shift
relate to congressional culture and politically-driven budgets and the agency culture
that results (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Budgets are, after all, the ultimate policy
document and prioritization of scarce resources toward competing values (Thomas
and Sienkiewicz 2005).
When public conflict arises, USFS managers should acknowledge that public
lands, and their employment thereupon, concerns people as much as it concerns
ecosystems and natural resources, thus the dialogue-focus of deliberative democracy
seems directly applicable. Montana’s DNRC managers seem to have formally
adopted this stance by virtue of their working relationships with those who disagree
with overarching policy and management goals (Interviews 7, 20, 22, 23, 28).
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Chapter 9
Conclusion: Disparate Outcomes between the BNF and the DNRC
Trust Land Mandate vs. Multiple Use
The DNRC successfully avoided public conflict and legal disputes, while the BNF
became embroiled in public conflict and legal battles. Why the differing outcomes as
between DNRC and BNF? The DNRC, undeniably, benefited from a relatively
simple mission. Certainly, there are complexities and ambiguities within the trust
land mandate to manage lands primarily for perpetual revenue generation. However
following the wildfires of 2000, the burned timber of the Sula State Forest was simply
more valuable from a market perspective as salvaged timber than as standing and/or
downed woody structure within an ecosystem. Within the trust land mandate, there
was little ambiguity or room for legal or administrative challenge, at least in the
short-term.
Equivocation and Tenuous Rationales
The BNF, on the other hand, was bound to manage within the ambiguous legal
framework of the multiple use mandate. Nonetheless, the BNF exacerbated existing
value-related tensions by proposing extensive salvage and attempting to justify its
actions, both in the media and in federal court, under ecological terms. To say the
least, the notion that salvage logging is ecologically restorative comprises an
unsettled scientific question. A federal court of appeals case, Ecology Center v.
Austin (430 F.3d 1057 (2005)), recently asserted as much. In furtherance of the
notion that salvage logging as ecologically restorative comprises an unsettled
scientific question, Donato et al. (2006) note,
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Recent increases in wildfire activity in the United States have intensified
controversies surrounding the management of public forests after large fires...
The view that postfire (salvage) logging diminishes fire risk via fuel
reduction, and that forests will not adequately regenerate without intervention
that includes logging and planting is widely held and commonly cited... An
alternative view maintains that postfire logging is detrimental to long-term
forest development, wildlife habitat, and other ecosystem functions... Our
data show that postfire logging, by removing naturally seeded conifers and
increasing surface fuel loads, can be counterproductive to goals of forest
regeneration and fuel reduction. In addition, forest regeneration is not
necessarily in crisis across all burned forest landscapes... [our] results...
suggest that postfire logging may conflict with ecosystem recovery goals.
As Donato et al.’s conclusions (2006) suggest, basing large scale, programmatic
post-fire management plans on general notions that salvage logging is “good for
ecosystems” is problematic. That said, the USFS and the BNF have the legal right to
harvest timber. Perhaps dialogue should have begun with this more honest premise,
that the BNF desired for certain reasons (to be outlined for the public) to produce X
volume of timber for market purposes. This discussion never occurred.
In short, the BNF proposed a large-scale salvage project for which many, even
among industry stakeholders, argued the BNF had inadequate resources to undertake
(Interviews 10, 11, 37). Moreover, the BNF attempted to justify this salvage
operation with questionable and equivocal rationales, allowing critics to expose
imprecise and inadequate explanations for proposed action.
Dialogue & Deliberative Democracy
Neither the DNRC nor the BNF could reasonably be considered deliberative
democratic agencies. Both are steeped in technocratic “natural resource professional”
cultures. Moreover, DNRC managers work under the relative clarity and ease of the
trust land mandate to maximize revenue generation in perpetuity. Nonetheless,
DNRC managers and administrators such as Bud Clinch, Tom Schultz, and DNRC
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field foresters embraced a more deliberative democratic approach to management
following the wildfires o f 2000. They did so even though the jurisprudence of trust
land law allow for a largely technocratic, unilateral management structure. DNRC
managers operated on the assumption that long-term benefits and trusting
relationships can result from ongoing dialogue, mutual respect with stakeholders, and
candor as to administrative realities and the limits of compromise. DNRC managers
seem to have benefited from this assumption. Many of the same stakeholders that
sued the BNF expressed trust and respect for DNRC managers despite significant
philosophical differences. Critically, DNRC managers seemed to set aside formal
management frameworks such as Montana’s version of the NEPA (MEPA) and
simply address stakeholders on personal terms, proactively discussing goals and
desires and offering compromise where legally, there was no requirement to make
any such concessions.
There was, for example, no legal requirement for DNRC managers to leave green
trees or moribund trees. Managers did so merely out of compromise, in the context of
ongoing dialogue with stakeholders such as the Friends of the Bitterroot, with whom
USFS managers were unable to maintain dialogue. Certainly the enmity existing
between certain stakeholders and certain BNF managers was a two-way street.
Nonetheless, the ongoing dialogue and deliberative approach fostered by DNRC
managers diminished the potential for critiques claiming aloofness, unilateralism,
technocracy, or violation o f laws promoting public participation.
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Political Support and Funding
Beyond the DNRC’s proactive, collaborative, and cooperative efforts, the agency
and its salvage logging efforts enjoyed the open and outspoken political support of
the Montana Governor’s administration. This is a significant variable mostly because
this support was backed by funding which would allow for immediate action. The
BNF, on the other hand, and by virtue of long standing national forest administrative
procedures, was not able to begin active salvage until the NEPA process had been
completed.
Matters were, of course, exacerbated by unforeseen events relating to the courtordered settlement agreement and subsequent fire season spending. In contrast to
political support for the DNRC’s salvage plans, political support for salvage logging
on the BNF came in the form of public criticism of the BNF having to follow
environmental laws such as the NEPA, and was not backed with immediate cash-inhand to conduct work. In effect, political support for federal land salvage logging
ignored legal-administrative realities, and pitted environmentalists against loggers.
This is an age-old polemic, and the results were predictable. Thus, the notion that
the BNF could have acted with anywhere near the speed as did the DNRC is illconceived and exhibits significant ignorance of the many laws, regulations, and
political realities under whose confines the BNF must operate.
Given the convoluted fact pattern and complex chain of events that comprised the
post-fire conflicts, the BNF/USFS leadership might begin the process of institutional
learning by opening a dialogue, establishing and maintaining relationships with
stakeholder groups, and in general, injecting—as John Dewey prescribed—more
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democracy into the established processes, frameworks, and political constraints under
which it presently operates.
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Afterword
In 2006, the scholarly journal Science published a study (Donato et al.)
addressing post-fire salvage logging’s ecological ramifications. Science initially
published an on-line version in Science Express. The on-line version of the study
found that where ecological recovery is the management goal, post-fire salvage
logging is not necessarily the most prudent management approach on burned forests
(Donato et al. 2006). Prior to release of the study’s print-version, forestry professors
and professionals attempted to delay, suppress, and/or qualify the study (Associated
Press 2006, Oregonian, January 20, 2006).
Science Editor and former Stanford University President, Donald Kennedy,
refused what he called attempts at “censorship” and published the print version of the
study, noting that “those who dispute the findings can respond to the study once it is
published” (Associated Press 2006). An Oregonian article noted that “James Karr, a
professor of fisheries and biology at the University of Washington who has criticized
logging after fires, said he is ‘appalled at the way this is playing out.’ He said the
turmoil is having a chilling effect on other OSU researchers” (January 20, 2006).
Before the print-version of the study had been published, Hal Salwasser, Dean
of Oregon State University’s College of Forestry, circulated a memo that made its
way around the country, noting, “It is imperative that major policy decisions be made
based on th[e] full body of available research and after thorough scientific dialogue
and review” (Salwasser 2006). Salwasser suggested that Donato et al.’s study lacked
context (Salwasser 2006). Salwasser generally attempted to qualify or disqualify
(depending upon one’s perspective) some of the study’s findings (Salwasser 2006).
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Dean Salwasser has testified in favor of legislation that would accelerate logging after
wildfires (Associated Press 2006, Oregonian, January 20, 2006).
Salwasser noted that he had asked the authors to make changes in the paper, i.e.,
he felt that Donato's paper went too far in its conclusions. However, Salwasser
disagreed with attempts by some to keep the study out of Science (Oregonian,
January 20, 2006). University of Washington Professor and noted fire ecologist
James Agee stated, "[the OSU critics] have lost a little perspective on this. Donato
works under Beverly Law, an associate professor in the College of Forestry and the
senior author of the research paper” (Oregonian, January 20, 2006). As for Donato,
he noted that the authors “stand behind their study and believe any response to their
work should undergo the same scrutiny and review that their research did”
0Oregonian, January 20, 2006).
Before publication of the print version of the paper in Science, the authors
removed one controversial sentence that had appeared in the online version: "The
results presented here suggest that postfire logging may conflict with ecosystem
recovery goals." Donato would not explain why it was taken out (Oregonian, January
20, 2006).
Why the conflict over what is merely one more scientific paper? Why the
defensive response from the forestry community? There is clearly more to this debate
than science. Scientific studies such as Donato’s hold the potential to sway the
political balance of power with regard to germane policy issues. Stakeholders stand
to gain or lose standing in the court of public opinion based on the science they might
either marshal to their cause or make the target of their slings and arrows.
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All should admit that there is inherent complexity and uncertainty in ecological
systems. Thus all might value some measure of scientific debate and dialogue.
Beneath the science, however, this debate comes down to values. In the public lands
context, those who would defend the right to log national forests, burned or green,
will tend to support the notion that salvage logging is ecologically restorative. Those
who question the assumption that human intervention is always the most prudent
course of action are apt to support findings such as Donato et al.’s, which suggest
nature often knows how best to restore its own systems after ecological disturbances.
This dichotomy exists independent of scientific facts and debate. Nonetheless, values
and science are oft-inter-tangled, but rarely labeled as such in public debate.
This debate is further complicated by the notion that those in support of salvage
logging and active replanting after burns generally think of “recovery” as speeding a
system to produce wood fiber for future harvest. Those in support of natural
“recovery” would tend to support untrammeled ecological parts, processes, and
interactions free of human intervention. Proponents of the latter value set would tend
to be primarily concerned with issues such as sediment loading to streams and
ecosystem responses to re-planting a bum site with seedlings of genetic stock foreign
to the burn site’s native ecological communities. Proponents of the former value set
would tend to be primarily concerned with issues such as seedling recruitment and
mortality rates. This is so because long-term sustained-yield wood production is
forestry’s primary goal.
The crux tension comes again to two different contingents using the same or
similar language and concepts, e.g., “restoration” and “ecosystem recovery,” but
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operating upon dramatically different underlying assumptions and definitions of key
terms and concepts. Are national forest managers to leave burned tracts of public
lands as untrammeled wilderness; to “restore” burns to monoculture tree farms of
species demanded by commodity markets; or to manage for desired conditions
comprising some middle ground between these two extremes?
Herein lies the rub. How are public land managers to approach burned areas?
Were the communications effective, the dialogue honest, and the mission and
management priorities of national forests clear, then much adversarial energy might
be directed toward productive ends. There is, at present, a movement among the
environmental and ecological communities to impress upon public lands agencies the
idea that wildfire burns comprise an underrepresented ecological niche and should be
seen as more than standing raw material for commodity production. There is
certainly merit in the notion that burned areas may be an underserved ecological
niche. Nonetheless, public and private forest management in the United States has
traditionally viewed burns primarily as an opportunity for the salvage logging of trees
that would otherwise fall down and rot. This is the mindset has long been the forestry
status quo.
Ecologists and environmentalists would respond to such views, by noting that
every variable within an ecosystem—burned or unbumed— serves an important
function, including standing and downed burned trees. “Nurse logs,” “snags & cavity
nesting birds,” “coarse-woody debris,” and many other ecological concepts are
associated with the very same ecosystem variables that traditional foresters might
view as “decadent,” “rotting,” “over-mature,” and “wasteful.” Can public national
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forest management bridge this cultural gap between ecologists and foresters, between
preservation and use? The answer is yes, but we are not yet there.
Burned areas and associated species such as the black-backed woodpecker
(Picoides arcticus) seem poised to become to the early 21st century what late
succession old-growth stands and the northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis
caurina) were to the late 20th century. Burned forests seem to have become the most
recent battle grounds in the traditional American conflict between proponents of
public lands preservation and proponents of public lands use. Associated threatened
and endangered species have before, and will again, become proxies for both leaving
national forest ecosystems alone to serve as habitat and haven, and harnessing their
commodity values for utilitarian purposes.
Where public lands are concerned, mission clarity and honest debate about
underlying values would do much to elevate public lands management above such
conflicts. Were there a clear mission, and perhaps one or two clear priorities, as to
what Americans wanted of their burned public forests—lumber, habitat, jobs, all of
the above?— such conflicts as the Bitterroot aftermath might remain within the realms
of academe and natural resources professionals as opposed making their way into the
judicial system.
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Appendix A
Further Themes or Patterns of Understanding as Exhibited by Respondent
generated Data/Expressed by Respondents
DNRC
• The DNRC actively engages in ‘salvage to restore’ management also called budget
maximizing behavior.
• The DNRC leadership actively promulgated the agency’s mission and priorities.
• DNRC managers operated under a clear mission and system of resource
prioritization.
• The DNRC’s clear mission simplified management priorities for both managers and
public participants.
• The DNRC dealt with problems of spatial scale and socio-political and legal
complexity that were less onerous than those BNF managers faced.
• Contrary to some rhetoric, DNRC management following the fires of 2000 was not
“perfect.” There were pitfalls and controversial instances.
• The DNRC leadership actively encouraged proactive cooperation and collaboration
with participating stakeholders.
• DNRC managers, in turn, proactively sought to involve stakeholders in management
project planning.
• DNRC managers nurtured relationships with involved stakeholders before, during,
and after salvage operations.
• DNRC managers involved stakeholders in actual planning processes, informally as
well as formally.
• DNRC managers exhibited respect for those in opposition to the trust land
management paradigm of revenue generation.
• The DNRC listened to stakeholder input and made compromises it was not (by law)
required to make— in part to maintain working relationships with stakeholders it
otherwise might alienate.
• The DNRC incorporated exogenous (NGO) concerns into its salvage operations.
• The DNRC kept/keeps its promises.
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• DNRC managers did not generalize to or make assumptions about the broad,
uninvolved population on the basis of those participating in comment, analysis, and
project planning.
• DNRC managers did not marginalize participants as “squeaky wheel” or “vocal
minority.”
• DNRC managers operated under auspices of open, transparent political support for
salvage logging.
• DNRC managers do not feel political pressure to publicly portray resource
extraction as other than resource extraction.
• DNRC managers do not tend to associate “salvage logging” with
“restoration”/”forest health,” or view such terms as synonyms.
• The DNRC benefited from auspicious cold weather and frozen ground which helped
to mitigate impact of mechanical treatments/salvage logging as well as public
perceptions as to protection of ecological integrity.
• From the criteria of ecological disturbance the DNRC was the beneficiary of good
(cold) weather and good fortune (frozen ground).
• The DNRC was also the beneficiary of its own planning, citizen involvement, and
efforts to harvest during winter when ecological impact could be mitigated.
• The DNRC’s management mission and the specifics of trust land law contributed to
the relative absence of political conflict in Montana Trust Land Management.
• The DNRC’s management mission, however, was among several factors that helped
post-fire management occur with little conflict.
• The DNRC is results driven more than it is driven by process.
• The state trust land doctrine allowed management to focus more on results than
process.
BNF/USFS
• The BNF/USFS actively engages in ‘salvage to restore’ management, also called
budget maximizing behavior.
• There was pre-existing enmity between BNF managers and environmental interests
prior to the fires of 2000.
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• BNF Managers were/remain subject to significant political pressure in the form of
direct contact from regional and national officials.
• USFS ‘culture’ frowns upon managers publicly discussing problems of budget,
culture, political pressures, and values.
• BNF managers were/are subject to significant political pressure in the form of
budgets favoring extractive projects such as timber salvage.
• USFS Managers had/have no formal, objective balancing tests for deciding on a
preferred option under the NEPA/the APA/the ARA, thus agency culture, political
pressures, and the decision maker’s personal values can wield significant influence
public land management projects.
• Washington D.C. officials are increasingly involved in regional and local projectlevel decisions on the BNF and other forests.
• Chief Bosworth, Undersecretary Rey, or Secretary Johanns could likely have
mitigated the loss of restoration funds and the agency’s failure to quickly replace
them. These high ranking officials did not consider doing so a priority.
• Supervisor Bull’s decisions were/are largely tied by the budgets created for BNF by
Congress.
• Budgets created for the BNF by Congress significantly influenced/influence
Supervisor Bull’s discretionary decisions.
• The BNF’s marking of 2005’s Middle East Fork Sale prior to completion of the
public comment period strongly suggests a ‘hollow’ NEPA process on some or many
BNF projects—that is to say, decisions seem largely to be decided prior to completion
of the NEPA process.
• Political manipulation of natural resource rhetoric and semantic wordplay or “spin”
encourages misunderstanding of forest management and ecological principals.
• By virtue of its recent actions, the BNF and its leadership appear to discount laws
relating to public participation, such as the NEPA, the APA, & the ARA.
• USFS and congressional budget processes have encouraged resource extraction—
not participatory measures or restoration projects.
• The BNF prioritized salvage logging projects by shoring-up funds for such projects
vis-a-vis signing work contracts, thus actuating criticism and claims of timber
primacy.
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• USFS hiring practices tend to favor internal candidates and other preferred applicant
categories that are unrelated to an applicant’s expertise. In this respect
USFS/govemment hiring seeks to fill positions based upon many criteria unrelated to
a candidate’s resource management capacity.
• Many USFS decision makers are ill-equipped to balance complex decisions
entailing thorough understanding of scientific disciplines, law, policy, economics, and
politics.
• Many USFS employees consider claims of timber primacy to be unfounded based
upon timber volume extracted from USFS lands as compared to volumes extracted
during the 1980s.
Other
• Some critics of the USFS consider the ecological harm actuated by USFS
management of public lands so significant, that the status quo timber harvest rates
will not soon compensate for cumulative effects of past management.
• No participants in the court-ordered settlement agreement found it to be a fulfilling
or successful process.
• All participants in the BAR settlement felt they had “lost.”
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Appendix B

Select Laws: Abbreviations and Acronyms

APA

Administrative Procedure Act (1966)

ARA

Appeals Reform Act (1992)

ESA

Endangered Species Act (1973)

FLPMA

Federal Land Policy and Management Act (1976)

HFRA

Healthy Forest Restoration Act (2003)

Mont. Const.

Montana Constitution (1973)

MUSYA

Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act (1960)

NEPA

National Environmental Policy Act (1969)

NFMA

National Forest Management Act (1976)

OA

United States Forest Service Organic Act (1897)

RPA

Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act
(1974)

UMRA

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (1995)
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Appendix C

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADR

Alternative Dispute Resolution

BAER

Burned Area Emergency Recovery (Team)

BAR

Burned Area Recovery (Plan)

BIRT

Bitterroot Interagency Recovery Team

BBBF

Billions of Board Feet

BLM

Bureau of Land Management

BNF

Bitterroot National Forest

BR

Bitterroot Restoration

CEQ

President’s Council on Environmental Quality

CFR

Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
(Montana)

DEIS

Draft Environmental Impact Statement

EA

Environmental Assessment

EIS

Environmental Impact Statement

FEIS

Final Environmental Impact Statement

FWS

United States Fish and Wildlife Service

FOB

Friends of the Bitterroot

FONSI

Finding of No Significant Impact

LNF

Lolo National Forest

MMBF

Millions of Board Feet

NGO

Non-government Organization

NFN

Native Forest Network

NPS

National Park Service
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OHV

Off Highway Vehicle

ORV

Off Road Vehicle

PAC

Political Action Committee

ROD

Record of Decision

SAF

Society of American Foresters

SSF

Sula State Forest

USDA

United States Department of Agriculture

USFS

United States Forest Service

WUI

Wildland-Urban Interface
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